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This report comprises the results of research by the core members of
the Deception Research Group conducted at the Naval Postgraduate School
during 1979, This group began to meet regularly in January, 1979 to share
ideas and develop strategies for doing basic research on deception, a prob-
lem which we felt would be studied most efficiently from a number of per-
spectives simultaneously . In order to focus its efforts, the group decided
to study military deception rather than the related but more amorphous
political or diplomatic deception, and to concentrate on the strategic
rather than the tactical level.
Through reading, discussions, and the presentation of working papers
by members of the group, a body of hypotheses and assumptions evolved which
set boundaries for the problem to be worked. Individually or in collabora-
tion, the investigators then developed research projects which applied the
methods from their academic disciplines. Our intentions in this group re-
search effort were twofold: to advance our understanding of military stra-
tegic deception, and to test the potential for increasing the relevance
and comprehensiveness of research by examining a complex problem in a
multidisciplinary way.
SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES ON DECEPTION
Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L, Herbig
The four papers in this section analyze strategic deception from the
perspectives of history, political science, psychology, and organization
theory. The authors agree that investigation of military deception should
nove beyond the describing of incidents (many such descriptions now exist)
,
to comparison and generalization. In an effort to begin devising theories
of deception, they have examined examples from the recent past informed
by various insights into human behavior from the social sciences.
The introductory essay considers the issue in broad terms. It is
conceived as an analytical survey, based on historical evidence, which
formulates concepts useful for thinking further about deception. To de-
fine their subject rigorously the authors differentiate three distinct
but interrelated levels of meaning within the concept "deception." They
then distinguish two variants of deception which differ in their effects
on a target. Using these basic concepts, the essay considers how military
deceptions typically work, and what factors condition how likely and
how successful they will be. The essay reaches and attempts to resolve
a seemingly paradoxical conclusion: although deceivers face many uncon-
trollable contingencies which threaten their plans, deceptions almost
always result in advantages for those who attempt them. How a device
which would seem so delicate can produce such robust effects is partly
explained in terms of the constraints and motivations of each side in-
herent in situations of conflict.
Why deceptions usually succeed is addressed again in the second es-
say with psychological evidence on cognitive and perceptual biases in
huran judgment. By playing on these biases deceivers can take advantage
of their adversary's predictable limitations. The author holds, for ex-
ample, that preconceptions so strongly influence what people perceive
that deceptions which exploit preconceptions are extremely difficult to
escape. This is so even if the victim is alerted to the possibility of
deception; despite his suspicions he will still tend to favor his initial
hypotheses, to believe data that are consistent over those which are com-
plete, and to follow analogies which are familiar, not necessarily those
which are most accurate. Among its conclusions the essay suggests that
mechanisms to increase analysts' openness to new, discrepant information
are necessary to counter deception.
Countering deception is the focus of the third essay, which proposes
a new intellectual strategy to detect and avoid being deceived. Here the
purpose of deception is seen to be preventing the prediction of one's
true intentions by an adversary. The author postulates that strategic
deceptions are so complex, distinctive, and far-reaching in their results
that they constitute unique events. The method of prediction typical in
social science, statistical probability derived from many instances of the
same type, does not work for unique events. Instead, the author proposes
a prediction method based on a "principle of narration." This he derives
from the observed human tendency to automatically construct narratives
which causally link discrete stimuli and create meanings. If persons gifted
with "acumen," i.e., empathetic skill, analyze possible deceptive informa-
tion for its coherence into a logical, credible plot, the author predicts
greater success at identifying deception than with the current statistical
methods.
The fourth essay reinforces the view that strategic deceptions are
not a subject which provides data ideal for social scientific methods.
The author considers various ways of studying how deception might be ac-
complished using the characteristics of organizations as the point of
entry. The typical target of a strategic deception is not an individual,
but an intelligence organization which in turn influences a group of de-
cision-makers. The author asks two questions of his material: how does
the fact that the target is an organization lend itself to deception, and
how can the organization counter deception? He applies four current theories
from organizational literature: interaction networks, communications, in-
formation processing, and situational context. Each theory is found to
contribute clues about which factors are likely to prove important, but
all demand levels of empirical data deemed too rigorous to permit their
literal application to the deception problem.
Thus although approaches from social science used in these four es-
says have whittled down incongruities, sharpened concepts, and identified
patterns in masses of details, a streak of unpredictability eludes theories
of deception thus far. Whether it depends on the psychological qualities
of individuals, the complexities of the organizations they create, or the
uniqueness of events like strategic deceptions, this unpredicatability
tantalizes those who would explain it.
PROPOSITIONS ON MILITARY DECEPTION
Donald C. Daniel and Katherine L. Herbig
Military deception is an aspect of strategy and tactics which is
often used but seldom acknowledged even long after a conflict has ended.
The United States and Britain, for example, have only in the last few
years declassified files on their World War II deception activities.
Historians and military analysts have begun to reassess the war in light
of these new materials, but, with the exception of pioneering work by
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Barton Whaley and William R. Harris,^ there are as yet few systematic
investigations of this topic which would further development of theory.
We have studied military deceptions of the recent past, and we
wish in this paper to present concepts and propositions which would
serve as a basis for formulating a theory of deception. Our analysis
is divided into five sections dealing with the nature of deception,
its variants, its process, factors conditioning its likelihood, and
factors conditioning its success. We are primarily concerned with
strategic as opposed to tactical-level deceptions. The former affect
the outcome of wars or campaigns, the latter the outcome of battles or
small engagements. While there are differences between both, we believe
most of our conclusions apply to deceptions at either level, and in a
few instances we have used tactical examples where they seemed especial-
ly apt.
THE NATURE OF DECEPTION
In our view deception is the deliberate misrepresentation of
reality done to gain a competitive advantage. It will aid our
elaboration of this definition if the reader refers to Figure 1, which
illustrates how the broad concept of deception encompasses several sub-
sidiary ideas.
At the figure's core is cover, the military term for secret-keeping
and camouflage. Cover embodies deception's negative side, i.e., a keeping
of secrets by negating access to or withholding information. Cover is at
the center of deception because, no matter what his other goals, a decei-
ver wishes to protect the existence of some truth, be it knowledge of an
already existing reality, (e.g. the capabilities of a weapon) or an in-
tended reality (such as the scenario for the weapon's use).
The concept "lying" encompasses that of "cover." To lie is also to
withhold information, but it is something more as well: a liar acts to
deflect his victim away from the truth, and thus lying highlights decep-
tion's positive side. Liars create and perpetrate falsities and seek
to fasten a victim's attention to them. In the narrow sense, to lie
simply means making an untrue statement, but in a broader sense it can
also involve manipulating the context surrounding the statement in order
to enhance its veracity.-^ This is what we mean by artifice, an impor-
tant element of nearly all strategic deceptions.
Just as lying subsumes cover, so does deception subsume lying in
both of its senses. Although the terms are often used interchangeably,
deception and lying are not exact synonyms. Lying looks primarily to
one side of the interaction between a liar and his audience. It stresses
the actions of the teller of falsehoods. Deception is a term of wider
scope because it also stresses the reactions of the receiver of those
falsehoods. Someone whose false tale is not believed is still a liar,
Figure 1
Deception's Subsidiary Concepts
but he has not deceived. One does not fail at lying because the audi-
ence is not convinced, but one does fail at deception if the audience
does not believe the lie. Eventually almost all deceptions are exposed
as events unfold, but the trick for the deceiver is to insure his lies
are accepted long enough to benefit him.
The question of benefits is important because they are a necessary
ingredient of deception as we see it. In our view, to be labeled de-
ception an act must be done to gain a competitive advantage. This means,
in effect, that there are three goals in any deception. The immediate
aim is to condition a target's beliefs; the intermediate aim is to in-
fluence his actions; and the ultimate aim is for the deceiver to benefit
from the target's actions. Deceptions are often credited with success
when only the first goal is achieved, but to evaluate the actual impact
deception has on the course of events, its success should properly be
measured against the third goal.
TWO VARIANTS OF DECEPTION
We distinguish two variants of deception which produce somewhat
different effects and operate in different ways. The less elegant vari-
ety, termed "ambiguity-increasing" or "A-type," confuses a target in
order that he be unsure as to what to believe. It seeks to compound the
uncertainties confronting any state's attempt to determine its adversary's
wartime intentions. Contradictory indicators, missing data, fast-moving
events, time-lags between data-collection and analysis, chance—all in
hibit accurate intelligence assessments. Intelligence analysts work on
the assumption, however, that as an adversary moves toward his true
operational goal, his preparations to do so will serve as tip-offs
clarifying his intent. What A-type deceptions seek to insure is that
the level of ambiguity always remains high enough to protect the secret
of the actual operation.
In order to have an impact, A-type deceptions require that the de-
ceiver's lies be plausible enough and consequential enough to the tar-
get's well-being that he cannot ignore them. Hoping to reduce uncer-
tainty by awaiting additional information, a target may delay decision,
thereby giving the deceiver wider latitude to marshal resources and take
or retain the initiative. If the deceiver can insure that the situa-
tion remains ambiguous, then the target may be forced to spread re-
sources thinly in order to cover all important contingencies. He there-
by reduces the resistance the deceiver can expect at any one point.
Plan Bodyguard is a familiar World War II example containing numer-
ous A-type deceptions. In support of the Normandy invasion, one of the
plan's main goals was to prevent the Germans from shifting their forces
from other European fronts to reinforce the Channel coast. The deceiv-
ers proposed to meet this challenge by mounting a coordinated series of
deceptive invasion threats to Scandinavia, western and southern France,
Italy, and in the eastern Mediterranean. 5 Some threats proved more plau-
sible than others to the Germans but the multiple threats did increase
ambiguity. Hitler and his generals were forced to consider a much great-
er range of possibilities than just the obvious assault across the Eng-
lish Channel, and this contributed to their holding in Norway and the
c
Balkans forces better needed in France."
Plan Barclay
,
the deception plan for the 1943 invasion of Sicily,
intended to generate ambiguity about the timing of impending action
as well as its location. The British raised the specter of invading
plausible Mediterranean targets other than Sicily and then simulated
two laborious postponements of the fake invasions. Subsequent German
testimony suggests there was confusion about both where and when to ex-
pect an attack.
In contrast to deceptions increasing ambiguity, there is a se-
cond more complicated category which we label the "misleading" or "M-
type." They reduce ambiguity by building up the attractiveness of one
wrong alternative. They cause a target to concentrate his_ operational
resources on a single contingency, thereby maximizing the deceiver's
chances for prevailing in all others.
A striking example of an M-type deception is Barbarossa , the Ger-
man campaign to mislead Stalin and achieve surprise in their attack of
22 June 1941. By making their build-up along the Russian border ap-
pear to be an exercise linked to the invasion of Britain, the Germans
created a plausible explanation for preparations which could not be
hidden. The deception also built on Stalin's expectation that Germany
would never attack Russia without first issuing an ultimatum. This
"ultimatum stratagem," according to Whaley, "served to eliminate am-
biguity, making Stalin quite certain, very decisive, and wrong ."
The overwhelming surprise achieved against the Russian defenses was
a measure of how thoroughly Stalin had been misled.
Fortitude South is another well-known example. The Allies sought
to portray the Normandy landings as preliminary to a much larger in-
vasion at Pas de Calais. They did this by simulating troop concentra-
tions in southeast England and orchestrating a symphony of agent's re-
ports, rumors, and aerial bombing. Miscalculating badly, the Germans
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fatally postponed reinforcing the Normandy front. For a remarkable six
weeks after D-Day, powerful Wehrmacht and Waff en SS forces remained in
the Calais area preparing to repel an invasion which was never intended.
Although the two variants of deception, M-type and A-type, are con-
ceptually distinct and can be initiated with different intentions in
the deceiver's mind, in practice their effects often coexist or shade
into one another as the deception evolves. In the latter case the direc-
tion of change generally appears to be from M-type to A-type. Deceptions
planned to mislead a target into choosing one possibility may degenerate
and instead increase ambiguity if the target resists or postpones making
the choice the deceiver intends.
How one categorizes a particular deception partly depends on the
perspective one takes. The variants can differ whether viewed from the
deceiver's intentions or from the effect they ultimately have on the tar-
get. Strategic deceptions seem to be most often intended to mislead,
since this form offers the largest potential payoff to the deceiver.
However, one would expect pure misleading deceptions to obtain rarely
because they require a target to be so sure of a false alternative that
he stakes all on preparing for it. Prudent commanders seldom do this.
They develop contingency preparations for other conceivable alternatives.
Thus it may be most useful to consider the outcomes of the two variants
as a continuum between convinced misdirection at the one pole and utter
confusion, in which all looks equally likely, at the other. The Bar-
barossa deception seems to be an unusually strong example of misdirec-
tion, while immediately before D-Day Fortitude South would fall per-
haps three-fourths of the way toward the misdirection pole. In the
latter case, although quite sure the main attack would come at Calais,
11
hitler and most German generals continued to consider a range of in-
vasion site possibilities along the channel. German forces, though con-




THE PROCESS OF DECEPTION
In order to understand the process of deception, it is necessary
to differentiate the categories of actors typically found on both sides
of the interaction. Figure 2 adapts the traditional systems model to
illustrate these categories and their relationships.
The deceiver's side consists of decision-makers, planners, and im-
plementers. Regardless of who had the inspiration, a deception does not
begin until a decision-maker agrees to it. Wide-ranging strategic de-
ceptions such as Bodyguard are cleared only by the highest authorities.
Having many responsibilities, they are unable to devote much time to
planning and implementation. During World War II such tasks were as-
signed to small cadres in intelligence-gathering and covert action
organizations as well as military staffs.^ These groups were often not
a normal part of the civilian or military bureaucracy but rather, like
the famous London Controlling Section, were specially formed during
the war and disbanded or severely cut back at its conclusion. On an
as-needed basis, ir^lementers temporarily coopted regular military per-
sonnel who generated false radio traffic, set up deceptive camouflage,
1
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simulated large troop movements or encampments and the like. National
political leaders, high level diplomats, civil servants, businessmen,




























The Process of Deception
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The initial target of a military deception is usually a state's
intelligence organization. It consists of channel monitors who seek
out and collect information and analysts who coordinate and evaluate
it. Gatekeepers within intelligence agencies and command staffs
screen the information and analyses, and determine what is actually
forwarded to civilian or military authorities— the ultimate deception
targets. Presumably relying on information received, these leaders
make the strategic or tactical decisions which the deceivers seek to
influence.
It is the links between deceivers anc targets which makes de-
ception possible. Designated as "channels" in Figure 2, their variety
is unlimited. A channel could be a foreign newspaper monitored by
the target, his reconnaissance satellites, electronic intercept systems,
diplomats, or spies. Through these channels the deceiver transmits
signals, planted clues or pieces of evidence, which it is hoped the
target will shape into indicators of the deceiver's intent or capa-
bilities. A signal iday be a paragraph in a news article on the activi-
ties of a general, a reduction in the level of military radio traffic,
or a photo of ships offloading cargo. Taken together, e.g, these may
indicate to a target that an expected amphibious attack will not
soon occur since the general expected to lead it is away on other busi-
ness, radio traffic is too sparse to indicate increasing activity, and
ships preparing to carry out an impending attack usually on-load rather
than off-loa^ goods.
A deception expert has compared his task of formulating and trans-
mitting signals to the work of a playwright. Each devises a story and
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seeks to put it across to an audience by means of "scenery, props,
costumes, principals, extras, dialogue, and sound effects."-"-^ In order
to have the story unfold in the intended manner, each must coordinate
the timing, tempo, and content of his signals.
Though similar in many ways, the problems facing the military de-
ceiver are more acute than those of the playwright. One reason is that
the deceiver cannot assume that his audience is attending only to his
production. He must accept that high level target leaders have numer-
ous responsibilities forcing them to divide their attention among numer-
ous "shows". lie must also accept that what a target knows about any
situation is not restricted to what the deceiver is telling him. In
other words, the deceiver is putting on a show but he does not fully
control the number of actors on stage or all the lines being said. Few
targets can be expected to be as accommodating as Stalin during the
Barbarossa deception. Refusing to consider the possibility of a German
attack, he threatened to silence forever one of his agents correctly
predicting it.-'
A second reason why the deceiver's problems are more acute is
that his production is being staged at some remove from his audience.
At times it may only dimly perceive what is going on. Hence, the de-
ceiver must be very sensitive to the prospect that some of his signals
may not make it through to the target in the intended manner and that,
if they do, they may not be interpreted as he would wish. Figures
3 and 4 depict the difficulties he faces. Figure 3 illustrates the
story of a deception as a puzzle made up of eight signals, the puzzle's
pieces. The deceiver desires the target to receive each of them,
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the picture on the puzzle's face. Figure 4 illustrates what can hap-
pen to the signals during transmission and interpretation. The tri-
angles on the deceiver's side reproduce signal number 1 in the top
left corner of Figure 3. If the target has properly received and in-
terpreted the signal, an identical triangle appears on his side. This
is possibility A of Eigure 4. It represents the deceiver's fondest
hope. In contrast, possibility B is a signal which was garbled or
modified in the channel after it left the deceiver. Hence the target
received a signal different from that which was transmitted (symbolized
by the square). C and D represent signals monitored intact, but the
former was misinterpreted (shown as the triangle within a circle) and
the latter dismissed(illustrated as a triangle thrown out from the
target's side). Finally, E is a signal sent but never received by the
target; perhaps the deceiver was inept in its transmission, or the
target happened not to be "listening," or chance in its many forms in-
tervened to deflect the signal away.
One would think from the above discussion of a deceiver's pro-
lems that deceptions should seldom succeed. In fact our research leads
us to conclude that the opposite is true. Targets, after all, are
normally searching eagerly for indicators of enemy intent and, if the
enemy is a deceiver, he is just as eager to provide his foe with in-
dicators, albeit false ones. Hence it should not be surprising that,
if properly transmitted and designed to be highly salient to a tar-
get's concerns, many signals reach the target largely unscathed. Un-
less his intelligence organization is inept, they are monitored and
evaluated for their significance as indicators, and their underlying
story (or a variant of it) usually rises to the surface. In the end
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the story may be dismissed, but only after it has at least been con-
sidered.
Finally, the direction of signals in a deception is not neces-
sarily always from deceiver to target. There may be return channels
from the latter to the former. This is the feedback loop shown in
Figure 2. The deceiver can thereby modulate his activities if time al-
lows. In a successful deception, of course, the target is not aware
that his actions and statements constitute feedback for a deceiver.
Should the target realize it, the stage is set for a further permuta-
tion in the deception process, entrapment of the deceiver by his vic-
tim. By using the feedback channels to send deceptive signals to his
enemy, the target becomes the deceiver and the deception channels be-
come feedback for this new layer of deception.
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE LIKELIHOOD OF DECEPTION
Two groups of factors influence the likelihood of military deception:
those which characterize situations confronting an actor and those which
actors bring to a situation by virtue of previous conditioning or personal
predilection. The factors may operate independently or in combination with
one another. It is difficult to establish a priori which group is more im-
portant, but the second set probably has greater impact.
Of the first group, high stakes situations can certainly influence
willingness to deceive. When outcomes are critical, adversaries are en-
couraged to make use of every capability, every advantage, to insure vic-
tory or stave off defeat. 1°
Resort to deception can be particularly compelling if decision-makers
are not fully confident of a situation's outcome because of their own
18
military weaknesses. Desiring to compensate for them, they seek through
some ruse to induce an enemy to lower his guard, dilute his strength, or
concentrate his forces on the wrong objective. Plans Bodyguard and Barclay ,
e.g., both reflected the concern that, until a beachhead is secured, am-
phibious landings are highly vulnerable to being pushed back into the sea.
From the attacker's perspective, it is thus imperative to assure that the
defender's response capability be as limited as possible. Weaker in mecha-
nized forces, Hitler similarly wanted to limit Allied response to Case Yel-
low
,
the May 1940 push into France. He convinced the Allies that his main
thrust would be through Holland and Belgium. While the British and French
massed in that direction, the Wehrmacht's primary offensive was actually
far to the south at Sedan. It then turned toward the channel encircling
the cream of the Allied armies. The Dunkirk evacuation meant that the bulk
of these would fight again, but for France the war was lost.
Even when optimistic of the outcome of a situation, an actor may be
attracted to deception as one way to lower costs. The wish to avoid being
viewed as an aggressor has inspired many a nation to fabricate evidence that
its victim actually fired the first shot. The wish to avoid human or ma-
terial losses has resulted in schemes such as the British plan in 1943 to
protect their bombers attacking Peenemunde. Though confident this German
rocket facility could be destroyed, the British sought to minimize their
own casualties. They succeeded in deflecting German fighters from their
bomber streams by convincing the enemy's air defense that Berlin was the
target instead. 18
Situations characterized by uncertainty can also induce deception.
In those circumstances, actors often seek to mislead or confuse in order
to keep their options open and to test the reaction to alternative policies.
19
A state undecided as to whether to attack another, for instance, may still
wish to be ready to do so. This was the case prior to the last-minute
Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia. Having its troops "exercise"
in border areas for the greater part of the summer allowed the USSR to pro-
ceed with preparations for an invasion while not openly committing itself
to this step. It also allowed the Soviets to save face if they decided
not to attack. After all, the Czechs might have backed down, making attack
unnecessary, or they might have rallied the overwhelming support of the
19
world community, making the invasion option even more unattractive.
In any of these situations, not all states or individuals would re-
sort to deception. Actors bring their own conditioned responses, their own
predilections, to the problems they face. We see at least five factors pos-
sibly at play here.
First, there may be "deception styles" which vary from culture to cul-
ture that would account for the differences in when and how nations use de-
ception. The intriguing thought that some societies' values or expected
modes of personal interaction condition individuals to understand and suc-
ceed at deception is to our knowledge largely unexplored.
Scott Boorman in his work on the Chinese does suggest that deception
has traditionally been part of Chinese military strategy because it is so
available in the cultural norms. The Chinese assume interpersonal de-
ception will and should occur constantly between individuals as a means
20
of protecting face by deflecting too-threatening truths. Since at
least the doctrines of Sun Tzu in the fourth century B.C., the Chinese
have long prized victories gained by undermining through deception
an adversary's desire or ability to give battle. * The potential link
between a culture's expectation for interpersonal truthfulness or
20
deceptiveness and that culture's resort to military deception is not
yet well formed, but it remains suggestive. For example, does a country
like the United States, with a culture noted for the openness, even the
naivete of its interpersonal interactions, find strategic deception un-
9 9
congenial to its habitual ways of thinking?^
It is conceivable that by studying cultural norms we may learn to
predict how nations will employ deception in military contexts. Harris
begins such an analysis by comparing national patterns in the deceptive
practices of the Soviets and the Chinese. He describes the Soviets' use
of the "false war scare" to overawe opponents, their penchant for "dis-
information," and their efforts to induce overestimation of their military
capabilities. This contrasts with the Chinese preference for the "deep
lure," the multiple stratagem, and the anticipation of the enemy's in-
23tentions through acumen. His work suggests that by expanding systematic
comparison of national "deception styles," we may isolate patterns that
could alert counter-deception analysts sooner to the deceptive ploys of
a particular culture.
Herbert Goldhamer suggests a second conditioning factor. He contends
that deception may be more common in states where political leaders take a
strong, central role in military decision. His argument implies that
politics either attracts individuals prone to deception or conditions
individuals to practice it. As a corollary to nis general argument,
he adds that a tendency to deceive is particularly prevalent in dictator-
ships and authoritarian regimes. He reasons that the "secrecy and total
control available [in these governments], and the reduced inhibitions that
accompany such exercise of power, facilitate and provide incentives for the
exercise of craft, cunning, and deception. "^
21
Paralleling Goldhamer's perspective are two closely related fac-
tors. One is the bureaucratic imperative that organizations trained for
particular tasks will seek to perforin them. The other is the psychologi-
cal trait that people tend to think in terms of what is available or fami-
liar to them. ^ These phenomena suggest that military deception is likely
to occur if a nation maintains an apparatus to plan and organize deception,
or if its military preserves, passes on, or at least debates a doctrine
for deception. Conversely, nations having no such apparatus or doctrine,
or which allow them to atrophy, must overcome the inertia involved in
creating or revivifying them—a situation characteristic of America's
early strategic deception efforts in World War Two.
Finally, there is the issue of a person's own predilection to decep-
tion. It is clear that even within the same cultural or organizational
setting, individuals differ in this regard. Some leaders relish deception,
others put up with it, still others resist it. Why this is so remains
largely unexplored. Whaley searched his historical data for evidence of
a "deceptive personality type," a group of attributes or experiences that
would account for these differences, but could find none. At present we
must be content to observe that personal reactions to deception are at least
self-consistent. That is, a commander who has appreciated and relied on
deception in the past is likely to do so again. Churchill was an early pro-
ponent of deception in World War I and encouraged its elaboration again twenty
years later; Douglas MacArthur used serial deceptions in his campaign across
the Pacific, and succeeded with it again at Inch'on. In following the good
advice to "know thy enemy," a nation might be well served to evaluate its
opponent's experience with deception.
22
FACTORS CONDITIONING THE SUCCESS OF DECEPTION
The succesof a deception can be evaluated in a variety of ways,
none of them precise. One can consider how well the deception was im-
plemented: were the activities outlined in the scenario carried out
according to plan? Even at this narrow level defining success must be
relative, since one characteristic of the most effective deceptions is
that they adapt to changing circumstances and thus depart from the
original plan. To evaluate the plan itself one must sort out the im-
pact of deception activities on the target from the other influences
affecting him. First, did he adopt the false understanding the de-
ceiver intended? And secondly, did he act on the basis of that under-
standing in ways contrary to his true interest? Usually it is impos-
sible to recover precisely the relative weight deception had in tipping
the scales of a decision. As in most problems of historical evaluation,
evidence on the priorities assigned in a decision is often lacking.
Unfortunately for students of strategic deception, what seems to us
as the two most common types of deceptions are also the most intract-
able to evaluate. Misleading deceptions which reinforce what a target
believes, and ambiguity-increasing deceptions which multiply the op-
tions a target must consider, both build on what already exists. Would
the target have continued undisturbed in his (false) expectations with-
out the deceiver's reinforcement? Would his existing ambiguity have
been enough to cause delay and confusion without the deceiver's add-
ing more? One cannot know for sure.
A higher level of evaluation asks one to consider what impact the
target's adverse actions
»
prompted to some degree by deception, had on
the outcome of the encounter itself. What military and political
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consequences flowed from it? For example, what degree of importance
should we assign to deception in the results of the invasion of Sicily
or Normandy compared to force levels, or weaponry, or generalship?
Would the English have bounced back more quickly from the Blitz had
they escaped the delusion that Hitler's Operation Sea Lion
,
a deception
which called for an invasion of Britain, was true? Would the Israelis
have rested secure in their (false) assessment of Arab intentions to
attack in 1973 even without the deceptive signals of calm planted for
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their benefit? Perhaps, but since deception did play a role in these
cases, historians who will wrestle with them cannot escape the delicate
task of reaching some tentative evaluation of it.
Two recently declassified documents provide an interesting start-
ing point for discussing factors conditioning success. They reveal
that experienced deceivers on either side of the conflict during the
Second World War arrived at similar conclusions about how to succeed
at deception. Comparing these two examples of "lessons learned," one
British, one German, helps focus on the basic requirements for success.
In September 1944, a deception planner working with the Supreme
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF)
,
produced a top-secret
report for the Allies on cover and deception procedures. His conclu-
sions reflected "four years of successful [deception] operations by the
British." Six years later General Hans von Grieffenberg, a German in-
fantry officer, wrote a review of German experience with cover and de-
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ception. Both of these documents are intriguing, and there is con-
siderable agreement between them.
Since the authors were writing to instruct future deception planners
in "the basics," they prescribed formulae for success in simple terms,
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avoiding qualifying or conditional statements. We will use their pre-
scriptions as a foil against which to develop and, in some cases,
elaborate our thoughts on successful deceptions. The documents provide
us with three useful categories: 1) secrecy, organization and coordina-
tion; 2) plausibility and confirmation; and 3) adaptability. We add a
fourth, the predispositions of the target, and a fifth, factors in the
strategic situation.
Secrecy, Organization and Coordination
Both the SHAEF planner and Von Grieffenberg strongly agree that
"knowledge that cover and deception is [sic] being employed must be
denied the enemy." (Emphasis in all quotes in original.) "If the
strictest secrecy is not observed," says Von Grieffenberg, "all decep-
tion projects . . . are condemned to failure from the very start."
Deceiving one's own troops for the sake of security, he adds, is a
normal byproduct of deception.
Consistent with these admonitions, both individuals argue that
deception must be well-organized and well-coordinated, else leaks may
occur and the deception unravel. They are well-organized when there is
"detailed preparation" where even "seeming trifles are not overlooked."
They are well-coordinated when directed from one central point—that
being the highest headquarters controlling operational forces directly
benefitting from the deception.
In one sense these prescriptions are obvious. By definition,
secrecy is inherent to deception, and organization and coordination
are inherent to the success of any but the most simple endeavors. Yet
total security is an elusive, usually unachievable goal even in the
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best organized and coordinated operations. Close study of preparations
for strategic operations such as the attack on Pearl Harbor or the in-
vasion of Russia in 1941 show numerous warnings and indications slipping
7 Qthrough Draconian security efforts. The relationships between deception
and security would seem to be more complex than our experts acknowledge.
There are two levels of security involved in a deception. One
tries to protect the truth about what a side intends to do in an im-
pending operation. For example, if the operational plan calls for
landings at Dakar, and the related deception plans try to make it ap-
pear there will be landings on the coast of Norway or in the Middle
East instead, trying to keep the actual intentions about Dakar secret
is obviously important. The second level of security tries to protect
the truth about the existence of the deception itself, to prevent the
target's certainty that some identified possibilities are deceptive and
may thus be safely ruled out.
Breaches of security at either level, commonly referred to as leaks,
need not be fatal to deception's success. Some leaks may not catch the
target's attention, and if they do, may only increase his ambiguity.
A target's predispositions may cause other leaks to be ignored or
misinterpreted as to their true significance. For example, Whaley's
study of the Barbarossa campaign shows how "leaky" the strict German
security became as the invasion approached; without damaging
deception or the surprise achieved, literally dozens of clues of
German intentions reached the Russians. Indeed, since Stalin apparent-
ly explained away all warnings as provocation by the Allies, here leaks
on
actually furthered the deception.
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There is reason to argue that the "bigger" the leak, the less
likely the target will believe it since it seems too good to be true.
One survey of ten such "windfalls" reaching an adversary, half of them
true and half deceptive plants, found that all deceptive leaks were
accepted, perhaps because the deceivers made sure it was plausible that
such valuable information was lost. Four of the five genuine windfalls
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were discounted as too blatant to be anything but plants. The wind-
fall cases illustrate that, even when a target suspects deception,
his position is not necessarily improved. Ke must still decide which
of two or more alternative scenarios is the truth.
Since leaks are an inevitable concomitant of strategic deceptions
and often result from mistakes in the organization and coordination
our experts from World War II recommend, we suggest that a more power-
ful predictor of deception success is plausibility.
Plausibility and Confirmation of the Lie
The SHAEF and Von Grieffenberg documents present a number of
principles to the effect that the lie must be plausible. They also im-
ply that is must be serious; that is, the deceiver's scenario must not only
be one which could conceivably happen, but also one which seems ominous
enough, and likely enough, to provoke the target to forestall it. To
achieve this, they recommend that the lie be woven into a skein of truth
and confirmed by more than one source. As Von Grieffenberg put it, the
deception "must be brought into harmony with the overall situation ." His
SHAEF counterpart insisted that an "enemy will not react to information
from a single source . He will react only on information from one source
confirmed by at least one other."
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Our work leads us to agree with the above propositions. As we see
it, a very important factor in establishing plausibility is the de-
ceiver's capability, as perceived by the target, to do what the lie
commits him to do . A deception is doomed to fail if a target is too
highly skeptical about the deceiver's capabilities. During the sum-
mer and fall of 1943, for example, the Allies tried a series of strate-
gic deceptions, with the overall code name Cockade . to simulate a cross-
channel invasion of France for early September. German response proved
disappointing: the Luftwaffe did not rise to the bait and avoided the
needless and costly air battles the deceivers had hoped their false in-
vasion would provoke. The Werhmacht did not reinforce the French coast
to brace for invasion; the slow drainage of German forces to the Eastern
front continued. German intelligence had felt that "the resources
available in GREAT BRITAIN are insufficient to permit any attempt to
invade the continent this summer." The British learned a lesson which
they applied the following year in Fortitude : while they only had 35
to 40 divisions available for a cross-channel invasion, they built up a
notional force of twice that number to convince the Germans that they
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really could strike at Calais.
A lie is made more plausible when it has been confirmed by a variety
of credible sources. The need for confirmation is a quality most
people develop from their experience with the complexities of reality:
truth, albeit partial, is seen to emerge from numerous points, some of
them contradictory, some veiled, some obvious. The usual targets of
deceptions, intelligence organizations, accentuate this issue by de-
manding that all claims be confirmed and evidence evaluated and ranked
according to its estimated reliability. The number of sources confirm-
ing a fact and the credibility of the sources are both important, and
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their effects interact.
Given the expectation that an array of mutually supportive clues
is likely to be true, the more channels of information a deceiver can
manipulate to send signals which reinforce one another, the more cred-
ible his deception. Conversely, if he can control most of the target's
channels of information, such as his double agents, the deceiver lessens
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his adversary's access to disconfirming evidence. The latter is often
as important for a deception's success as the former, since the best-
orchestrated chorus of many reinforcing clues will be questioned if even
a few voices sing off-key loud enough. In the Mediterranean and in
northern Africa, for example, the British deception teams could never
count on complete control over German channels of information. There
independent German agents persisted, sending back observations and
hearsay irrespective of the British deceivers. This made deception more
difficult, less precise, and more unpredictable than was achieved in
England, where the island's isolation, the turning of the whole German
spy network, and the decline of German air reconnaissance allowed almost
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complete control.
Credibility of sources can be as important as their number. In-
telligence analysts rank information by how credible its source is;
they pay most attention to reliable sources, and a few of these may
outweigh many questionable ones. The deceiver's knowledge of his
target will shape how he establishes the credibility of the channels
he controls. What seems credible to him may not seem credible to the
target since cultural perceptions can intervene in this judgment, and
it is the target's skepticism the deceiver must allay.
Credibility itself is a relative judgment that shifts with cir-
cumstances. When one has no better available sources, those which
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do exist often seem better than an objective evaluation would war-
rant. The Germans placed heavy reliance on their agents in England dur-
ing World War II in part because they had so few other choices. It seemed
to the British who ran the double agent system that the Germans forgave
their agents egregious errors rather than consider that they might have
been turned. The spymasters in Germany were paid according to how well
their particular agents performed, a mercenary incentive which further
undermined their skeptical evaluation of sources. On the other hand,
knowing that a whole agent system could be turned, since they were doing
it, did not prevent the British from being deceived by the Germans in
just this way. For several years the Abwehr ran all the Allied agents
in Holland using radio communications
.
Knitting the deception into many strands of truth is another part
of providing the target with confirmation. By meshing many of the less-
critical ooints of a deception scenario with the real plans, a deceiver
assures that the target can verify these details as they occur. As more
of the elements in an evolving explanation are confirmed, the target is
likely to ignore, twist, or explain away those details which do not fit,
and often these are the crucial incongruities on which the deception hinges.
The British deception teams learned this early in the war. Evaluating
their deception efforts for Operation Torch , the invasion of North
Africa, they found that their scheme to explain the build-up on Gibralter
as reinforcement for Malta rather than an invasion force "went well,"
while threats to more distant destinations, Norway and northern France,
proved unconvincing. According to J.C. Masterman, this "underlined the
obvious fact that cover stories ought to be as near the 'real thing'
as was safely possible. "-*° One deception expert estimated that deception
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scenarios should be 80 to 90 percent true. He thereby highlighted a
paradoxical quality of deception. While Churchill may have correctly de-
fined it as the protection of truth by a "bodyguard of lies," the execu-
tion of deception requires the protection of its lies by a bodyguard of
truth.
Adaptability of Deception
Von Grieffenberg argues that deceivers should take advantage of any
opportunities which arrive by chance. Implied in his agrument is the
proposition that the success of deception is enchanced if the deceiver
adapts to changing circumstances and unplanned events. This proposition
n
is a logical extension of ealrier statements that the lie must be plau-
sible and woven into a skein of truth. As the truth changes, so must the
deception if the lie is to remain believable. Otherwise the divergence
will expose the lie.
Von Grief fenberg's emphasis on uplanned opportunities is well chosen.
Their "chance" nature can help make it difficult for a target to suspect
that they may be part of a deception scheme. For example, Hitler achieved
complete surprise in his attack on Russia in 1941 because Stalin expected
to receive an ultimatum of German demands before any action was taken.
Given Hitler's previous behavior before invading Czechoslovakia and Po-
land, this expectation was shared by many knowledgeable observers through-
out the world. Yet of all the many ploys the Germans launched to deceive
the Russians about their intention to attack, this ultimatum expectation,
apparently the most effective deceptive clue of all, seems to have been
spontaneously generated by the churning international rumor mill. Hitler
then cleverly picked up and reinforced this useful fiction in his decep-
tion campaign. ° Similarly, the Allies expected their Fortitude decep-
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tion to play out quickly after the size of the Normandy invasion became
clear. As the days passed and evidence mounted that the Germans held to
their expectations for a second invasion at Calais, the opportunity to
spin out the deception, using Patton's fictional forces as a threat,
was seized and milked for nearly two months, aiding the consolidation
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of the Normandy beachhead.
The ultimate asset which allows deceivers to adapt their scenarios
in these ways is feedback from the target. Accurate intelligence on what
the adversary is intending and how he is reacting is one of the basic
goals in any competition, but for deception it has particular importance.
This is because the crucial effect for which deception aims occurs in
the inaccessible mind of the opponent. For his miscalculations to produce
actions beneficial to the deceiver, the latter ideally should be able to
monitor how his opponent's ideas are evolving in response to the deceptive
clues provided by him. Feedback allow deceptions to continue for a longer
time, to take advantage of unexpected interpretations or unforseen events
in the enemy camp, and to protect valuable resources by ending the ploy
should the deception wear thin.
Since trusting one's feedback presents deceivers with the same evalua-
tion problem that the target faces— is this information reliable, or part
of a counter deception?— the most valuable kinds of feedback are obtained
through cryptanalysis, espionage, or other covert means. Such methods
can bring the deceiver into the inner sanctum of high-level adversary
thinking and decisionmaking. Revelations of the British achievement in
securing feedback for their deceptions through ULTRA have recently fo-
cused attention on the importance feedback can have. Decoding relevant
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ULTRA messages fast enough to gain operational advantage was a "knife-
edge business," as Lewin says, but as a source of insight about how
Hitler and his staff were responding to deception it was unparalleled
•
John Bevan, "controller" of British deception, gave ULTRA full credit
for enabling them to sustain their more complicated deception scenarios. ^
Target Predispositions
Unaccountably, neither the SHAEF nor Von Grieffenberg reports advised
potential deceivers to make use of a target's predispositions, yet this
factor seems undeniably significant. Certainly deceptions which slant
the target's mind-set in directions he is predisposed to take have a
higher probability of convincing him than those which run against the
grain of his expectations and assumptions. Conventional wisdom is sup-
ported by experimental psychology on this point: the stronger his pre-
dispositions, (especially if he explicitly commits himself to them), the
more a target will ignore or twist information inconsistent with them.
When an adversary knows the other's predispositions, he may well
choose to do the unexpected. The deceiver's task then becomes providing
clues which reinforce these predispositions while minimizing or dis-
crediting clues which contradict them. He can assume the target will do
much of this work for him, however, since experiments have repeatedly
shown the strong impact of expectations on perceptions and judgment.
Thus the target acts as an unwitting but cooperative victim, and the dis-
tinction between perpetrated deception and "self-deception" narrows.
This is Roberta Wohlstetter 's point in a recent article. She considers
examples of policy makers seeing what they devoutly wished to see, rather
than what was there. For example, the United States accepted the Indian
government's repeated bland assurances that its nuclear research was
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aimed at peaceful uses because this "transparent cover" allowed nuclear
sales to continue; when the Indians then exploded a nuclear weapon, they
blew away the U.S. self-imposed blinders about India's goals. ^
Determination of an adversary's expectations may be direct or in-
direct, through inference. Close study of an enemy's habits of thought
and preoccupations provides one means, as when the Allies repeatedly
played to Hitler's known fear of a Balkan invasion. Intelligence
sources provide others, such as ULTRA or the analysis of German questions
to their agents in England, which revealed the patterns of their concerns. -*
Often just the indirect means of studying the strategic situation
will reveal the adversary's expectations clearly enough. It was strate-
gically almost inevitable that the Allies would eventually invade across
the English channel; it was also fairly clear to both sides in 1942 that after
the North African victories the next Allied target should be Sicily and
the Italian Peninsula. These "realities," which are in part a reflection
of the strategic doctrines available to both sides in a given period, set
bounds on what can be made to seem plausible in a deception, and define
what an opponent will probably be expecting to happen.
However, the case of Sicily illustrates a different problem. Here
the Allies wanted to invade precisely where the Germans expected them to;
(as Churchill said," anybody but a damn' fool would know it is Sicily,")
so the task for deception was to change the target's mind enough so he
expected attack somewhere else, or at least at several other points in-
stead of one.^° This provoked the famous Mincemeat ruse using the corpse
of a notional courier to plant false plans pointing to an attack on Sar-
dinia. The windfall, when backed up with additional rumors and signs
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pointing to several other targets, led to a dilution of German forces
on Sicily and confusion about where and when the attack would come.
Experimental psychology tends to support the likelihood of Mincemeat 's
success. In experiments done to isolate the factors which lead someone
to change his mind, results were best when subjects were confronted with
a large amount of information which contradicted their expectations, and
when they received this information all at once or in a short period of
time. The information must also be credible and salient to t the_prohlem.
In our example, Hitler saw and initialed the German intelligence report
on the Mincemeat courier's documents and altered his orders immediately
thereafter to reflect this information. 4y He illustrates how only
with a considerable and concentrated shock to his comfortable assump-
tions will the target consider giving them up and changing his mind in the
direction the deceiver intends.
Examples of deceptions which successfully played on a target's pre-
dispositions are much more numerous than those which reversed a target's
expectations. This suggests that the former are the norm and the latter
are exceptions. How readily one can change a target's mind seems to de-
pend in part on the pressures his environment exerts for making decisions.
Experimental psychologists suggest the seemingly paradoxical proposition
that if a target can be influenced to adopt a vigilant posture, chances
increase that he can be convinced to change his beliefs. Why this hap-
pens requires distinguishing three emotional states associated with
making important decisions.
The first of these is relaxation: an individual feels no tension be-
cause no such decision is required of him. The second is that of moderate
tension, or vigilance: some tension arises from the need for a decision,
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but it remains moderate as long as the individual believes he has adequate
time to evaluate alternatives before deciding on one. The third state is
high tension, or rigidity. Here the individual feels great stress because
time seems inadequate to properly evaluate alternatives.
Psychologists argue that individuals are most apt to follow their pre-
dispositions in either the first or the third emotional states: when they
are relaxed, or when they are very tense. In the first case, facing no
important decision, the individual sees no disadvantage in giving head
to his predispositions. Pressed for important decisions in a hurry, on
the other hand, individuals fall prey to "selective exposure," defined
by Janis and Mann as an "active search and preference for supportive
"Siinformation and avoidance of discrepant information. •> -L In other words,
the target sees what he consciously or subconsciously chooses to see.
It is the second state of moderate tension, or vigilance, that elicits
responses most likely to overcome predispositions. Vigilance is here de-
fined as:
a discriminating and open-minded interest in both supportive




[T]he vigilant decision-maker will actually pre-
fer to obtain nonsupportive messages in order to satisfy his
need for specific information about the losses he might incur. -^
Deceivers who need to change someone's mind should thus choose as their
entry point this open-minded interest in contradictions of the vigilant
decision-maker. A target confronting a potential decision with enough
time can be expected to seek out, consider, and possibly accept informa-
tion he would otherwise be likely to ignore or reject. A vigilant target
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may still consider and then reject a deceiver's slanted evidence, but
faced with either more or less pressure for a decision, he might never
seriously consider it at all.
A third mode for handling a target's predispositions lies open to
deceivers: instead of capitalizing on or reversing existing expectations,
deceivers may wish to create certain expectations. Here the deceiver sets
up the target for a future surprise by conditioning him to expect some-
thing he hadn't considered before. Often these deceptions rely on creat-
ing the comforting illusion that the deceiver follows certain standard
operating procedures which the target comes to expect and therefore to
disregard. When the deceiver's intended action does occur, the target mis-
interprets it, and does not respond appropriately or quickly enough. An
example in which the British were caught napping by such a deception
occurred in February 1942. Two German ships, the Scharnhorst and the
Gneisenau
,
dashed through the English Channel undetected because British
coastal radar had been systematically hoodwinked by gradually increased
jamming. R.V. Jones admits that the Germans has "subtly increased the
intensity of their jamming over a period so that we would get acclima-
tized to it, without realizing that it was now so intense that our radar
was almost useless.'
Strategic Initiative
It is not surprising that our fifth category of factors affecting
success is not to be found in the admonitions of either Von Grieffenberg
or the SHAEF writer. This is because it concerns an element over which
deceivers have little control: strategic initiative in war. While being
on the defensive gives more urgent motives for resorting to deception,
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it limits the scale of deceptions that are likely to succeed. The initi-
ators of action are defining the nature of the encounter and thereby
have the greater degree of control over it at the outset. They act; the
opponents must react. This control puts the initiators in a relatively
better position to succeed at deception if they attempt it.
A major advantage which the initiative confers for successful de-
ception is time. Being able to act when it is ready, the initiating
side has the luxury of using the available time to spin deception plans
if it chooses to; the defenders must respond willy-nilly to the action,
ready or not. Since deceptions at the strategic level demand time to
work well, it is not surprising that instances of the most elaborate sort
are done by the side which can take the initiative.
Realizing that the better position from which to succeed at decep-
tion is the offensive should not lead us to underrate deception by the
underdog seeking to overcome disadvantages with guile. The point is
that defensive deceptions are still literally disadvantaged—limited in
scope and in planning time and possibly also thin in resources needed
instead for battle operations. This was the context of British deceptions
in World War II from 1939 thraugh mid-1942; most of their deceptions were
passive, that is, camouflage or simulation exercises to deflect German
weapons from their targets. As the tide turned against the Germans late




Aesop wrote of a fly which sat on a chariot's axle and credited
to itself the dust raised by the turning of the wheels. R.F. Hesketh
referred to this fable in a now declassified report wherein he described
the work of his deception group in 1943-44 as it implemented Fortitude .
Hesketh' s point was that he was careful in his analysis not to over-
value the significance of his work to the Allied victory at Normandy.
"It is always tempting," he wrote, "for those who set out to deceive
and who see their objects fulfilled, to claim credit for their attain-
ment when, in fact, the motive force lay in another quarter. "55
We applaud Hesketh' s candor and would add that all deception
analysts need to guard against over-crediting deception's significance.
The temptation to do so is alluring because deception does seem to be
such a powerful tool. Fortitude and other cases illustrate that the
advantage in any properly executed scheme invariably belongs to the
deceiver. After all, he knows what the truth is_, and he can assume
his adversary will search for its indicators. As a result, the deceiver
can expect the victim to pick up some of the signals intended to mis-
lead or confuse. Should they be ignored, dismissed, or misinterpreted,
the deceiver is probably not worse off. Should they be interpreted
as he intends, the deceiver stands to gain. The target must pay atten-
tion even to scenarios which he suspects to be untrue if they are plau-
sible and consequential to his interests. Although the target may ul-
timately choose not to act on them, the additional time he spends evalua-
ting deceptive scenarios or searching for further information should bene-
fit his foe.
The danger in accepting an advantage to the deceiver is to assume
that it will significantly contribute to victory . It may well do so,
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but as Hesketh would undoubtedly agree, the contribution is very dif-
ficult to measure. Hesketh proceeded as best he could, concentrating
primarily on the actions of his group and on the content, timing and
reasons for German beliefs. To truly certify Fortitude's impact, how-
ever, would have required determining not only what the victim might
have believed and done in the absence of deception, but also distinguish-
ing deception's impact from among other factors such as troop morale,
quantity and quality of weapons, generalship, or effective planning.
These analytical tasks are prodigious, some might say impossible; yet
deception analysts must confront them. Beyond studying the use of
deception in individual instances we should next try to identify a
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COGNITIVE FACTORS IN DECEPTION AND COUNTERDECEPTION
Richards J. Heuer, Jr.
INTRODUCTION
To be successful, deception must achieve a desired impact upon the
thinking of the deception target, either a national or military decision-
maker or the intelligence analyst working for the decision-maker. The
chances of success are enhanced the more a deceiver understands about
the thought processes of the target leaders or analysts. Conversely, the
chances of avoiding deception increase the more one understands one's own
information processing capabilities and limitations. In examining these
judgmental processes, one can either determine the propensities and pre-
dilections of individual persons or examine those factors that most men
and women seem to have in common. This paper takes the latter approach.
That human beings often make erroneous judgements is self-evident
from our daily experience, and it has been demonstrated by many psycho-
logical experiments. Military, political and economic issues involving
interaction with other nations are among the most complex analytical pro-
blems. This complexity is normally exacerbated by lack of information
concerning some critical elements of a problem and a large volume of frag-
mentary, ambiguous and even erroneous information concerning other ele-
ments. Judgements must be made in the face of great uncertainty.
Over 20 years ago, Herbert Simon advanced the concept of "bounded"
or limited rationality. Because of limits in our mental capacity, he
argued, the human mind cannot cope directly with the complexity of the
world. Rather we construct in our mind a simplified model of reality
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and then work with this mental model. We behave rationally within the
confines of our mental model, but this model is generally not very well
adapted to the requirements of the real world.
Simon's theory of bounded rationality was stimulated by earlier psy-
chological research on perception, memory, attention span, and reasoning
capacity that documents limitations in our "mental machinery." A princi-
pal thesis underlying more recent research has been that these limitations
cause us to employ various simplifying strategies when processing infor-
mation to make judgements and decisions. Psychologists have conducted
many experiments to identify these strategies and to show how - at least
in laboratory situations - they affect our judgment and decisions. Stu-
2
dents of international relations, particularly Robert Jervis, have con-
ducted historical research to document instances in which political and
military decisions appear to have been significantly influenced by these
psychological variables.
This research provides substantial experimental and historical evi-
dence to support Jervis' conclusion that "perceptions of the world and of
other actors diverge from reality in patterns that we can detect and for
3
reasons that we can understand." These patterns of erroneous perception
and judgment are frequently called "biases." A bias, as the term is used
here, is an error in judgment that is consistent and predictable. It is
not predictable in the sense that all persons under the same circumstances
will make the same error all the time. Rather, it is predictable in a
statistical sense, in that given a large number of cases most people will
be influenced by this tendency most of the time.
One can identify several types of biases. Motivational biases result
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from the influence on judgment of our ambitions and fears, and the need
to perceive our past behavior as commendable and consistent. The func-
tional roles and circumstances of organizations generate patterns of bi-
ased organizational judgment. Cultural biases are rooted in predisposi-
tions inherent in one's cultural values and heritage.
This paper deals only with perceptual and cognitive biases. Percep-
tual biases arise from the nature of the process by which we perceive the
world about us, and they limit the accuracy of our perceptions. Cognitive
biases result not from any intellectual or emotional predisposition toward
a certain judgment, but simply from the way the mind tends to work. They
influence how we estimate probabilities, evaluate evidence, and attribute
causality.
Of the diverse forms of bias, we have opted to discuss perceptual
and cognitive baises for two reasons. They are the most general forms of
bias, presumably affecting all persons regardless of cultural background
or organizational affiliation. Cognitive biases are also the least well
known, for most research on these biases is of recent origin.
The paper is divided into three sections, one dealing with perceptual
biases, one with cognitive biases, and a concluding section that includes
discussion of the broad problem of countering deception. Not all percep-
tual and cognitive biases are discussed here, for we have selected just
those that seem most relevant to the problem of deception. The first two
sections present the biases sequentially with a concluding discussion re-
lating them to the deception problem. These discussions are principally
from the point of view of the deception planner, for countering deception
* For example, Richard Betts contends that military intelligence has an or-
ganizational bias toward "worst-case" analysis in analyses that support pro-
curement planning and "best-case" analysis in evaluating the results of mili-
tary operations.
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involves basically different problems discussed primarily in the conclusion.
An Appendix contains a brief summary of all the biases and their implica-
tions.
A word of caution before proceeding further. How humans perceive
and process information to arrive at analytical judgments is not fully un-
derstood. Although the evidence presented here is persuasive, it is not
conclusive. The intention of this paper is not to deliver the last word
in psychological theory, for psychologists differ among themselves just as
much as historians, intelligence analysts or priests. The purpose is to
describe the current state of knowledge from a perspective that views hu-
man cognitive processes as a critical variable in explaining fallible hu-
man judgment. The aim is to learn something about how people make judg-
ments, and to provide guidelines concerning how to exploit this knowledge
to deceive others or prevent being deceived ourselves. The guidance is
limited to principles that will generally be helpful, not firm rules that
guarantee an optimal result, for judgment is not guided by algorithms that
ensure a correct answer.
BIASES IN PERCEPTION
The process of perception links the individual to his or her environ-
ment and is critical to accurate understanding of the world about us. We
tend to think of perception as a passive process; we see, hear, smell,
taste or feel stimuli that impinge upon our senses. If we are at all ob-
jective, we record what is actually there.
Yet perception is demonstrably an active rather than a passive process;
it constructs rather than records "reality." Perception implies understand-
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ing as well as awareness. It is a process of inference in which the in-
dividual constructs his or her own version of "reality" on the basis of
information provided by the senses. This sensory input is mediated by
complex and poorly understood mental processes that determine which in-
formation we attend to, how we organize it, and the meaning we attribute
to it. Thus what we perceive and how readily we perceive it is strongly
influenced by our past experience, education, cultural values and role
requirements, as well as by the stimuli recorded by our receptor organs.
This should shake some traditional assumptions about "objectivity" in
analysis
.
Perception is a process of constructing reality
rather than recording it.
Figure 1
Expectations Condition Perception
Many experiments have been conducted to demonstrate the extraordin-
ary extent to which the information obtained by an observer depends upon
the observer's own expectations, assumptions and preconceptions. For
example, when you looked at Figure 1, above, what did you see? Did you
note that the article is written twice in each of the three phrases.
This is commonly overlooked, because perception is influenced by our ex-
pectations about how these familiar phrases are normally written. If
you perceived Figure 1 correctly, you have exceptional powers of obser-
vation, were lucky, or have seen the figure before. This simple experi-
ment demonstrates one of the most fundamental principles concerning per-
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ception: we tend to perceive what we expect to perceive. A corollary
of this principle is that it takes more information, and more unambiguous
information, to recognize an unexpected phenomenon than an expected one.
Another classical experiment to demonstrate the influence of expecta-
tions on perception used playing cards, some of which were gimmicked so
the spades were red and the hearts black. Pictures of the cards were
flashed briefly on a screen and, needless to say, the test subjects iden-
tified the normal cards more quickly and accurately than the anomolous
ones. After test subjects became aware of the existence of red spades
and black hearts, their performance with the gimmicked cards improved
but still did not approach the speed or accuracy with which normal cards
could be identified. This shows that patterns of expectation become so
deeply embedded that they continue to influence perceptions even when we
are alerted to and try to take account of the existence of data that do
not fit our preconceptions. Trying to be objective does not guarantee
accurate perception.
The position of the test subject identifying playing cards is an-
alogous to that of the intelligence analyst or government leader trying
to make sense of the paper flow that crosses his desk. What is actually
perceived in that paper flow, as well as how it is interpreted, depends
in part, at least, on the analyst's patterns of expectation. We do not
have expectations just about the color of hearts and spades. We have a
set of assumptions and expectations about the motivations of people
and the processes of government in foreign countries. Events consistent
with these expectations are perceived and processed easily; those which
contradict prevailing expectations tend to be ignored or distorted in
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perception. Of course, this distortion is a subconscious or pre-con-
scious process, as illustrated by how you presumably ignored the extra
words in the triangles in Figure 1.
This tendency to perceive what we expect is far more important than
any tendency to perceive what we want . In fact , there may be no real
tendency toward wishful thinking. The commonly cited evidence supporting
the claim that people tend to perceive what they want to perceive can
generally be explained equally well by the expectancy thesis or the avail-
ability bias (to be discussed later)
.
Expectations have many diverse sources, including past experience,
professional training, and cultural and organizational norms. All these
influences predispose us to pay particular attention to certain kinds of
information and to organize and interpret this information in certain
ways. Perception is also influenced by the context in which it occurs.
Different circumstances evoke different sets of expectations. We are
more attuned to hearing footsteps behind us when walking in an alley at
night than along a city street in daytime, and the meaning we attribute
to the sound of footsteps will vary under these differing circumstances.
A military intelligence analyst is similarly tuned to preceive indica-
tors of potential conflict. When the evidence is ambiguous, as is com-
monly the case in intelligence analysis, this predisposition increases
the likelihood the indicators will be perceived accurately when they in
fact exist and escape the attention of other observers, but it also in-
creases the chances they will be perceived erroneously when they are not
really there.
Patterns of expectation, rooted in past experience and training,
tell us, subconsciously, what to look for, what is important, and how to
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interpret what we see. These patterns form a "mind set" that predis-
poses us to think in certain ways . A mind set is akin to a screen or lens
through which we perceive the world. For example, the following truisms
have been part of the mind set of intelligence analysts:
— A totalitarian government enjoying the support of effective
military and security organizations cannot be overthrown by
popular opinion.
— When the position of a dictatorial ruler is threatened, he
will defend his position with force if necessary.
— The principal threat to friendly governments comes from the
left, not the right.
These premises were part of the lens through which U.S. policy makers
and intelligence analysts alike perceived developments in Iran in 1978
prior to the fall of the Shah. They had a significant impact on where
analysts focused their attention, what they expected to happen, and how
they interpreted the unfolding events. That all these "truisms" were
proven wrong in that instance is perhaps no small part of the explana-
tion why the Shah's demise took the United States government by surprise.
There is a tendency to think of a mind set as something bad, to be
avoided. One should have an open mind and be influenced by the facts
rather than by preconceived notions! But there is no such thing as "the
facts of the case." There is only a very selective subset of the overf-
all mass of data to which we have been subjected that we take as facts
and judge to be relevant to the question at issue. Actually, mind sets
are neither good nor bad; they are unavoidable. There is no conceivable
way of coping with the volume of stimuli that impinge upon our senses,
or with the volume and complexity of the data we have to analyze, with-
out some kind of simplifying preconceptions about what to expect, what is
important, and what is related to what. "There is a grain of truth in
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the otherwise pernicious maxim that an open mind is an empty mind." Ob-
jective analysis is not achieved by avoiding preconceptions (that would be
ignorance or self-delusion) , but by making our basic assumptions and
reasoning as explicit as possible so they can be challenged by others
and we can ourselves examine their validity.
Perceptions Resist Change
One of the most important characteristics of perceptions is that they
are quick to form, but resistant to change. Once we have perceived an ob-
ject, event or situation and formed some judgment about its essential
characteristics, we are biased toward continuing to perceive it in the
same manner even though the object of our perception may change.
Figure 2 illustrates this principle by showing part of a longer
series of progressively modified drawings that change almost imperceptibly
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viewed alone, has equal probability of being perceived as a man or a wo-
man. When test subjects are shown the entire series of drawings, one by
one, their perception of this intermediate drawing is biased according to
which end of the series they started from. Test subjects who start by
viewing a picture that is clearly a man are biased in favor of continuing
to see a man long after an "objective observer" (i.e., an observer looking
at a single picture) recognizes that the man is now a woman. Similarly,
test subjects who start at the woman end of the series are biased in favor
of continuing to see a woman. Once an observer has formed an image, that
is, once he or she has developed a mind set or expectation concerning the
phenomenon being observed, this conditions future perceptions of that
phenomenon. This is the basis for yet another general principle of per-
ception: new information is assimilated to existing images.
This principle explains why gradual, evolutionary change often goes
unnoticed. It also explains the phenomenon that an intelligence analyst
assigned to work on a topic or country for the first time may generate
accurate insights that have been overlooked by experienced analysts who
have worked on the same problem for ten years. A fresh perspective is
sometimes useful, for past experience can handicap as well as aid analysis,
This tendency to assimilate new information to pre-existing images is
greater "the more ambiguous the information, the more confident the actor
is of validity of his image, and the greater his commitment to the estab-
9lished view,"
Figure 3 provides the reader an opportunity to test for him or her-
self the persistence of established images. Look at the picture. What
do you see <r an old woman or a young woman? Now look again to see if you
can visually and mentally reorganize the data to form a different image -
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It is difficult to look at the same data from differ-
ent perspectives.
Figure 3
that of a young woman if your original perception was of an old woman, or
of the old woman if you first perceived the young one. Do not look at
the footnote unless you need clues to help you identify the other image.
Again, this illustrates the principle that perceptions are quick to form
but resistant to change.
When you have seen Figure 3 from both perspectives, try shifting back
* The old woman's nose, mouth and eye are, respectively, the young woman's
chin, necklace and ear. The old woman is seen in profile looking left. The
young woman is also looking left, but we see her mainly from behind so most
facial features are not visible; her eyelash, nose and curve of her cheek
may be seen just above the old woman's nose.
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and forth from one perspective to the other. Do you notice some initial
difficulty in making this switch? One of the most difficult mental feats
is to take a familiar body of data and reorganize it visually or mentally
to perceive it from a different perspective. Yet this is what intelli-
gence analysts are constantly required to do. In order to understand in-
ternational interactions, we must understand the situation as it appears
to each of the opposing forces, and constantly shift back and forth from
one perspective to the other as we try to fathom how each side interprets
an ongoing series of interactions. Trying to perceive Soviet as well as
U.S. interpretations of international events is comparable to seeing both
the old and young women in Figure 3; once we have perceived events one
way, we tend to resist alternate perspectives.
Impact of Ambiguity
Initial exposure to ambiguous or blurred stimuli interferes with
accurate perception even after more and better information becomes avail-
able. This effect has been demonstrated experimentally by projecting onto
a screen pictures of common, everyday things such as a dog standing on
grass , a fire hydrant , and an aerial view of a highway cloverleaf inter-
section. The initial projection was blurred in varying degrees, and
the pictures were then brought into focus slowly to determine at what
point test subjects could identify them correctly. This experiment
showed two things. First, those who started viewing the pictures when
they were most out of focus had more difficulty identifying them when
they became clearer than those who started viewing at a less blurred
stage. In other words, the greater the initial blur, the clearer the pic-
ture had to be before people could recognize it. Second, the longer time
that people were exposed to a blurred picture, the clearer the picture
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had to be made before they could recognize it
.
What happened in this experiment , and what presumably happens in real
life with cognitive as well as visual perceptions, is that despite ambigu-
ous stimuli we form some sort of tentative hypothesis about what it is we
are seeing. The longer we are exposed to the ambiguous data, the greater
confidence we develop in this initial and perhaps erroneous impression, so
the greater the impact this initial impression has on our subsequent per-
ceptions. For a time as the picture becomes clearer, there is no obvious
contradiction; the new data is assimilated to our previous image, and the
initial interpretation is maintained until the contradiction becomes so
obvious that it forces itself upon our consciousness. The early but in-
correct impression tends to persist because the amount of information nec-
essary to invalidate a perception is considerably greater than the amount
of information required to form an initial impression. The problem is not
that there is any inherent difficulty in grasping new perceptions or new
ideas, but that established perceptions are so difficult to lose. Thus
inaccurate perceptions generated by ambiguous data may persist even after
additional information has been received to clarify the initial ambiguity.
One might seek to limit the adverse impact of this tendency by suspending
judgment for as long as possible as new information is being received.
Implications for Intelligence Analysis
Understanding the ways in which perception is commonly distorted has
significant implications for comprehending the nature and limitations of
intelligence analysis. If we consider the circumstances under which ac^-
curate perception is most difficult, we find these are exactly the circum--
stances under which intelligence analysis is generally conducted - dealing
with highly ambiguous situations on the basis of information that is pro-
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cessed incrementally under pressure for early judgment. This is a recipe
for inaccurate perception. That intelligence analysts perform as well as
they do is testimony to their generally sound judgment, training and dedi-
cation in performing an extremely difficult task.
Intelligence seeks to illuminate the unknown. Almost by definition,
intelligence analysis deals with highly ambiguous situations. Yet we have
seen that the greater the ambiguity of the stimuli, the greater the impact
of expectations and pre-existing images on the perception of that stimuli.
Thus despite maximum striving for objectivity, the intelligence analyst's
own preconceptions are likely to exert a greater impact on the analytical
product than in other fields where the analyst is working with less ambig-
uous and less discordant information.
Moreover, the intelligence analyst is among the first to look at new
problems at an early stage when the evidence is very fuzzy indeed. The
analyst then follows a problem as additional increments of evidence are re-
ceived and the picture gradually clarifies - much as the test subjects in
the experiment demonstrating that initial exposure to blurred stimuli in-
terferes with accurate perception even after more and better information
becomes available. If the results of this experiment can be generalized
to apply to intelligence analysts, it suggests that because the analyst
starts observing a potential problem situation at its early and most un-
clear stage, he or she is at a disadvantage as compared with others - for
example, policy makers - whose first exposure may come at a later stage
when more and better information is available.
The receipt of information in small increments over time also facili-
tates assimilation of this information to the analyst's existing views.
No one item of information may be sufficient to prompt the analyst to
58
change his view. The cumulative message inherent in many pieces of infor-
mation is not examined as a whole. The Intelligence Community review of
community performance before the 1973 Arab-Israeli War noted
The problem of incremental analysis - especially as it applies
to the current intelligence process - was also at work in the
period preceding hostilities. Analysts, according to their own
accounts, were often preceding on the basis of the day's take,
hastily comparing it with material received the previous day.
They then produced in 'assembly line fashion' items which may
have reflected perceptive intuition but which [did not] accrue
from a systematic consideration of an accumulated body of inte-
grated evidence.
And finally, the intelligence analyst operates in an environment that
exerts strong pressures for premature judgment. Policy makers' needs for
interpretive analysis are greatest within at most two or three days after
a new event occurs. The system requires the intelligence analyst to make
an almost instant diagnosis before sufficient hard information becomes
available to make a well-grounded judgment . This diagnosis can only be
based upon the analyst's preconceptions concerning how and why events norm-
ally transpire in a given society.
As time passes and more information is received, a fresh look at all
the evidence might suggest a different explanation. Yet we have seen from
the various perception experiments that an early judgment adversely affects
the formation of future perceptions. Once an observer thinks he or she
knows what is happening, this perception tends to resist change. The new
information received incrementally fits easily into the analyst's pre-
vious image. This perceptual bias is reinforced by organizational pres-
sures favoring consistent interpretation, for once the analyst has commited
him or herself in writing, both the analyst and the organization has a
vested interest in maintaining the original diagnosis.
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Implications for Deception
One overwhelming conclusion stands out with respect to deception: it
is far easier to lead a target astray by reinforcing the target's existing
beliefs, thus causing the target to ignore the contrary evidence of one's
true intent, than it is to persuade a target to change his or her mind.
Military operations possess a certain logic. Terrain, weather, sup-
plies and the relative balance of forces often suggest optimal tactics or
strategy. Yet, if the preferred alternative is equally obvious to the
enemy, these advantages can be offset by the enemy's counter-preparations.
Thus planners of military operations may use deception to conceal their
true intent, and in doing so they are faced with two basic alternatives.
They can plan to attack in a place, time and manner most expected by the
enemy, while seeking through deception to achieve surprise by changing
the enemy's expectations. Or they can reinforce the enemy's expectations
while planning a surprise attack in a different place, time or manner.
The tendencies to perceive what we expect to perceive and to assimi-
late new information to existing images make it far easier to reinforce
a target's existing beliefs than to change them. Deceptions that follow
this principle seldom fail, for the odds are then strongly in favor of
the deceiver. The human capacity to rationalize contradictory evidence
is easily sufficient to outweigh the pernicious effects of security leaks
and uncontrolled channels of information that deception planners might
otherwise fear are certain to compromise their efforts.
Deceptions that require persuading a target of something he is not
already predisposed to believe should be avoided if at all possible. If
nonetheless required by the operational situation, the chances for success
may be enhanced by following a simple sequencing rule. Because of the ten-
dency to integrate new information into existing beliefs, the first goal
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in any effort to change beliefs must be to ensure that the target is at
least considering seriously the desired alternative hypothesis. This may
require initiating the deception with strong and obvious evidence that
forces the desired conclusion to be at least considered seriously by in-
telligence analysts and policy makers. This is then followed in quick
succession by additional supporting evidence that leads the target to a
reasoned conclusion in favor of the desired alternative.
The opposite tactic, which seems incorrect from a psychological
point of view, would be to save the more dramatic evidence until after the
stage has been set by transmitting a number of supporting messages. The
expectation is that the target initially attributes little importance to
the supporting messages, but once the key is received the other pieces
are perceived to fall into place forming a coherent and persuasive pic-
ture. The weakness of this tactic is that the target may have failed to
notice, forgotten or misinterpreted the earlier evidence, for information
that does not fit neatly into an existing hypothesis tends to be ignored
or misperceived. Intelligence analysts and policy makers are commonly
confronted with a larget amount of discordant information. They have
only a limited capacity to sort and store discordant or seemingly irrele-
vant information in memory in a manner that makes it possible to recall
it for the evaluation of hypotheses that are not now under consideration.
Planning and implementing a deception typically involves a major in-
vestment of time, energy and ego. When people make such an investment
in preparing a message, they tend to overestimate how clear this message
will be to the receiver. This results from the importance of context in
perceiving and interpreting a signal; when a message is placed in a dif-
ferent context it assumes a different meaning. The message developed by
the deception planners is understood by them in the context of the endless
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meetings in which alternatives were weighed and details worked out. They
are so familiar with their own thinking that they risk overlooking the de-
gree to which the message is clear to them only because they know what to
look for.
The target of a deception is likely to have a different agenda of
concerns, different predispositions and a different information base than
the deception planners. Normally this will lead to a different interpreta-
tion of messages. If the deception planners have sufficient understanding
of the target's situation and thinking, messages may be planned to take
advantage of the particular context in which they will be received, but in
practice the target may miss many clues the deceiver sets out for him and
may assign considerable weight to factors the deceiver regards as trivial
or to information of which the deceiver is wholly unaware. To the extent
that the deception signals reinforce the target's expectations, there is
a large margin for error and these miscalculations have little impact.
If the goal is to change the target's mind, however, they may be critical.
It is not by accident that discussion to this point has concerned im-
plications for the perpetration of deception rather than its detection.
The counterdeception problem is extremely difficult. When should we dis-
believe our eyes and ears and the seemingly logical conclusions of our
mind? When should we second guess, and say to ourselves that since most
of the evidence points to X, then Y must be true rather than X? Even in
the absence of deliberate deception, the evidence at the most critical
junctures is typically so ambiguous that the proper conclusion is far
from obvious. To the extent that we cannot believe the evidence, the an-
alytical problem becomes even more complicated. The problem of detecting
deception is not simply a matter of accurate perception. It is embedded
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in the much larger problem of effective intelligence collection and analysis,
and we reserve discussion of these points until the end of this paper.
COGNITIVE BIASES
The cognitive biases discussed here are grouped according to whether
they affect the estimation of probabilities, the evaluation of evidence, or
the attribution of causality.
Biases in Estimating Probabilities
Estimating probabilities is important because we live in a probabilis-
tic world. Social, political, military and economic developments are not
rigidly determined but occur or fail to occur with some degree of probabil-
ity. Decision makers cannot be certain of the outcome of their actions, so
they must weigh the probabilities of alternative outcomes. The information
on which these decisions are based also involves many uncertainties ex-
pressed in probabilistic terms. The intelligence analyst, for example, is
constantly assessing probabilities with respect to the intentions of for-
eign leaders, the capability of military forces, the future consequences
of current events, or the credibility of sources.
Typically, these probability judgments are expressed in imprecise
terms such as possibly, probably or very likely - terms that unfortunately
have different meanings to different people. But the issue here is not
whether communication and decision making can or should be improved by re-
placing these verbal qualifiers with numerical ranges of probability. It
is whether the estimates themselves are influenced by systematic biases
that affect their accuracy. Research by experimental psychologists sug-
gests that this is in fact the case. Knowledge of these biases may be
useful to those planning deception or seeking to avoid it.
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Availab ility Bias
One of the simplified rules of thumb we use in making probability es-
timates is known as the availability rule. In this sense availability re-
fers to imaginability or retrievability . Psychologists have shown that
two of the cues we use in judging the probability of an event are 1) the
ease with which we can imagine relevant instances of the event, and 2) the
12
number or frequency of such events that we can easily remember. In other
words, we are using the availability rule of thumb whenever we estimate
frequency or probability on the basis of how easily we can recall or imagine
instances of whatever it is we are trying to estimate.
Normally this works quite well. If one thing actually occurs more
frequently and therefore is more probable than another, we probably will
be able to recall more instances of it. Events that are likely to occur
generally are easier to imagine than unlikely events. We are constantly
making inferences based on these assumptions. We estimate the probability
of successful deception by recalling historical examples of deception un-
der similar circumstances. We estimate the probability that a politician
will lose an election by imagining ways in which he may lose popular sup-
port . Although this generally works well, we are often led astry be-
cause the ease with which things come to mind is influenced by many fac-
tors, such as emotional saliency, vividness and how recently we have been
exposed to them, all of which may be unrelated to the correct probability.
When this happens, our judgment is biased in favor of the probability of
those events that are most available. For example, the Soviet assessment
of the likelihood that Germany may once again become a military threat to
Soviet interests seems clearly biased by the ready availability of vivid
memories of the Second World War.
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Intelligence analysts often have difficulty estimating the likelihood
of low probability events , especially when those events have potentially
very serious consequences. For example, what is the likelihood of civil
war in Canada, perhaps even including Soviet or Cuban assistance to Quebec,
during the next ten years? Or the likelihood of an aggressively anti-
American, Castro-like government coming to power in Mexico? It is diffi-
cult for us to imagine such developments, so we assign them a very low pro-
bability, but imaginability is most likely irrelevant to an accurate assess-
ment of the probability that either of these developments will actually
occur. To the extent that our estimate is influenced by ready imaginabil-
ity rather than by a full analysis of the causal factors at work, we are
likely to underestimate the true probability.
Sino-Soviet reconciliation is another low probability, high signifi-
cance event, but here the availability bias is likely to cause people to
overestimate the probability of it actually happening. This is because it
is so easy to imagine such a development and what impact it would have on
U.S. policy. In fact, our memory of having been taken by surprise by the
Sino-Soviet split causes many people to be preoccupied by the possibility
of reconciliation. Analysts working full time on this question are con-
sidering the operative causal factors, not making quick and easy infer-
ences on the basis of imaginability, But the policymaker or generalist
who does not have the time or the information to go into details must un-
consciously take shortcuts, and the obvious shortcut is to use the avail-
ability rule of thumb for making inferences about probability.
Anchoring Bias
Another strategy that people seem to use intuitively and unconsciously
to simplify the task of mentally processing complex information is called
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"anchoring." Some natural starting point is used as a first approximation
to the desired judgment. This starting point is then adjusted, based on
the results of additional information or analysis. Typically, however,
the starting point serves as an anchor or drag that reduces the ammount
of adjustment, so that the final estimate remains closer to the starting
point than it ought to be.
Anchoring has been demonstrated by asking a group of test subjects
to estimate one or more known quantities, for example, the percentage of
people in the United States who are age 55 or older. In an experiment
that used this question, the test subjects were given starting percentages
that were selected randomly - they were drawn out of a bowl - and were
then asked to adjust these arbitrary starting points until they reached
their best estimate in response to the question. Because of insufficient
adjustment, those who started out with an estimate that was too high ended
with higher estimates than those who started with an estimate that was
too low, and vice versa. Even the totally arbitrary starting points ac-
ted as an anchor, causing drag or inertia that inhibited full adjustment
of estimates to the point that the test subjects would otherwise have con-
13
sidered desirable.
Policy makers and intelligence analysts deal with dynamic situations
They must continually review their estimates in response to changes in the
situation or the receipt of previously unavailable information. Ideally,
there should be a direct correlation between changes in the situation
and/or new information and changes in the estimate, but such is frequently
not the case. There is much evidence to suggest that people do not change
their judgments enough. Once an estimate is made, thinking becomes an-
chored and moves only within a narrow range around that spot.
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Overconfidence Bias
Problems of perception and bias might be less serious if people had a
better appreciation for the limits of their own knowledge. Many tests have
been conducted that show people have difficulty expressing accurately the
degree of uncertainty in what they know or believe. People tend to be
overconfident about how much they know.
The Subjective Probabilities Assessment Test (SPAT) uses 75 general
knowledge questions with known answers taken from an almanac. Test subjects
are asked not just to answer the questions, but for each question to also
assign a probability that shows how confident they are that their answer
is the correct one. For questions with two possible answers, a 50% proba-
bility indicates complete uncertainty about which of the two answers is
correct, while 100% indicates absolute certainty that the chosen answer is
the proper one.
Performance on the SPAT test is not measured by the number of correct
answers, but by the "calibration" between assessed probability that the
answer is correct and the actual number of correct answers at each probabil-
ity level. If a subject indicates 70% certainty on ten questions, then a
perfect score would be seven correct and three incorrect answers. Under
such circumstances, we would say that the person's subjective or intuitive
feeling of certainty is perfectly calibrated with the reality of his per-
formance. On the other hand, only five or six correct answers would in-
dicate overconfidence and eight or nine correct answers underconfidence in
assessing the accuracy of one's knowledge.
Figure 4 shows the results from testing almost 1,000 DIA and CIA in-
14
telligence analysts and managers. For questions on which analysts ex-
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pressed 100% confidence, the median analyst was correct only 76% of the time
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Figure 4
When expressed confidence was 90%, the judgment was correct on only 63% of
the questions, and so on as indicated in the graph. In brief, the test
demonstrated that the intuitive feelings of certainty of intelligence an-
alysts do not conform with reality. The analysts are markedly overconfident
of how much they know.
Very similar results have been found with test groups not affiliated
with the intelligence community. Experiments have shown that the overcon-
fidence bias is greater for difficult questions than for easy ones. Train-
ing involving feedback on one's performance improves the calibration be-
tween expressed confidence and actual performance; weather forecasters per-
form exceptionally well on the SPAT test, doubtless because they commonly
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receive rapid feedback on the accuracy of their probability judgments. On
the other hand, neither superior intellectual ability nor expertise in the
subject matter of the questions has been found to improve performance in
assessing the certainty of one's knowledge.
The intelligence analyst's subjective overconf idence may not be trans-
lated into overconfident intelligence judgments. Organizational and moti-
vational incentives also influence how the analyst expresses his level of
confidence when writing an intelligence report. Hedging to avoid embar-
rassment in the event of error and overwriting to mask ignorance are not un-
common. The bias toward overconfidence applies to the private feelings of
analysts, not necessarily to the way they present these feeling in formal
intelligence products.
Implications for Deception
Availability bias may make analyst believe that strategic deception is
more common than it really is, and thus cause them to be more disposed to
perceive it. Successful cases of deception are far more salient, and con-
sequently more available for recall in memory, than cases in which deception
was not employed under comparable circumstances. Deception attracts both
the popular imagination and the attention of historians, while the absence
of deception in strategic operations does not. When an analyst is faced
with a situation in which deception may or may not be employed, his or her
estimate of the probability of deception is influenced by this easy retriev-
ability of past instances of deception.
The availability bias also suggests that employees of watch offices
will tend to overestimate the probability of whatever it is they are watch-
ing for. Having been briefed and trained to recognize certain indicators,
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and having imagined and rehearsed scenarios that include the watched-for de-
velopments, it is not surprising that the watched-for developments are at
the forefront of their minds as they try to forecast the future course of
events. To the extent that the watched-for development is judged more pro-
bable, the perceptual bias of seeing what we expect to see also plays a
greater role.
If the goal of a deception is to induce ambiguity or to persuade the
watch officers that what they are watching for is not happening, e.g., that
there is no intent to attack when an attack is in fact planned, a watch of-
fice is an extremely difficult deception target. On the other hand, it may
be possible to exploit the watch officers' preconceptions, for example, as
part of a plan to exploit the cry wolf cyndrome. The watch office might be
provoked to issue an alert of impending attack several times when no attack
is in fact planned, so that future alerts will be received more skeptically.
In this procedure, the availability of the attack scenario is countered by
building up in the watch officers another availability - the memory of re-
cent false alarms.
Policy makers and others seeking to avoid deception would do well to
keep the availability bias in mind and to check the extent to which it in-
fluences their thinking on critical issues. If their judgments of the like-
lihood of future events are determined by imaginability or retrievability
rather than by causal analysis, they should have little confidence in these
judgments and should seek an independent assessment based on more systema-
tic analysis.
The significance of the anchoring bias to the deception planner depends
upon the type of deception being planned. If the goal is to change a tar-
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get's previous beliefs, anchoring will facilitate achieving this objective.
Because the anchoring bias tends to prevent analysts from revising their
estimates as much as they should when new information is received, analysts
seeking to avoid surprise will generally wish to try to overcome this bias.
The prognosis is not favorable. In one experiment, the bias persisted even
after test subjects had been given feedback to show the bias and after they
had been urged to try to overcome this tendency in answering a new set of
1 C
estimation questions. This is a common finding in experiments dealing with
cognitive biases; the biases persist even after test subjects are informed
of them and instructed to try to avoid them or compensate for them.
One possible technique for avoiding the anchoring bias, to weigh anchor
so to speak, may be to ignore one's own or others' earlier judgments and re-
think a problem from scratch. In other words, consciously avoid using any
prior judgment as a starting point. There is not experimental evidence to
show that this is possible or that it will work, but it certainly seems
worth trying. Alternatively, it is sometimes possible to avoid human error
by employing formal statistical procedures. Bayesian statistical analysis,
for example, can be used to revise prior judgments on the basis of new in-
formation in a way that is designed to avoid any anchoring bias.
Overconfidence exacerbates the impact of all the biases. Although a
written estimate may have been hedged, if the analyst's subjective feeling
is one of overconfidence and satisfaction with his or her estimative per-
formance, there will be few efforts to improve. For the deception planner,
the implications of a target's overconfidence are the same as the implica-
tions of the anchoring bias. It is one more obstacle to overcome in inducing
a target to change his or her mind, but it can be readily exploited if the
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objective is to reinforce the target's existing convictions. In ambiguity-
inducing deceptions, the intent is to reduce the target's confidence.
BIASES IN EVALUATION OF EVIDENCE
Collection and evaluation of evidence are crucial steps in analysis.
Are there systematic biases in the way we handle evidence? We have seen in
our discussion of perception that new information tends to be assimilated to
existing images. Thus the order in which we receive information affects our
judgment. Evidence received early in an investigation has a greater impact
on our thinking than evidence received after our impressions have already
formed. At present, however, we are concerned with several other problems
as discussed below.
Oversensitivity to Consistency
Consistency is normally an appropriate guideline for evaluating evidence.
We formulate alternative explanations or predictions and select the one which
encompasses the greatest amount of evidence within a logically consistent
scenario. When very little evidence is available, however, we tend to be
oversensitive to consistency. We have more confidence in conclusions drawn
from a very small body of consistent information than from a larger body of
less consistent data. This is incorrect, because conclusions drawn from very
small samples are highly unreliable.
Test subjects were asked to predict students' class standing on the basis
of grades obtained in the freshman year, and to indicate the amount of confi-
dence they had in their predictions. The predictions were almost identical
when based on a single B in one course as when based on an A in one course
and a C in another, but there was a significant difference in level of confi-
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dence. Subjects expressed far more confidence when predicting from a single
grade than from an inconsistent pair of grades. This is not justifiable sta-
tistically.
Similarly, a government leader is likely to have more confidence in a re-
commendation reached unanimously by a group of three advisors than in a recom-
mendation concurred in by 10 members of a 12-man panel. This, too, is incon-
sistent with the laws of statistical probability. When an intelligence an-
alyst has little data on a certain subject, but all the data are consistent,
the analyst is likely to overestimate the degree of confidence he or she
should have in the judgment drawn from that data.
Absence of Evidence
One of the significant differences between intelligence analysis and most
academic research concerns degree of control in determining the data that are
used. The academic researcher generally tries to define his or her research
problem as one for which the data are known to be available. The intelligence
or policy analyst is generally drawing inferences from very incomplete data.
He or she must work with the evidence at hand and somehow take into account
the fact that much relevant information is known to be missing.
Ideally, intelligence analysts should recognize that relevant evidence
is lacking and be able to factor this into their calculations, estimating
the potential impact of the missing data and adjusting confidence in their
judgment downward in recognition that key information is unavailable. Unfor-
tunately, this ideal may not be the norm. "Out of sight, out of mind" may
be a better description of the impact of gaps in the evidence.
This problem can be demonstrated using a fault tree, which is a schema-
tic drawing showing all the things that might go wrong with any endeavor.
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Fault trees are often used to study the fallibility of complex systems such
as a nuclear reactor or space capsule. Figure 5 is a fault tree showing all




1. Faulty Ground Connections




2. Transmission Not in Park
or Neutral
3. Seat Belt Problem (1974 Cars)
4. Faulty Starter Motor




3. Spark Plugs Defective





2. Excess Fuel (Flooding)
3. Defective Choke
4. Defective Air Filter
1. Oil Too Thick
2. Pistons Frozen
3. Poor Compression
Mischievous Acts or Vandalism
1. Theft or Breakage of Vital
Part (e.g., Battery)
2. Siphoning of Gas
,3. Disruption of Wiring
All Other Problems
Figure 5
The "car won't start" fault tree in Figure 5 was shown to several groups
19
of experienced mechanics. One group was shown the full tree and asked to
imagine 100 cases in which a car won't start. Members of this group were then
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asked to estimate how many of the 100 cases were attributable to each of the
seven major branches of the tree, that is, to battery failure, ignition sys-
tem failure, etc. A second group of mechanics was shown only an incomplete
version of the tree; three major branches were omitted in order to test how
sensitive the test subjects were to what was left out.
If the mechanics' judgment had been fully sensitive to the missing in-
formation, then the number of cases of failure that would normally be attri-
buted to the omitted branches should have been added to the "Other Problems"
category. In practice, however, the "Other Problems" category was increased
by only half as much as it should have been, indicating that the mechanics
shown the incomplete tree were unable to fully recognize and incorporate in-
to their judgments the fact that some of the causes for a car not starting
were missing from the fault tree. When the same experiment was run with non-
mechanics, the effect of the missing branches was much greater.
As compared with most questions of intelligence analysis, the "car won't
start" experiment involved rather simple analytical judgments. That the pre-
sentation of relevant variables in the abbreviated fault tree was incomplete
could and should have been recognized easily by the experienced mechanics
selected as test subjects. That the mechanics performed so poorly on this
experiment suggests that intelligence analysts may have similar problems.
Missing data is a normal characteristic of intelligence problems, and it is
probably more difficult to recognize and incorporate the missing data in
judgment in abstract intelligence problems than in the more concrete "car
won't start" experiment.
Persistence of Impressions Based on Discredited Evidence
Impressions tend to persist even after the evidence that has created
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those impressions is fully discredited. Psychologists have become interested
in this phenomenon because many of their experiments require that the test
subjects be deceived, for example, that they be made to believe they were
successful or unsuccessful in performing some task, or that they possess cer-
tain abilities or personality traits when this is not in fact the case. Pro-
fessional ethics require that test subjects be disabused of these false im-
pressions at the end of the experiment, but this has proven surprisingly dif-
ficult to achieve.
Students' erroneous impressions concerning their logical problem-solving
abilities persevered even after the students were informed that manipulation
of good or poor teaching performance had virtually guaranteed their success
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or failure. Similarly, test subjects asked to distinguish true from fic-
titious suicide notes were given feedback that had no relationship to actual
performance; the test subjects had been randomly divided into two groups,
with members of one group being given the impression of above average suc-
cess and the other of relative failure at this task. The subjects' erroneous
impressions of the difficulty of the task and of their own performance per-
sisted even after they were informed of the deception, that is, informed
that their alleged performance had been preordained by their assignment to
one or the other test group. Moreover, the same phenomenon was found among
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observers of the experiment as well as the immediate participants. The
impressions persisted even after the evidence on which they were based was
fully discredited.
There are several cognitive processes that might account for this pheno-
menon. The previously mentioned tendency to interpret new information in
the context of pre-exiting impressions is relevant here but probably not suf-
ficient to explain why the pre-exiting impression cannot be eradicated even
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when the new information authoritatively discredits the evidence on which it
is based. An interesting but speculative explanation draws on the strong
human tendency to seek causal explanations.
When evidence is first received, it is perceived within a context that
implies causal connections between the evidence and some antecedents that
explain the evidence. The stronger the perceived causal linkage between the
evidence and its antecedents, the stronger the impression created by the evi-
dence. Thus in the experiment with suicide notes, one test subject attribu-
ted her apparent success in distinguishing real from fictitious notes to her
empathetic personality and the insights she gained from the writings of a
novelist who committed suicide. Another ascribed her apparent failure to
lack of familiarity with people who might contemplate suicide. Even after
learning that the feedback concerning their performance was invalid, these
subjects retained this plausible basis for inferring that they were either
well or poorly qualified for the task. Thus their initial impressions of
22
task difficulty and of their own ability remained unchanged.
In more general terms, when evidence is received, we postulate a set of
causal connections that explains this evidence. Even though the evidence may
subsequently be discredited, the causal linkages remain plausible and may be
seen as sufficient to imply the existence of an event even in the absence
of the now-discredited evidence. The previously preceived causal linkage
comes easily to mind. It is a readily "available" (note previous discussion
of availability bias) explanation that makes the event seem more likely than
it would have appeared prior to receipt bf the discredited evidence.
Implications for Deception
The bias favoring a small amount of consistent information over a large
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body of less consistent data supports the common maxim in deception opera-
tions that the deceiver should control as many information channels as possible
in order to reduce the amount of discrepant information available to the tar-
get. Deception can be effective even with a small amount of information as
long as the target does not receive contradictory data. Not only should the
notional picture be consistent, but the deceiver should actively discredit
the real picture as well. To achieve maximum consistency, it is necessary
to discredit the true as well as build up the false.
To deception planners, the "car won't start" experiment suggests that
deception is unlikely to fail because of information that is not provided.
The absence of evidence is often overlooked, so errors of omission will be
less serious than errors of commission. Conversely, the analyst attempting
to detect deception would be well advised to consider carefully what informa-
tion is missing. If the enemy were planning X, what would be the observable
consequences of this plan, what is the likelihood this evidence could in
fact be observed, and what inferences should be drawn from the fact that
certain evidence is not observed?
Neither of the above conclusions is at all surprising. The persistence
of impressions based on discredited evidence, however, does have counter-in-
tuitive implications. The impressions created by information fed through a
double agent may persist even after the opposition learns that its agent has
come under control and that information from this source cannot be trusted.
If we give credence to information and it affects our thinking and we subse-
quently learn that this information was deliberately leaked by an enemy, this
subsequent knowledge does not necessarily reduce the impact of the initial re-
port. Once information rings a bell, so to speak, the bell cannot be "unrung."
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The ambiguity of most real world situations contributes to ;he opera-
tion of this perseverance phenomenon. Rarely in the real world is evidence
so thoroughly discredited as is possible in the experimental laboratory.
Assume, for example, that you receive a report that an intelligence agent
you run has come under hostile control. Assume further that you have
formed a number of impressions on the basis of reporting from this agent.
It is easy to rationalize the perseverance of these impressions by arguing
that the information was true despite the agent being under hostile con-
trol, or by doubting the validity of the report claiming the agent is un-
der control. In the latter case, the phenomenon of impression perseverance
may itself affect evaluation of the evidence that supposedly discredits
the impression; it is because we retain our initial impression that we
disbelieve the new evidence.
It is a truism that security is an essential element of successful
deception. If the deception is undertaken to protect the security of an
operational plan, compromise of the deception might be worse than no de-
ception at all, for it could attract attention to the true plan. While
security is obviously desirable, it may not be quite as essential as past
deception planners have believed, for there are cognitive factors that
help reduce the adverse consequences of security leaks. The persistence
of impressions based on discredited evidence is one of these. Others
dealing with the human capacity to rationalize contradictory evidence have
been discussed in the perceptual biases section. There is empirical evi-
dence to support this conclusion. Of the 68 cases of strategic surprise
or deception studied by Barton Whaley, none had perfect security. Some
more or less specific warnings were present in every case, yet surprise
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or deception was successful nonetheless.
BIASES IN THE PERCEPTION OF CAUSALITY
We cannot see causation in the same sense that we see a desk or a
tree. Even when we observe one billiard ball strike another and then ob-
serve the previously stationary ball begin to move, we are not seeing causa-
tion. The most we can see is the juxtaposition of events in time and space,
The perception of causation results only from a complex process of infer-
ence, not from direct observation. As other forms of inference, it is
subject to systematic biases. The two biases discussed in this section
increase the likelihood that analysts will perceive deception when it is
not in fact present.
Bias Toward Causal Explanations
We have a deep psychological need to understand our environment. Un-
derstanding implies order, so we arrange our observations into regular pat-
terns and relationships. Happenings that we cannot understand may be at-
tributed to God's will or to fate, which is somehow preordained, for we
resist the thought that outcomes may be determined by forces that interact
in random, unpredictable ways, People generally do not accept the notion
of chance or randomness. Even dice players behave as though they exert
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some control over the outcome of a throw of dice.
Because of this need to impose order on our environment, we may seek
and see patterns that actually are not there. Some recent research in pal-
eobiology seems to illustrate this tendency. A group of paleobiologists
has developed a computer program to simulate evolutionary changes in animal
species over time. But the transitions from one time period to the next
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are not determined by natural selection or any other regular process; they
are determined by computer-generated random numbers. The patterns that
are produced by this program are very similar to the patterns in nature
that paleobiologists have been trying to understand. Events that seem, in-
tuitively, to have a very strong pattern, were in fact generated by random
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processes. This suggests that there may, in fact, be no valid causal
explanation of evolution.
B.F. Skinner noted a similar phenomenon in the course of experiments
with the behavioral conditioning of pigeons. The normal pattern of these
experiments was that the pigeons were given positive reinforcement, in the
form of food, whenever they pecked on the proper lever at the proper time.
To obtain the food regularly, they had to learn to peck in a certain se-
quence. Skinner demonstrated that the pigeons "learned" and followed a
26pattern even when the food was actually dispensed randomly.
These examples suggest that in military and foreign affairs, where
the patterns are at best very difficult to fathom, there may be many events
for which there is no valid causal explanation. Our bias against random-
ness as an explanation may cause us to impose a pattern on these events
so that we see causal relationships that are not in fact there. It clear-
ly does not do much for our ego as analysts to admit that some of the
things we are called upon to explain might be caused by random processes
such as the random numbers used in the paleobiologists' computer program.
And it is certainly unlikely that the customers for our intelligence would
appreciate such an explanation, so there are motivational biases that rein-
force the cognitive bias favoring order over randomness.
The need to perceive order and reason in the world around us causes
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us to overestimate the extent to which other countries or other people are
pursuing a coherent, rational, goal-maximizing policy. We tend to see the
actions of other governments as the intentional result of central direc-
tion and planning, and to overlook the fact that the same behavior might be
more accurately explained by accident, blunder, the unintended consequence
of well-intentioned policy, improperly executed orders, bargaining among
semi-independent bureaucratic entities, or following standard operating
procedures under inappropriate circumstances.
Internal vs. External Causes of Behavior
Attribution theory is a sub-field of psychology dealing with how we
assess the causes of behavior. Most research in attribution theory employs
a basic dichotomy between internal and external causes of behavior. In-
ternal causes include a person's attitude, beliefs and personality. Ex-
ternal causes include such factors as incentives and constraints, role re-
quirements, or difficulty of a task. Attribution theory examines the cir-
cumstances under which we attribute behavior to either internal or exter-
nal causes. Such differences in attribution may have significant conse-
quences for behavior, as our response to friendly or unfriendly actions of
other persons may be quite different if we attribute the behavior to the
nature of the person than if we see the behavior as resulting from situa-
tional constraints over which that person had little control.
The fundamental attributional error is to overestimate the importance
of personal traits and dispositions in determining behavior. When we ob-
serve another's behavior, we are too quick to infer broad personal quali-
ties or dispositions from this behavior and to expect that these same dis-
positions will determine the actor's behavior in other contexts. The so-
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called "Peter Principle" is a simple illustration of this bias. An employee
is promoted to his or her level of incompetence because the supervisor at-
tributes the employee's promotion-meriting performance exclusively to per-
sonal ability and assumes that this personal characteristic will continue
to determine performance despite changes in the situational context. Much
research into personality traits, however, shows that personal traits are
not consistent determinants of behavior; which trait predominates at any
given time is heavily dependent upon the situational context in which the
behavior takes place.
Most interesting for our purposes, however, is that susceptibility to
this attributional error depends upon whether we are examining our own be-
havior or observing the behavior of others. We tend to attribute the be-
havior of others to the nature of the person, while we see our own behavior
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as conditioned by the nature of the situation in which we find ourselves.
This bias is partially explained by differences in information avail-
able to actors and observers. In evaluating our own behavior, we compare
our present behavior with our own past behavior in similar or different
contexts. This past behavior is well known to us, so it is easy to com-
pare the impact of different situations on our behavior over time. This
causes us to focus on the nature of the situation as the principal variable
explaining differences in our own behavior. The observer of another per-
son, on the other hand, typically lacks this depth of knowledge of the
other person's behavior in other circumstances. So the observer's orien-
tation is to examine how the actor's behavior compares with the behavior
of other persons under similar circumstances. This prompts a focus on the
nature of the person rather than on the nature of the situation. Other
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differences in perspective between actor and observer may also contribute
to this bias.
I know of no experimental evidence that this bias applies to our percep-
tion of the behavior of countries as well as the behavior of individuals,
but such an extrapolation seems plausible and is supported by personal ex-
perience. Reportedly one of the persistent differences between intelligence
analysts responsible for the Soviet Union and those responsible for China
and working on Sino-Soviet relations is this: Soviet analysts tend to at-
tribute Chinese behavior to the nature of the Chinese, while they see Soviet
options as circumscribed by many situational constraints. Chinese analysts
tend to take the opposite view, that is, that the Russians behave like
Russians while Chinese actions are the product of the situation in which
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the Chinese find themselves.
Thus familiarity, either with oneself or the country for which one is
responsible, produces empathy and understanding, and attribution of behavior
to external circumstances rather than to the nature of the actor. Lack of
information concerning the past behavior and current circumstances of an
actor, or lack of empathy for whatever reason, causes us to perceive that
actor's behavior as stemming from the nature of the actor. As with all the
cognitive biases, we are describing a tendency, not a black and white rule
that applies to all people in all cases. In assessing the behavior of
others, we normally do make some allowance for situational pressures and
role requirements, but this allowance is often insufficient.
A principal implication for international relations is that this bias
sows the seeds of mistrust and misunderstanding, as countries have quite dif-
ferent perceptions of the causes of each other's behavior. There are also
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several corollaries and related biases that are quire relevant to the analy-
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sis of international affairs.
When we fall prey to the attributional bias of judging another country's
behavior to be more heavily influenced by the nature of the people or the
leaders than is in fact the case, we tend to perceive this state as more
hostile than it really is. If actions that adversely affect our interests
are attributed to the predispositions and attitudes of the other country,
we perceive these actions as expressing hostility. If, however, the other
nation's actions are actually responsive to situational constraints, it is
unnecessary to assume hostile intent. Similarly, attribution of behavior
to personal or national characteristics and the assumption that these char-
acteristics are consistent over time leads to the perception of behavior
as inflexible and unchanging. Conversely, to the extent that behavior is
attributed to external circumstances, it is perceived as flexible and sub-
ject to influence by our own actions.
Implications for Deception
Deception planners need to avoid these biases relating to causality in
order to evaluate accurately the situation in which they find themselves
and to estimate how a target is likely to respond to whatever information
is provided. But the most direct relevance of these biases to the question
of deception is their impact on the analyst seeking to detect and avoid de-
ception. Both biases tend to make analysts perceive deception when it is not
really there.
Deception is an example par excellence of a policy that is centrally
directed, well planned, and highly coherent and rational. As a causal
explanation, deception is intrinsically satisfying precisely because it is
so orderly and rational. When other persuasive explanations are not avail-
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able (perhaps because the phenomena we are seeking to explain were actually
caused by mistakes, failure to follow orders, or other factors unknown to us),
deception offers a convenient and easy explanation. It is convenient because
intelligence analysts are generally sensitive to the possibility of deception,
and its detection is often taken as indicative of sophisticated, penetrating
analysis. It is easy because almost any evidence can be rationalized to fit
the deception hypothesis; in fact, one might argue that once deception has
been raised as a serious possibility, this hypothesis is almost immune to
disconfirmation. While deception is by no means an uncommon phenomenon, I
suspect that our bias toward seeing events as part of an orderly pattern
leads us to perceive deception more frequently than is warranted.
This tendency to perceive deception is reinforced by the bias toward per-
ceiving the behavior of others as caused by the nature of the person rather
than by situational constraints. When another person or government employs
deception, we commonly (although perhaps erroneously) consider this decision
to stem primarily from the nature of the person or government rather than
the nature of the situation in which this person or government finds it-
self. It is satisfying to attribute deviousness and malevolence to our
enemies. And if they are devious and malevolent, of course they will en-
gage in deception. Deception is "them" acting, not just responding to events.
When we observe activity that we do not otherwise understand, deception may
be a more attractive explanation than to simply admit that we have insuf-
ficient information or understanding of the situation.
Our recollection of the many cases in which deception has proven suc-
cessful makes us think we should be more rather than less sensitive to the
possibility of deception. But the fact that deception is generally success-
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ful does not mean people are insufficiently disposed to perceive it, or that
increased alertness will protect us from being taken in. Deception is gen-
erally successful despite our predisposition to perceive it, not because of
any tendency to overlook this possibility. As we shall see shortly, greater
alertness to deception increases our vulnerability to the most common form
of deception. To determine whether governments tend to be oversensitive to
deception or not sensitive enough, it is insufficient to look only at the
many cases in which countries have been deceived. It is equally necessary
to examine cases in which they have perceived deception erroneously. Such
cases may be equally common but are seldom documented as they are intrinsi-
cally less interesting to historians.
CONCLUSION
We have examined a number of perceptual and cognitive biases and their
implications for strategic deception and counterdeception. For quick refer-
ence, the biases and their implications are summarized in tabular form in
the Appendix. Three primary conclusions emerge from this examination.
1. Perceptual and cognitive biases strongly favor the deceiver as
long as the goal of deception is to reinforce a target's preconcep-
tions or to simply create ambiguity and doubt about the deceiver's
intentions. Under these circumstances, which are by far the most
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common forms of deception, the deceiver clearly holds most of the
cards. If the situation is such that the deceiver can achieve
planned goals only by changing the target's preconceptions, how-
ever, the target is shielded by many of the same perceptual and
cognitive biases that otherwise work to his or her disadvantage.
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2. While security is obviously desirable for any deception plan,
perfect security is rarely attained and deceptions succeed without
it. When the deception is planned to reinforce preconceptions,
the target's ability to rationalize discrepant information tends
to offset security leaks and uncontrolled channels of information.
Even after a source of information has been discredited, impres-
sions created by the information from that source tend to persist.
3. Analysts are generally predisposed to perceive deception. In-
stances of successful deception are far easier to recall than
cases in which deception was not employed under similar circum-
stances, and this sensitizes us to the possibility of deception.
We are attracted to deception as an explanation for otherwise in-
congruous events because the deception explanation enables us to
impose order and reason on a disorderly world, and because it en-
ables us to attribute deviousness and malevolence to our enemies.
These factors sometimes cause us to perceive deception when it is
not really present.
One might think that the analysts' predisposition to perceive deception
would offset the advantages we have attributed to the deceiver, but such is
not the case. Deception is generally successful despite the target's alert-
ness. According to Barton Whaley's analysis of 68 cases of strategic sur-
prise or deception between 1914 and 1968, deception was successful in 91% of
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the cases in which it was attempted. As in so many other fields, major
advantages accrue to the actor who seizes the initiative, rather than to
the reactor who seeks to parry the initiatives of others. Whaley's finding
highlights the unenviable position of the intelligence analyst seeking to
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avoid being deceived, and the remainder of our conclusion is devoted to a
closer look at the analyst's plight and what might be done to alleviate it.
The fundamental problem involved in avoiding deception, and avoiding
intelligence surprise in general, is the problem of determining when to
change our mind in response to new information that does not jibe with
our current conception. If we are unreceptive to new information, we can-
not learn from experience or keep abreast of changing circumstances and
situations. If we are too receptive, we are unduly influenced by the most
recent report or the latest short-term trend. There is no magic formula
that tells us when to discount discrepant evidence and when to revise our
thinking to take it into account. But as a general rule, we err more of-
ten on the side of being too wedded to our established views and thus too
quick to reject information that does not fit these views, than on the
side of being too quick to revise our beliefs. Thus, most of us would
do well to be more open to evidence and ideas that are at variance with
our preceonceptions.
In his study of surprise attacks, Abraham Ben-Zvi identified two kinds
of information on which estimates of impending conflict might be based -
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strategic assumptions and tactical indicators. Examples of strategic
assumptions include the U.S. belief in 1941 that Japan wished to avoid war
at all costs because it recognized U.S. military superiority, and the
Israeli belief in 1973 that the Arabs would not attack Israel as long as
they lacked sufficient airpower to secure control of the skies. Such pre-
conceptions are based on a large body of interrelated evidence and have
usually been held for a long time. Tactical indicators are the specific
reports concerning preparations or intent to initiate hostile action, or
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more generally, specific evidence from current events that indicates the
direction in which events are moving. This distinction between strategic
assumptions and tactical indicators is very similar to the distinction we
have been making between pre-existing beliefs and new information.
Ben-Zvi studied five cases of intelligence failure to foresee a sur-
prise attack: Pearl Harbor, German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941,
Chinese intervention in the Korean war, Chinese attack on India in 1962,
and the Arab attack on Israel in 1973. He found that in each case tacti-
cal indicators of impending attack were present but were discounted because
they conflicted with analysts' and policy makers' preconceptions.* The
strategic assumptions were not revised in the light of the increasing
flow of contrary tactical information. Ben-Zvi argues that whenever stra-
tegic assumptions of intention to attack and tactical indicators of impend-
ing attack converge, an immediate threat is perceived and appropriate pre-
parations are made. But when there is a divergence between strategic as-
sumptions and tactical indicators, the strategic assumptions always pre-
vail. Thus despite the evidence of preparations for an attack, the actual
attack comes as a "surprise," as in the five cases analyzed. Ben-Zvi
concludes that tactical indicators should be given increased weight in the
decisionmaking process.
This may well be appropriate advice. It certainly accords with our
conclusion that people err most often by being too quick to reject new in-
formation that does not conform to their preconceptions. But Ben-Zvi does
not consider cases in which alarming tactical indicators have been proper-
ly discounted as maneuvers, bluff or deception rather than as indicators
of impending attack. Ascribing more weight to tactical indicators in all
* CIA post morterns on cases of intelligence failure have also found that
information that would have permitted an accurate assessment was generally
available, but that this information assumed significance only with the
benefit of hindsight.
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cases will increase the frequency of false alarms, and this too entails
costs. While we should in general be more open to changing our minds as a
result of discrepant tactical or other information, in any single case it
is impossible to know a_ priori whether we should revise our estimate or
stick with a long-established view.
Alertness to the possibility of deception can influence the degree of
one's openness to new information, but not necessarily in a desirable direc-
tion. The impetus for changing one's estimate of the situation can only
come from the recognition of an incompatibility between a present estimate
and some new evidence. If people can explain new evidence to their own
satisfaction with little change in their existing beliefs, they will rarely
feel the need for drastic revision of these beliefs. Deception provides
a readily "available" explanation for discrepant evidence; if the evidence
does not fit one's preconceptions, it may be dismissed as deception. Fur-
ther, the more alert or suspicious one is of deception, the more readily
available is this explanation. Alertness to deception presumably prompts
a more careful and systematic review of the evidence. But anticipation of
deception also leads the analyst to be more skeptical of all the evidence,
and to the extent that evidence is deemed unreliable, the analyst's pre-
conceptions must play a greater role in determining which evidence to be-
lieve. This leads to a paradox: the more alert we are to deception, the
more likely we are to be deceived.
Actually, this paradox applies only to the type of deception in which
the deceiver's goal is to exploit and reinforce our preconceptions. If
the deceiver's goal is to sow confusion or make us change our mind, it will
be to our advantage to ignore the evidence and stand by our preconceptions.
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The problem of how to detect deception is not generically different
from other common problems of intelligence analysis. It is, for example,
very similar to the general problem of early warning. From a cognitive per-
spective, there are no prescriptions that apply uniquely to the deception
problem. Consideration of ways to improve our ability to detect deception
is a part of the much broader problem of improving intelligence analysis
in general.
While cognitive psychology does not provide direct insights on how to
detect deception, it can be of indirect assistance. By better understand-
ing how our mind processes information, including the diverse perceptual
and cognitive biases to which we are subject, we can hope to compensate for
some of these basic problems in human information processing. We can iden-
tify situations in which our normal faith in our impressions should be
suspended, and in which some more systematic means of handling the evi-
dence may be appropriate. We can also identify guidelines concerning the
types of analytical methods that may be most useful in supplementing in-
tuitive judgment.
A common factor in cases of successful deception, and in most cases
of intelligence surprise in general, is that analysts have become fixed in
a mind set that does not respond effectively to discrepant information.
Thus methods for breaking mind sets are particularly relevant to the pro-
blem of detecting deception. This includes such practices as competitive
analysis, use of a devil's advocate to analyze alternative scenarios, in-
terdisciplinary brainstorming and other techniques that facilitate the
identification and analysis of alternative hypotheses.
Current research suggests that people perform poorly at generating
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a full set of hypotheses. If the correct hypothesis is not even formula-
ted for consideration, there is clearly little chance of making an accurate
estimate. Formation of alternative hypotheses and identification of the
indicators and observables associated with each hypothesis helps direct an
economical search for information. The hypotheses also serve as an organ-
izational structure for storage and recall of information in memory.
There is a strong tendency to view the significance of evidence in
terms of the degree to which it supports, contradicts or seems irrelevant to
what we already believe to be the case. We overlook the fact the evidence
we think of as supporting our case may also be quite consistent with sev-
eral alternative hypotheses, so we draw from the evidence false confirma-
tion of our pre-existing beliefs. We can avoid this by evaluating the evi-
dence in terms of its diagnosticity in helping revise our estimates of the
relative likelihood of each hypothesis.
As we saw in the old woman-young lady experiment, it is difficult to
look at the same data from several different perspectives. Yet this is
exactly what is required for the simultaneous evaluation of multiple hypo-
theses. Some sort of methodological aid is useful to facilitate this task,
as an aid to memory and to help integrate the many probabilistic judgments
that are required. There are a variety of computer programs available for
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this purpose, but significant benefits might also be obtained by simple
paper-and-pencil techniques.
Our intention in these final paragraphs has been to be suggestive,
not prescriptive. Traditional, intuitive methods of analysis have not been
sufficiently effective in detecting deception, so it is necessary to explore
other alternatives. We have tried to point out some useful directions for
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this exploratory effort, but a fuller discussion of analytical methodology
goes far beyond the scope of this paper.
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APPENDIX
REVIEW OF BIASES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR DECEPTION
BIAS IMPLICATION
Perceptual Biases
We tend to see what we expect to see.
It takes more information, and more un-
ambiguous information to recognize an
unexpected phenomenon than an expected
one.
It is far easier to reinforce a target's
existing preconceptions than to change
those beliefs.
Perceptions are quick to form but resis-
tant to change. Once we have formed an
impression about an object, event or
situation, we are biased toward continu-
ing to perceive it in the same way.
It is far easier to reinforce a target's
existing preconceptions than to change
them. Ability to rationalize contra-
dictory information may offset hazards
of security leaks or uncontrolled chan-
nels .
Initial exposure to ambiguous or blur-
red stimuli interferes with accurate
perception even after more and better
information becomes available.
Impact of information can be affected by
the sequence used in feeding it to a tar-
get.
Biases in Estimating Probabilities
We estimate probability according to
how easily we can imagine an event or
recollect instances of the event.
Known as availability bias.
Because deception is more salient than
absence of deception, analysts will be-
lieve deception is more common than it
really is, and thus be more disposed to
perceive it. Employees of watch offices
will generally overestimate the probabil-
ity of whatever they are watching for.
This leads to the cry wolf syndrome that
can be exploited by deception planners.
Analysts seeking to avoid surprise should
not make judgments based on availability.
We estimate probability by seizing upon
some natural starting point as a first
approximation, then adjust the estimate
incrementally in response to new infor-
mation or further analysis. Normally
we do not adjust enough. Known as an-
choring bias.
Because people do not revise their judg-
ments enough as new information is re-
ceived, it is easier to conduct a de-
ception aimed at reinforcing the target's
existing preconceptions than to change
these beliefs.
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In translating our subjective feel-
ings of certainty into a probability
estimate, we are generally overconfi-
dent about how much we know.
Overconf idence exacerbates the impact of
all the biases, for if we are satisfied
with our judgments we will make fewer
efforts to improve them. An overconfi-
dent target is easier to deceive when
the deception involves exploiting ex-
isting preconceptions.
Biases in Evaluating Evidence
We have more confidence in conclusions
drawn from a small body of consistent
data than from a larger body of less
consistent information. We are over-
sensitive to consistency.
The deceiver should control as many in-
formation channels as possible to re-
duce the amount of discrepant informa-
tion available to the target. Decep-
tion can be effective even with a small
amount of information
We have difficulty factoring the ab-
sence of evidence into our judgments.
The absence of information that would
normally be available is often over-
looked. "Out of sight, out of mind."
For the deception planner, errors of omis
sion will be less serious than errors of
commission. Analysts seeking to detect
deception should analyze what inferences
can be drawn from the fact that some evi-
dence is not observed.
Impressions tend to persist even after
the evidence on which they are based
has been fully discredited. You can-
not "unring" a bell,
The consequences of a security leak may
not be as serious as might otherwise be
expected.
Biases in Perceiving Causality
We are biased toward seeing events as
part of an orderly, causal pattern.
Randomness, accident and error tend to
be rejected as explanations for obser-
ved events. We overestimate the extent
to which other people or countries are
pursuing a coherent, rational, goal-
maximizing policy.
We are predisposed to perceive deception
even when it is not really there. As
a causal explanation, deception is in-
trinsically satisfying because it is so
orderly and rational.
We tend to attribute the behavior of
others to the nature of the person or
country, while we see our own behavior
as conditioned by the nature of the
situation in which we find ourselves.
We are predisposed to believe our enemies
will engage in deception. It is satisfy-
ing to attribute deviousness and malevo-
lence to our enemies, and if they are de-
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ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS OF COUNTERDECFPTION
Theodore R. Sarbin
My aim in this paper is to explore soine ideas on the detection and
identification of communications that are intended to influence the receiver
to perform in ways that are advantageous to the sender. My agenda is as
follows: first to consider the scientific approach to the detection of
deception and other strategies; second, to examine whether the scientific
paradigm has proven useful in the study of strategic interactions, and to
question whether the assumptions underlying the scientific paradigm are ap-
propriate to the study of deception and other strategies; and third to ex-
plore an alternative to the traditional models of scientific analysis;
the employment of the narrative.
Many analysts of intelligence in their daily work no longer rely on
scientific models to predict the political and military actions of an ad-
versary. Nevertheless, various government agencies, including military
and intelligence, encourage and financially support scientific organizations
that have the mission of improving the practice and detection of deception
and other strategies. It is expected, or hoped, that the scientific com-
munity would come up with formulae, equations, nomograms, etc., the better
to predict the actions of an adversary. Although the research on communica-
tion and its management is directed to many problems, none of the problems
is so critical as the development of tools and techniques to help determine
whether a given set of signals from an adversary is to be classified as em-
pirically valid (Does it mean what it says?) or invalid (Does it mean some-
thing other than what it says?). For example, in 1944, the German High
Command had to predict the actions of the Allied Armies on the basis of a
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large number of signals, the most salient being the Normandy landings. One
of two interpretations had to be selected and acted upon; (a) the Normandy
landings were what they appeared to be— the long awaited assault on the
Continent, or (b) the landings were not what they appeared to be, but rather
an action intended to divert troops held in readiness for an expected as-
sault at Pas de Calais.
The traditional approach to scientific problems is to instantiate the
particular set of circumstances as a member of a class and then to predict
to the particular case from knowledge of the characteristics of the class.
This is the method that Scheibe has identified as sagacity. It assumes
that a class can be constructed and the criteria of similarity can be
established for the purpose of sorting communicative acts. That classes
and criteria can be established is indubitable. Whether cases of the type
illustrated above can be sorted into a class for the purpose of making pre-
dictions has not yet been established.
To predict from class membership means having available inductively-
derived base rates. As I shall take pains to point out presently, the use
of base rates is rational when occurrences are repetitive and where predic-
tions are expected to be in error proportional to the prior probabilities
contained in the base rates.
THE PREDICTION PROBLEM
The basic problem for the strategist and the analyst of strategy centers
on the ability to predict the actions of an adversary. Whether the target
is a singular person, a group such as a football team, a military unit, or
a political entity, one's chances of gaining or holding an advantage are
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proportional to the ability to predict the conduct of the adversary. To
the extent that predictions are valid, to that extent does the actor have
the edge in any competitive situation. His own strategic plans will take
into account the predicted actions of his adversary.
The study of the prediction of behavior has an interesting history.
Although prophecy is probably as old as civilization, it was not until the
1920's that social scientists applied statistical methods to problems the
better to increase the reliability and validity of their practices. For
example, sociologists and penologists raised the question: how can we in-
crease the accuracy of forecasting the behavior of paroled felons? At about
the same time, the military establishment sought methods for increasing the
effectiveness of their selection procedures. In the 1930' s the problem of
predicting outcome of college-going became a well-worked problem. The
question was phrased: how to predict success or failure on parole, in the
army, in the university, etc.? Applicants for flight training, for example,
could be screened beforehand on the basis of prediction tables. Those ap-
plicants for whom failure was predicted would be rejected and expensive
training programs could be reserved for those for whom the predictions were
favorable.
Borrowing the statistical methods that had been used by life insurance
actuaries, social scientists constructed equations and prediction tables to
predict outcomes of parole, military training, and higher education. Later,
the methods were employed in medical and psychiatric settings.
The psychology of prediction has been elaborated by a number of authors,
among them Horst^, Sarbin^, Meehl^, Sarbin, Taft and Bailey^, Kahneman and
Tversky° and others. The earlier work focused on the problem of how to
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improve, through the intervention of a human judge, clinician, or analyst,
predictions made on the basis of prior probabilities.
The general form of the statistical prediction can be illustrated as
follows:
70 percent of persons with charactistics X, Y & Z succeed in
a given outcome; Jones has characteristics X, Y, & Z. There-
fore, Jones has a 70 percent chance of success. (An alternate
way of stating the conclusion is: The statement "Jones will
succeed" has a credibility of .7.)
Implied in the use of prior probabilities or base rates is the assumption
of a stable world, the assumption of "the continuity of nature," so that
prior probabilities constructed last year will be applicable this year.
The use of the syllogism is often unrecognized as the cognitive model
for predicting the actions of persons. (Or for that matter, for predict-
ing the weather.) The illustration above is a "probabilif ied" version of
syllogistic reasoning. The quantified major term is a more precise way of
writing the major term in the major premise. In formal logic, the premise
would be written "Some M are P," or "Some persons with characteristics XYZ
succeed in a given outcome." Even though "some" is translated to a pro-
portion, the logical problem remains: no determinate prediction can be
made about Jones. No conclusion is permissible when the major premise is
qualified by "some."
The statistical inference model, outlined above, arose as an adaptation
of logical inference. The syllogisms of Aristotle reflected the accumu-
lated wisdom of the ancients on how to solve problems, i.e., how to think.
If syllogisms of the form All X are Y or No X is Y were sufficient to deal
with the exigencies of human existence, no modification of the rules of
syllogistic inference would be necessary. But most human situations, when
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translated into the language of propositions and premises, are described
without the categorical All or None , Human beings must solve problems
from premises of the form: Some X are Y, or Some X are not Y . This type
of syllogism may be illustrated: Let us consider a class of deceptions, D.
Success in confounding the adversary is indicated by S.
Some D are S.
The strategist entertains a plan to employ Z, a deception of type D.
The minor premise becomes: Z is an instance of D.
Now the question: will Z, this instance of D, succeed or fail? Clearly,
no valid conclusion is possible. Z may be a member of the "some" class
that succeeds or of the "some" class that fails.
Suppose, following Whaley^, an interested observer collected a series
of cases in which D was employed and organized the data according to the
base rate formula
Number of Successes
Number of successes + number of failures.
Over a period of time, let us say, he collects 100 cases, 70 of which re-
sulted in success (from the point of view of the deception planner) and 30
in failure. The qualifier in the major premise, "Some," is now quantified
and may be written
70 percent of D are S.
Collocating with the minor premise,
Z is an instance of D,
does not remove the ambiguity from the syllogism. However, with the ad-
dition of the probabilistic token, one could construct the following con-
clusion: The probability that this particular instance of D will succeed
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is .7. In the hypothetical case, a deception planner who employed D a
large number of times would be able to report success 70 percent of the
time and failure 30 percent of the time. The statistical (actuarial) method
merely applies a formula or prediction table constructed from inductively
derived base rates.
In situations where extremely high stakes are at risk, the statistical
formula may be perceived as inadequate, if not dangerous. In nonmilitary
situations such as prediction of the outcome of parole, or admission to a
training program, or medical diagnosis, the use of base rates has been
declared inefficient because a certain predictable portion of the popula-
tion is assigned to false positive or false negative categories. From the
point of view of the individual who is assigned to a false positive or
false negative category, the criticism is usually stated in value terms,
i.e., the method is unfair or unjust.
The charge of inefficiency of the base rate method is a relative one.
The penologist is not satisfied with the application of prediction tables
because he might recommend the release on parole of a felon whose post-
prison behavior would assign him to that class of cases that recidivated.
On the other hand, the profits of life insurance companies amply demon-
strate the utility of the actuarial approach in predicting death rates.
If one is willing and able to accept the inevitability of the costs of
false positive and false negative predictions, the actuarial method has
has no peer. Such costs are regarded as necessary and tolerable in pre-
dicting, for example, achievement in college, success in training programs,
etc. When dealing with life and death issues, or with decisions with far-
reaching personal or community implications, inductively-derived base rates
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thai do not approach or 1 are perceived as inappropriate and even im-
proper. It is clear from reading the history of diplomacy and warfare
that political leaders and military strategists ply their craft by pre-
dicting the conduct of adversaries. Whether stated explicitly or not,
they cannot make a prediction involving high stakes on the basis of an in-
valid conclusion drawn from a major premise of the form Some X are Y .
To counter the criticism of inefficiency or unfairness, a method had
to be devised that would improve on the base rates. For this purpose, the
clinical method came into use. Sometimes called the intuitive method, the
cas^ study method, or individual mode of prediction, the clinical method
require the analyst to make a prediction on the basis of data that allow
tinkering with, or even ignoring, the base rates for individual cases.
A description of the clinical method of prediction is pertinent to the
problems of strategic interaction. The deception planner, for example, is
reluctant to develop a course of action on the assurance that it will be
successful 7 times in.10. In the first place, when operating in a high
stakes situation, (e.g., the possible loss of a fleet, a division, a cri-
tical engagement) extrapolation from base rates is not enough. In the se-
cond place, the deception analyst on the other side will have access to
the same inductions. The deception analyst, operating under conditions of
uncertainty, looks for inputs that will assure a modification of the pro-
bability statement toward or 1. In so doing, he will utilize whatever
information he has available, some of which may already be contained in
the variables of the prediction equation. When he uses additional inputs
he will do so by assigning such inputs to a class of events that are assumed
to be related to successful deceptions. That is to say, he may take events
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with known prior probabilities—probabilities based on induction—and modify
them on the basis of assumed and untested prior probabilites , His assump-
tions follow from the recognition that each case is unique.
An example from the prediction of college achievement will illustrate
the use of the clinical method of prediction. On the basis of two easily
obtained measures, score on a college aptitude test (CAT) and rank in high
school graduating class (HSR) the prediction of academic success of entering
freshmen was made. Let us say that the correlation coefficient for the
statistical method was .45. That is, predictions from the inductively de-
rived regression equation based on CAT and HSR had a modest correlation
with actual achievement (college grades). Applying the clinical method,
college psychologists made predictions as if each case were unique. The
clinical prediction was made "intuitively," presumably by the two predictor
variables and a mass of information gathered in a clinical interview con-
ducted before the student attended any classes, and other data which in-
cluded a preliminary interviewer's data sheet and impressions, additional
aptitude test scores, a structured autobiographical form, and, of course,
the impressions and information gathered during the clinical interview.
While commonsense expectations would favor the hypothesis that the large
amounts of clinical data together with the clinician's freedom in combining
and weighting the information would increase the accuracy of prediction,
in fact, the accuracy was decreased, the correlation coefficient being .35.
From their increased knowledge of each case, the clinical predictors altered
the weights assigned by the base rate formula. In the sample under con-
sideration8 the difference between the two coefficients was not statistical-
ly reliable.
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Numerous studies have been conducted over the past 40 years in which
predictions from inductively derived data are compared with predictions made
by experienced clinicians, diagnosticians, case workers, management special-
ists, etc. The returns are uniform. Whether working in medical, prison,
employment, psychiatric, or educational settings, the clinical predictions





The experience of comparing predictions from extrapolating base rates
with predictions made without the confining controls of prior probabilities
has not given us much to go on in our search for a model to study and to
predict the strategic behavior of an adversary. Even where the intuitive
predictor regards his task as that of predicting for the unique individual,
the retrospective analysis shows that his error rate is as large as, or
larger than predictions made from prior probabilities.
A number of investigators have tried to penetrate the reasons for sys-
10 ?i
tematic error in prediction, among them Hammond, Kahneman and Tver sky ,
-
LX
and Nisbett et al .
The findings of Kahneman and Tversky are especially pertinent to our
discussion. In their experiments, subjects are asked to make probability
estimates under various conditions. In general, they demonstrate that under
conditions of uncertainty human beings ignore base rate information, even
when it is available. Instead they make predictions on the basis of one
or more "heuristics." One of these heuristics is representativeness . People
make predictions on the basis of the degree that the outcomes to be pre-
dicted represent the salient features of the evidence on which the predic-
tion is made. If a person is instructed to predict the occupation of a
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target person, he will tend to be influenced by the information about the
target person that is representative of stereotypes held by the predictor.
Another heuristic is anchoring , the biasing effect of an initial judgment
on subsequent judgments. A third is availability , the readiness to recall
or imagine relevant instances. 1 -^ This heuristic would be similar to Bruner '
s
notion of "access-ordering." 1 ^
For the most part, Kahneman and Tversky do not offer a theory to help
account for their findings. The reader of their interesting experiments
is most likely to conclude that people naturally have trouble in using pro-
babilistic data, even under benign conditions.
The findings of Nisbett etal," working from a somewhat different per-
spective, converge with the findings of Kahneman and Tversky. Nisbett and
his collaborators assessed the responses of people to "consensus" informa-
tion and discovered that such information, like base rates, tends to be ig-
nored in making judgments. Their discussion offers a lead to a theoretical
statement. Quoting Bertrand Russell that "popular induction depends upon
the emotional interest of the instances, not their number, "16 they specu-
late that concrete, interesting information generates inferences because
such information serves to recall or construct scripts, schemas, or stories.
The chaining of inferences then follows the "well worn lines" of a familiar
story or script. Abstract information, such as base rates and consensus
data, are less rich in "potential connections to the associative network
by which scripts can be reached." 1 ' Both the Kahneman-Tversky studies and
those reported by Nisbett and his associates lead to the conclusion that
people tend to ignore the kinds of information that scientists, acting in
their role as scientists, regard as pertinent and compelling. Other kinds
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of information, logically and empirically remote from the solidity of
base rates, become the cues for inferences, predictions, and actions.
The reader of these reports, convinced that most human beings are less
efficient than necessary in processing information, might well ask: what
are the conditions that facilitate the downgrading and ignoring of solid
information and the utilization of untested information?
Answers to this question must be sought from a number of perspectives.
One of these, the origins and use of logical systems, allows a helpful
restatement of the general findings. Whether operating under benign con-
ditions or under conditions where the wrong prediction would lead to cata-
strophic outcomes, the ordinary person must operate with a major premise
the major term of which is qualified by "some." Even if the syllogism is
presented in quantified language, the actor makes the prediction with no
warranty of certainty. He knows that acting upon such solid knowledge
still carries a token of uncertainty and that the outcomes could be cata-
strophic.
It is at this point that the decision-maker employs the practical
reasoning that lead Aristotle and others to formulate elegant rules for
constructing syllogisms. Although most humans cannot recite the rules for
valid inference, their life experiences provide a general schema which in-
cludes the rule for dealing with major premises that contain the qualifier
"some." Without being analytic, a person "knows" that no valid conclusion
is possible from such a premise. The case under scrutiny would be perceived
as unique. In the interests of certainty, he directs his efforts to a
search for premises and for cues that would allow the construction of a
different premise, a premise presumably more suitable to unique events.
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Many problems are involved in writing about unique events. To be
sure, every event is unique in some way. Some events, however, share enough
features with others that it is possible to construct a class. For the
class to serve as a reliable aspect of one's problem solving requires
that it be relatively context-free. But no human is entirely free of con-
textual influences which accounts for the high frequency of premises with
the qualifier, "some." Where the magnitude of the cost of failure is catas-
trophic and the benefit of success is stupendous (historical turning points)
,
we can begin to think of such events as having unique properties, especial-
ly where knowledge of the success or failure of a putatively similar case
is part of the context in which the decision about a new case is being
made by both the strategist and the counter deception analyst.
I refer again to the Normandy landings. This was part of a larger
strategic plan, Operation Bodyguard, designed to influence the deployment
of Axis troops. The course of the political history of the world was
changed by the outcome, and this conclusion was entertained as a hypothesis
by both adversaries. Subsequent historical analysis supports the view that
the adversaries assigned the highest outcome value to their respective stra-
tegic plans. The Bodyguard strategy was a turning point, and for this rea-
son must be considered a unique event. The second feature that would
allow the description "unique" is the dependency of the event on context.
The economic, political, climatic, and technological conditions of June,
1944 cannot be reproduced, nor even approximated. Further, the strategic
plans of both adversaries are now public knowledge. Such knowledge is a
strand in the texture of events that would be colligated into the con-
struction of a class. Such hindsight information was of course not a part
of the context for the 1944 planners and analysts. The specification of
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context for strategic actions must be continually renewed. A particular
class of strategic actions at time will have different contextual charac-
teristics than at time, as the result of the employment of exemplars of
the class during the interval between t
1
and t^. Generalizations made at
1
!
t., , applied to events at t ? , are therefore unwarranted.
At this point we are in a quandary : since people are inclined to ignore
solid but probabilistic information, since neither statistical nor clini-
cal prediction is appropriate to the unique case, and since strategic de-
ceptions may be regarded as unique events, how can we discover or invent
a ::odel that would in principle facilitate the prediction of unique events,
such as the Normandy strategy? A brief recapitulation is in order before
I attempt an answer to the question:
A distillation of the review of the prediction problem accents the
commonly held belief that unique events are unpredicatble. When we con-
front reference cases that contain grand outcomes, such as Operation Body-
guard, we are forced to conclude that the valuable work on statistical and
intuitive prediction provides no foundation for a model to help plan or
detect strategic deceptions. A paradigm asserting causality is not ap-
plicable to the study of unique events. Unwarranted is the expectation
that the science of psychology and related sciences would clear the way
for constructing a usable model of strategic interactions. On analysis
it appears that the scientific orientation is simply not applicable. We
must consider a method drawn from sources other than contemporary science,
sources that are free from the requirement of machine-like causality.
At this point, I prepare the reader for an unconventional approach
to the complex task of seeking a metaphor to serve as a guide to unravel
the strands of the unique case.
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CAUSALITY AND THE UNIQUE CASE
We have all been influenced by a notion of causality that has its
modern roots in the work of Newton and subsequent generations of scientists.
That other ways of accounting for events are possible comes as a surprise
to many analysts of human and natural events. The modern scientist—physi-
cal or social—cannot imagine a world bereft of causality.
In everyday speech and in the language of science, causality is re-
garded as a granted category, In considering the world of relatively stable
objects, we are habituated to describing happenings in terms of antecedent
happenings. We are familiar with the metaphysic of a clockwork universe.
We have been raised on the causality of pushes and pulls, levers, wheels,
screws, force, and so. Observations can be repeated and causal relations
noted and confirmed. The popularization of psychology has influenced
people to seek causal attributions (often to support the assignment of
blame to others)
.
The utility of the root metaphor of the transmittal of force has given
warrant to the long forgotten transformation of the metaphor of the machine
to the status of an unquestioned given, i.e., a myth. Scientists concerned
with human and social problems have sought to mimic the physical scientists
in providing functional relations of the form: given stimulus conditions
X, the response B is the inevitable consequent. Such functional relations
have not been firmly established in the sciences dealing with human rela-
tions, save for trivial situations, A large error term remains after the
causal relationships have been described as tendencies, probabilities, etc.
The myth of the machine is kept viable and whole by explaining error as
the result of the imprecision of measurement or of inadequate sampling.
When the observations yield only probabilistic rather than determinate
115
relationships, the disclaimer is often expressed or implied that the error
term might be reduced, perhaps to zero, with increased sophistication in
methodology and sampling.
An alternate metaphysic, contextualism, does not require the causality
principle of mechanistic science. The root metaphor of contextualisnr-°
is the historic event in all its complexities. This alternate approach to
human knowledge and action has not been a feature of the scientific enter-
prise partly because its categories do not fit the causality requirements
of mechanistic science and partly because its home is in an alien province
—
the humanities, notably history and literature.
Contexts make a difference. Events are subject to change. Novelty
is expected. Stimulus condition A in context M will influence behavior
in one direction, in context N in another. Human beings carry on their
commerce with each other and with the world of nature episodically. The
episode, or the scene, is, in addition to being multifaceted, a changing
scene. In spite of attempts by several generations of psychologists to
employ the machine as the root metaphor of science, as a way of conceptuali-
zing human beings, the imperious fact of novelty and change (and unpre-
dictability) has frustrated the plan to mimic natural science. The root
metaphor of the machine is an inept figure to convey the complexity of
human interaction and the effects of constantly changing environments.
Centuries of experience support the claim that scenes, episodes, acts, and
lives can be aptly described without recourse to the transmittal-of-force
causality of mechanistic sciences.
Applying the foregoing discussion to the problem of strategic deception,
we turn to categories congenial with the contextualist approach to knowing.
If we look, e.g., at the work of R. V. Jones,^ or Anthony Cave Brown"^ we
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see descriptions of pertinent events in the genre of autobiography and of
history. Whether we take small episodes such as the "Crooked Leg"2l epi-
sode in Jones' book or a larger chunk of history, Operation Bodyguard, the
descriptions are more than mere chronologies, and more than causal attri-
butions. To be sure, the authors take temporal reference into account.
The essential feature of their work is the organization of a chaotic mix-
ture of events into a comprehensible plot. That is to say, the writers
take "events," "episodes," and "happenings" and string them together, not
randomly, and not exclusively on the temporal dimension, but according to
to a story line. The process of organizing or integrating happenings into
a comprehensible story is called emplotment . 22
I propose that the planners of strategic interaction, in the course
of their work, create a story, the elements of which are the bits and pieces
of action, some of which are manipulated and some of which are allowed to
happen "naturally." I shall try to show below that the planner, like any
teller of tales, does not string happenings together haphazardly, but fol-
lows a story line. The use of the epithet "plotter" (often used synony-
mously with conspirator) is noted here and shows at least a philological
connection between the actions of strategy planners and the actions of
story tellers and dramatists. Like the author of a novel, the author of
a strategy emplots a narrative. He fashions a story in which the charac-
ters are to play out their roles, influencing each other according to
the requirements of the plot. The task for the counter-deception analyst
of strategy is like the task of the literary critic or the dramatic critic
—
to fathom the intentions of the author, to "understand," to decipher the
meaning of the creative work. As I noted above, this approach is boldly
unconventional to scientists and technologists, but not historians and
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biographers. In the following pages, I shall attempt a justification of
this approach, at the same time exploring some of the features of emplot-
ment
.
THE NARRATIVE AS A METAPHOR
An underlying assumption of my theory is that human beings think, per-
ceive, and imagine according to a narrative structure. That is, given two
or three stimulus inputs, the person will connect them to form a story.
In penetrating the meaning contained in the writings of historians, White
has suggested, as a beginning, a fourfold-classified of emplotment : Comedy,
Tragedy, Romance, and Satire. ^ It is not the actions of individual charac-
ters but the plot structure that determines whether the reader will be
saddened, amused, inspired, or enlightened.
While at first blush the narrative as the root metaphor appears ir-
responsibly radical, the central idea makes contact with proposals from
more conventional sources. The narrative is a way of organizing episodes,
actions, and accounts of actions; it is a mode of incorporating not only
accounts of actions but also accounts of accounts of actions; it allows
for the inclusion of antecedent and concurrent events that guide action.
In short, the narrative is an organizing principle and may be compared with
organizing principles from more conventional sources. Hammond, for example,
employs an undefined "organizing principle" as a central category in
social judgment theory, Kahneman and Tversky make use of "heuristics"
as the equivalent concept in their version of decision-theory. In the
contructivist approach to the study of personality, Rosenberg employs an
organizing principle: implicit personality theory." People convert cues
to judgments on the basis of implicit but discoverable theories of
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personality. Gestalt psychology has demonstrated that organizing principles
are at work in the patterning or structuring of sense data. 26 The gestalt
idea was incorporated into most theories of perception and is communicated
by the aphorism: the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
Organizing principles are invoked, then, by scientists of many dif-
ferent persuasions to help account for the observation that human beings
impose structure on the flow of experience. Note that such organizing prin-
ciples are most often expressed in abstract or schematic language, such as
"heuristics," "integrative hypotheses," "patterning" and so on. The in-
tention in using such language flows from the tradition of mechanistic
science. To account for an observed set of regularities, the scientist
posits a force, e.g., libido, instinct, drive, habit, reinforcement, and
so on. In so doing, the scientist schematizes the flow of experience,
seeking structure and organization in abstracted schemata aided by mathe-
matical, geometric, graphic, economic, or other models. A note from
John Dewey puts it succinctly:
. . . the novelist and the dramatist are so much more
illuminating as well as more interesting commentators
on conduct than the schematizing psychologist. The
artist makes perceptible individual responses and thus
displays a new phase of human nature evoked in new
situations. In putting the case visibly and dramatically
he reveals vital actualities. The scientific systematizer
treats each act as merely another sample of some old
principle, or as a mechanical combination of elements
drawn from a ready-made inventory. 27
The introduction of the narrative as a organizing principle of cog-
nition is both continuous and discontinuous with the efforts of traditional
theorists of cognition. It is continuous in that it fills the need for a
conception to denote that the flow of experience is organized. It is dis-
continuous in that it is a departure from the usual notion that is tied
to the underlying metaphysic of mechanistic force. It is different also
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in that "narrative" has the properties of a lively metaphor. Unlike the
abstractions used by cognitive theorties, the narrative calls up images of
a story, a plot, characters, and a story teller, and in the narrative that
is dramatized, images of actors strutting on the stage.
It remains now to show that the metaphor of the narrative may serve
important heuristic functions in the study of cognition generally and in
the study of strategic interaction particularly.
In the paragraphs to follow, I want to make a case for the operation of
a narratory principle in thinking and acting. The narratory principle may
be the overarching conception for the schematized organizing principles
such as combination rules, integrating hypotheses, heuristics, and so on,
principles that are intended to illuminate how chaotic sense data are or-
ganized into structures and patterns. I shall try to show that it 'is the
narratory principle and its derivatives that give warrant to "meanings"
as the subject matter for students of the social and behavioral sciences.
To entertain seriously the proposal that the narratory principle
guides thought and action, we can look at any slice of life. Our dreams,
for example, are experienced as stories, as dramatic encounters, often
with mythic overtones. Our fantasies and daydreams fit into the notion
of story telling. The ritual of daily life and the pageantry of special
occasions are organized as if to tell stories. Our rememberings, our
plannings, our learning, even our loving and hating are guided by narra-
tive. The claim that the narratory principle facilitates survival is not
to dismissed as hyperbole. Survival in a world of meanings is problematic
without the talent to make up and to interpret stories about interweaving
lives.
Story telling is properly associated with fiction, fantasy, and
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pretending. Story telling is incorrectly associated with immaturity and
playfulness. The basis for regarding an interest in story telling as the
expected activity of childhood probably flows from an ideology that places
a high value on "realism," on empirical science, on technology, and a low
value on imagining and on playful behavior. In America, at least, such
a point of view is associated with the Puritan tradition. Both playfulness
and feigning were discouraged as improper conduct. One might look into the
relics of the Puritan tradition for cues to the apparent lack of interest
in grand strategic deception among American military commanders.
Belief in the association of imagining with immaturity has declined
in recent times. The ludic behavior described in R. V. Jones' serious
book The Wizard War 28 makes clear that grown men and women engaged in
the most deadly kind of work can insert playfulness into the flow of action.
To the potential criticism that the narratory principle is suspect
because it embraces fiction, one must reply with a defense of the imagina-
tion. It is true that when we think of stories we think of fiction, fantasy,
and pretense. From the standpoint of the tough-minded scientist, fictions
must be laid bare in the search for "truth." That "truth" is a conception
with unstable footings needs no support in today's ideological climate.
The defense of imagination in understanding human thought and action is
nowhere better illustrated than in the writing of history. No historical
treatise is a mere chronology of events. It is a selection of events which
the historian interweaves with interpretation, the latter arising from
the quality of his imaginings. The novelist and the historian both write
narratives; both are story tellers. The historian, unlike the novelist,
is expected to tell his stories so that they are consistent with chrono-
logy and reveal a "truth." No less a figure than Bentham sensitized us
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to the fact that fictions are a part of the "reality" in which we carry
on our business. Even the most positivistic scientists cannot get along
without injecting imaginings into their formulations. Every theoretical
conception or hypothetical construct is an exercise in imagining, in con-
structing and using fictions. As I said earlier in connection with the
discussion of organizing principles, the traditional scientist ordinarily
labels his fictions with opaque and abstract terms, thereby conferring
credibility and unwittingly diminishing the probability that the fictions
will be seen as such.
The discussion of fact and fiction is not idle. I want to accent
that all stories are compounds of "events" and imaginings. Whether novelist,
historian, or metallurgist, the person seeks to make sense of his world,
and where he has no firm hold on the connection between empirical events,
he organizes them into a formulation that meets one or more tests of co-
herence. I propose that such a formulation, when thoroughly examined,
will reveal the narratory principle at work.
Let us take a set of experiments designed to show how people attribute
causality through the employment of the narratory principle. Michotte^'
constructed an apparatus that allowed an observer to see two or more small
colored rectangles in motion. The experimenter could control the speed
and direction of the moving figures, and also the distance traveled.
Michotte demonstrated that for certain patterns of movement, the observers
would attribute causality to the movements of the rectangles. For example,
if rectangle A stopped after moving towards B, and if rectangle B then be-
gan to move, the observers would say that B got out of the way of A.
Michotte used these demostrations to support the view that causality is
immediately given in the organization of the stimulus display. His
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interest was in the effects of controlling the stimulus display and not
in the language used by the subjects to report the experience of causality.
In one set of experiments, A "triggers" an action from B. Michotte writes:
"Some very amusing descriptions are given: 'It is as if A's approach
frightened B an B ran away,' "It is as if A in touching B induced an elec-
tric current which set B going,' 'The arrival of A by the side of B acts
as a sort of signal for B to G,' 'It is as if A touched off a mechanism
inside B and thus set it going,' and so on. Also this experiment often
produces a comical effect and makes the observers laugh . . ."->V
From the description of the experiments it is clear that the meaning-
less movements of the rectangles were assigned meaning and described in
the idiom of the narrative. Each of the illustrative reports is a minia-
ture plot. Could laughter have been a response unless the observer emplot-
ted the actions of the rectangles as narrative figures in a comedy?
Another experiment is even more applicable to the argument that people
are ready to describe non-human actions by making up a story. Heider and
Simi5el-> -L made a short motion picture film of three geometrical figures that
moved in various directions and at various speeds. A large triangle, a
small triangle and a circle moved in the circumscribed field that also
contained a rectangle, a part of which was sometimes open. Observers re-
ported the movements of the geometrical shapes as human action. The three
forms in action became characters in dramatic encounters. The reports were
not about physical movements of geometric forms, but about people, and the
reports made use of sequences in the forms of plots and subplots.
One subject reported (in part): "A man has planned to meet a girl
and the girl comes along with another man. The first man tells the second
to go; the second tells the first, and he shakes his head. Then the two
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men have a fight and the girl starts to go into the room . . .She apparent-
ly does not want to be with the first man. The first man follows her into
the room after having left the second in a rather weakened condition lean-
ing on the wall outside the room. The girl gets worried and races from one
corner to the other in the far part of the room . . . The girl gets out of
the room in a sudden dash just as man number two gets the door open. The
two chase around the outside of the room together, followed by man number
one, but they finally elude him and get away. The first man goes back and
tries to open his door, but he is so blinded by rage and frustration that
on
he cannot open it . . ."
It is interesting to note that some of the observers were given the
instruction merely to report what they saw; other observers were instructed
to regard the geometric figures as human. The results were similar whether
the set for human action was explicitly given or not. It is also of in-
terest that there was considerable agreement on the qualities of the "char-
acters" and on the plots and sub-plots in the created stories.
These experiments call attention to the readiness of human beings to
organize and make sense of meaningless movements. No further demonstration
is needed that an organizing principle, emplotment , is at work. Emplotment,
however, needs further development. One source of support for the nar-
ratory principle is in the history and prehistory of humanity. Story
telling as a pervasive human activity is supported by the oral tradition,
at least as remote as the Homeric epics, by the ancient and still extant
practice of guiding moral behavior through the telling of parables and
fables, by the use of proverbs (which are shortened fables), by the uni-
versality of the story to entertain and to enlighten, and by the omnipresence
of special kinds of stories, myths, to illuminate cosmological questions.
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I do not want to give the impression that story telling is some postu-
lated "deep structure" within the nervous systems of human beings. Rather,
with the development of the skill in using symbols, in talking about ab-
sent things as if they were present, (i,e,, imagining) story telling has
become pervasive, so much so as to be unrecognized by most users of the
narratory principle.
In order to distance themselves from the immaturity of children's
fables and from the "superstitions" of mythic tales, our forbears employed
abstractions to account for action. In psychological science, for example,
it is considered anthropomorphic, if not animistic, to embody, or, better,
to "emperson" a thing, as in fact, was the case for the observers in the
experiments of Michotte and of Heider and Simmel. The more abstract and
schematic the term used in theory, the better. Accepting the thesis of
the narratory principle would blur the distinction between "reality" and
"fantasy," a distinction highly valued in many circles.
When we examine psychological theories, it is no great effort to in-
terpret the abstractions as persons in action. Freud, e.g., was unconcerned
with being charged with the misdemeanor of anthropomorphism. He wrote of
the struggles, battles, and maneuvers of his abstractions— id, ego, and
superego—as if they had become empersoned, had become narrative figures.
The vocabulary of psychological science is encumbered with abstractions
such as stimulus, response, reinforcement, drives, motives, instincts,
cognitions, percepts, and so on. The abstractions are the terms of specu-
lative languages. Only if a reader or hearer is primed with some concrete
instance of, say, the abstraction "stimulus," can his interpretation of a
speculative story have any meaning. These observations lead me to propose
that the theoretical language of psychology and related sciences arises
125
out of the efforts of scientists to dampen or to repudiate the effects of
the universal narratory principle. That is to say, my insistence on em-
plotment as a device for penetrating meanings is not such a radical de-
parture from scientific practice. Respected theorists also tell stories
with their speculations. They are less interesting, however, because
they deal with abstractions and it requires sustained effort to retrans-
late the speculation to its original story form, i.e., to retranslate
from the dead abstraction to the live metaphor.
The foregoing pages have been necessary background for the reader
interested in a psychological approach to strategic interaction. The
discussion flows from my conclusion that the well-entrenched psychology
of prediction under uncertainty is not applicable to the unique case, and
from the proposal that the concept of emplotment be explored as a means
of assessing an adversary's strategic behavior. The use of emplotment
is not a substitute for our knowledge about prediction; rather it is a
supplementary conception applicable to the unique case. Our interest con-
tinues to be the prediction of conduct of other. If we see a fox looking
up at grapes beyond his reach, the fable of the fox and the grapes in-
fluences our prediction of the fox's subsequent conduct
.
The discourse on emplotment is in the service of illuminating the
detection of deception and other strategic ploys, such detection providing
the basis for predicting the "next moves" of an adversary. Earlier, I dis-
cussed prediction from prior probabilities as prediction by sagacity, fol-
lowing the taxonomy suggested by Scheibe. Two other modes are identi-
fied by Scheibe: prediction through authority and control, and prediction
through acumen. When one party controls another, as in the master-slave
relationship, the role structure dicates complete predictability for the
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slave. From the slave's point of view, predictability of the master is
problematic
.
There are many situations in contemporary life where the role relation-
ship makes the behavior of the subordinate ; predictable. Physicians through
implied contractual agreements with their patients can hold an authority
relationship to the patient. Under these conditions, the patient is pre-
dictable. The role relationship of parent to young child, or monarch to
subject, of sergeant to private, is characterized by legitimate authority.
Ordinarily, the authority can in principle control the actions of the sub-
ordinate, and prediction of the latter by the former is likely to be cor-
rect. Perfect predictability is not to be expected, however: the slave
may rise against the master, the subject may rebel against the monarch,
the child may refuse to acknowledge the authority of the parent, and the
patient may seek another doctor. This mode of prediction is not likely to
lead to the use of strategic actions on the part of the dominant person in
the relationship. However, the subordinate person, in order to achieve
his goals and meet his needs, may indeed employ the whole armamentarium
of strategic interactions. For example, black slaves in the antebellum
South deliberately employed the strategy of "masking," among others, to give
the master the impression of a passive, lazy and stupid Sambo. 34 Applica-
tion to international affairs is straightforward. In principle, the power-
ful state can control the weaker by superior arms, achieving a form of
legitimate if coercive authority. No intricate strategies are needed to
predict the conduct of the weaker. The weaker state, without the resources
or access to power, must be ready to anticipate the actions of the stronger.
In order not to lose whatever rights, goods, advantages, etc., permitted
by the stronger, the weaker engages in strategic actions: deception,
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masking, secrets, and managed communication.
The third mode of prediction is most pertinent to our problem. Pre-
diction by acumen is the stock in trade of persons who can penetrate the
masks or expose the lie of the antagonist. He does this not by verbal
or nonverbal tips-offs or leakage^ but through empathic skill. "A poker
player can know that an opponent is bluffing ... by realizing that the
opponent does not expect to be discovered in the bluff and therefore feels at
liberty to bluff." Everyday experience confirms that some people possess
skill in "taking the role of the other." The skill in such role taking has
been demonstrated in various kinds of simplistic laboratory settings. Al-
though the topic has been studied under the rubric of social sensitivity,
empathy, and intuition, only the surface has been penetrated. What ap-
pears to be involved when one person consistently makes correct predictions
of the conduct of another? Various traits have been posited, such as
Einfuhling, social intelligence, empathy, and so. These trait names only
serve as synonyms for acumen. Literary sources abound in examples of this
quality: Chesterton's gifted sleuth Father Brown and the narrator in Edgar
Allen Poe's detective stories made their predictions of the behavior of
others through "taking the role of the other." This ability has been the
subject of research for several decades, but the attempt to find measurable
correlates has achieved only moderate success. Among other things, it seems
that the ability to take the perspective of another is related to the per-
son's ability to "decenter," i.e., to shift from an established anchor to
a new anchor in perceptual and cognitive judgments. However, the size
of the correlations are such that one would hesitate to select persons as
deception analysts exclusively on the basis of current research. 3' From
literary and autobiographical sources, one can infer that the person who
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is successful in taking the role of another is able to construct a scenario,
a story, and place himself in relation to the other features of the story,
physical features such a geography and climate, and social features, such
O Q
as role relationships with multiple role players. (See, for example, Levin "
and Hilgard 39 )
An important difference between acumen and the other modes of pre-
diction is its contextual nature. While prediction by sagacity and pre-
diction by authority can be achieved through "freezing" or "holding" a
matrix of cues and inferences, prediction by acumen involves the person's
moving with the experiential flow, and responding flexibly to change and
novelty as the target person enacts his roles. We shall return to the
topic of acumen in connection with proposals for improving the skill of
analysts of strategic interaction, including deception.
THE ARMAMENTARIUM OF STRATEGIC INTERACTION
Scheibe^'-' has identified four tools to aid in the major objectives
of strategy: security and cover of one's own plans and actions, and de-
tection of the adversary's plans and actions. He refers to these tools
as mirrors, masks, lies, and secrets. Although Scheibe's intent was to
illuminate the strategies of interpersonal action, his descriptions of
the tools of the strategist are germane to the analysis of military and
political deception. The tools are useful for any of the modes of pre-
diction, but they are especially pertinent for acumen.
The mirror is a metaphor for reflected information, sometimes called
feedback. A person, a team, or a large organization, to know its cap-
abilities, may emit certain responses in order to examine what is reflected.
A strategically placed mirror will help the actor guide his performance so
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as to avoid mistakes. In managing communications, a deception specialist
can send out ultimately verifiable information to determine whether his
communications are perceived as credible. A well known example is the
controlled German spy in WWII who reported to the Abwehr that Eisenhower
had set up headquarters in London. The information was not public know-
lege until a week later. The Abwehr command served as a mirror, giving in-
creased credibility to communications from this agent. In using the mir-
ror as a tool of strategy, the actor, team, or political unit asks the
question: How do I look to others? Or, alternately, how do others per-
ceive me? In the illustration above, the "control" for the spy would
assess his status as "credible."
No less than for other tools, mirrors do not have perfect validity.
Mirrors, both literal and figurative, can reflect actual states of affairs
and also illusory conditions. To continue the metaphor, mirrors may be
distorted and give unreliable reflections. The strategist will therefore
try to use multiple mirrors with different reflecting (information giving)
properties the better to construct a coherent theory of the adversary's
intentions.
A second tool is the mask. In personal or military strategy, its
purpose is to conceal plans and intentions and also to quide the adversary's
perceptions. Masks can be used as defenses, giving information to the ad-
versary that would indicate that one is stronger, more mobile, better
equipped, etc., to deal with any contingency. The mask is the tool of
espionage— the spy presents himself as one identity through appropriate
masking when, beneath the mask lurks another identity. Disguise serves
the masking function. The notional First United States Army Group (FUSAG)
that was stationed in East Anglia with rubber tanks, plywood dummy aircraft,
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and other imaginary features is a thoroughly discussed example of the use
of masks. The failure to penetrate the mask of strength in East Anglia
contributed to Hitler's unsuccessful defense plans.
It is in connection with masking that the theatrical metaphor is most
productive. The lessons of the theater are not learned overnight. The
deception planner must be alert to all the varieties of stagecraft in order
to present a credible mask. A secret memo (now declassified) dated 11 July
1944 is instructive. ** Clearly, the message has to do with maintaining
the credibility of FUSAG, the notional military force, "The attitude of
the 23d Hqs towards their mission is lopsided. There is too much MILITARY
, , . and not enough SHOWMANSHIP . The 603d Engr, on the other hand, con-
tains too much ARTISTRY and not enough G.I , TACTICS . The successful prac-
tice of military deception by the 23d Hqs requires the proper amount of
SHOWMANSHIP and ARMY PROCEDURES ,
"Like it or not, the 23d Hw must consider itself a travelling show
ready at a moment's notice to present:
THE SECOND ARMORED DIVISION-By Brooks
THE NINTH INFANTRY DIVISION-By Eddy
THE SEVENTH CORPS-By Collins
The presentations must be done with the greatest accuracy and atten-
tion to detail. They will include the proper scenery, props, costumes,
principals, extras, dialogue and sound effects. We must remember that we
are playing to a very critical and attentive Radio, Ground, and Aerial
audience. They must all be convinced."
The report continues with a number of specific stage directions one
of which is especially interesting." 'Get the installation in, then lie
down and take it easy. All you got to do is blow up (inflate) the (dummy)
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tanks and then you can go to sleep,' said one Colonel to a group of 603d
Camoufleurs. This is very bad 'theater.' The Colonel forgot that we were
in the show business and thought he was actually dealing with real tanks and
tankers. In reality only part of the job is done when the dummy tanks are
in position. They merely represent the 'scenery'— the PLAY must go on until
the 23d is released to return to its base camp. They must repair 'Tanks,'
hang out washing, go looking for cider, and generally mill around in typical
GI style."
The problems of the deception analyst are the obverse of the problems
of the "stage manager" who employs the strategy of masking. The more convin-
cing the staged performance the more acute must be the efforts at detection.
Lies are intentional communicative acts that misrepresent "facts."
The distinction between a lie and fiction is important to make. A lie is a
fictional statement or action that is represented as truth; a fiction is
represented as a fiction. Most of the work on deception has to do with the
telling of lies. Masking and lying overlap. For example, after the Normandy
invasion, Churchill and other leaders intimated that there would be addition-
al landings, communicating that the Normandy action was but one of a series
of planned military actions. The intent was to deceive the enemy, but the
communications were stated in oblique ways, encouraging ambiguity. To de-
tect lies, the strategy analyst faces the same problem as any person who
must make an assessment of another's expressive behavior: The ultimate
test is the comparison of the suspected deceptive communication with vali-
dating criteria, contrary or supporting evidence, and so on.
The fourth tool of strategic interaction is secrecy. In strategic
interaction, secrets perform a special function. They conceal plans with-
out the risk of using a distorted mirror, an ineffective mask, or a bald-faced
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lie. If the adversary is misled it is not because he has been exposed to
strategic information. The use of secrets in creating ambiguity is in-
dicated by Scheibe: ". . .there is another use of secrets for purposes
of gathering intelligence—as capital for exchange. One effective way of
gaining access to gossip is to offer a bit of gossip in exchange. Since
secrets can be so easily manufactured (as lies) it is a simple matter to
make up secrets as they are needed to prime the pump for the exchange of
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rumors. This is a major mechanism for the magnification of scandal.
The tools of strategic interaction—mirrors, masks lies, and secrets
—
are available to everyone. For this reason any advantage gained through
prediction by one party in an adversarial situation can be nullified by
the other. In the case of prediction by sagacity (the use of base rates),
one party can nullify the predictions of the other by misrepresenting him-
self. In the syllogism, All M are P, Jones may be an X but represent him-
self as a M. If his misrepresentation is successful, he will be instantiated
as a P
.
The nullification of prediction via authority and control is brought
about by the subordinate not "playing the game," by dissent, by contract
breaking, by rebellion, and by masking and lying. The assumption that the
person or group that controls a relationship has unilateral access to the
tools of strategic management cannot be maintained. All persons or groups
have access to the tools of information management. Whether they use such
tools is a function of considerations of risk, expediency, and so on.
Prediction via acumen can also be nullified. If both parties have
access to the same base rates (if they are equally sagacious) and if they
have no authority or control over one another, then the potential winner
in an adversarial situation will be the party with superior acumen. However,
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both parties can, in principle, "dope out" each other's next movements.
In such a case, the advantage will move back and forth as each makes ac-
curate predictions of the other's moves.
We have come full circle and again confront the question: under con-
ditions of uncertainty where stakes are high, where some predictions are
nullified by the operation of error-producing heuristics and biases, and
where other predictions are nullified by the adversary's use of the tools
of strategic interaction, can there be a science of information management?
Can we select and improve the ability of our counter deception analysts to
predict by taking the role of the other? Is it possible to gain a per-
manent advantage through increased acumen? These and other questions are
addressed herewith in the final section of this essay.
THE CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIC INTERACTION
From the foregoing account, it is transparent that I am not sanguine
about the development of a scientific or mathematical model for the study
of strategic interaction. My analysis directs me to seek answers to the
persisting questions by appealing to the humanistic tradition. Earlier,
I speculated on how the narrative could serve as a metaphor to quide our
research. The underlying postulate is that the deception planner has as
cognitive background a life lived according to narrative. He constructs
a story in imagination. Lyman and Scott refer to this construction as
the pretext to differentiate the imaginative planning from the actual
carrying out of the plan, i.e., the text. Given that the texts are in-
fluenced by many contingencies, can the pretexts be subjected to scrutiny?
A basic question needs to be answered: do individuals with common
ethnic orgins and national heritages develop certain kinds of plots and
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not others? If the Russians were plotting a strategic interaction, would
the plot follow from the tragic mode so often associated with both the
Russian novel and the Russian landscape? Would the Americans construct
plots out of the raw material of romance, conditioned by an abundance of
Hollywood movies and television dramas? Would the pretexts, the imagina-
tive planning, reflect the Puritan tradition that proscribes deception and
feigning? Or would the pretext be influenced by generals following the
romantic tradition of the Old South with its emphasis on honor, gallantry,
and manners? These questions appear unanswerable. Yet literary historians
are able, from hindsight, to identify the forms of emplotment used in a
particular account. ^^ To be sure, hindsight facilitates such historical
analysis because the outcome as well as the antecedent conditions are
known. The problem for the counter deception analyst is to construct a
plot from antecedent events and predict the outcome. We are still concerned
with prediction, but the foundations for the prediction are not specific
events, but the organizing principle that assigns meaning to the happenings.
The plot, once it is constructed, will dictate the possible endings for
the incomplete story.
It appears that the whole Bodyguard program 1^ (Cave Brown, 1975) could
be seen as emploted in satire. The accounts of British intelligence as pre-
sented by Cave Brown and Jones^° lead to the inference that such units as
the London Controlling Section, (the small group charged with formulating
plans for strategic deception in WWII), MI-5, and MI-6 engaged in their
work much in the manner of college students perpetrating a hoax. In fact,
Jones regards the hoax as a fitting model for strategic deception. Cave
Brown is clear in his judgment that the British deception strategists
wanted not only a victory but also wanted to leave the enemy perplexed,
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confused and dumbfounded. The reactions of the British participants to
reports of successful deception were hardly the reactions of serious minded
adults engaged in a terrible conflict, rather they seemed to enjoy the job
of creating a gigantic hoax. The form of emplotment that corresponds to
the hoas is satire, the prevailing trope is that of irony. Jones has im-
portant words to say about both.^'
Writing of the inductive building up of the hoax, Jones says: "...
the object is to build up in the victim's mind a false world picture which
is temporarily consistent by any test that he can apply to it, so that he
ultimately takes action on it with confidence. The falseness of the pic-
ture is then starkly revealed by the incongruity which his action precipi-
tates." In another place, he recognizes the need for "taking the role
of the other" and provides tangentially some support for the narratory
principle. "As with all hoaxes, the first thing is to put oneself in the
victim's place (indeed a good hoax requires a sympathetic nature) to see
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what evidence he has with which to construct and test his world picture."
Putting oneself in the victim's place, means of course, putting one-
self in the victim's place in the context of the developing world view.
Taking the victim's role implies that the role belongs to an ongoing drama,
a story, the victim being but one actor in an emplotted story.
General William H. Baumer, an American Army officer detailed to the
London Controlling Section, spoke of different attitudes of American and
British commanders to strategic deception. In his view, the typical American
military commander was not very different from the John Wayne stereotype:
"Throw everything at 'em" rather than embark on the uncertain outcomes of
deception. By contrast, the planners of the British strategies were men
and women, most of whom had had classical English educations, and felt at
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home in the world of imagination and literature. The American bias might
have been a reflection of the belief in the American superiority in fire-
power, troops, and material. Deception, then, would be an unnecessary and
perhaps delaying element.
In this connection, it is possible that the preference for strategic
interactions might be related to the long tradition of literature and drama
in England. Such traditions have a way of influencing educated men and
women to think and act with the words and deeds of historical and literary
figures. To perpetrate a hoax of such large proportions, then, may require
skill in imagining, in contemplating the counterfactual, in addition to
the skill in taking the role of the other, as Jones suggests. The skill
in imagining may indeed be related to the acquisition of many narratives,
narratives that can serve as hypotheses for the deception planner.
This essay may be regarded as a prolegomenon to a more extensive study
of its central thesis: that the narratory principle guides human actions,
including the planning of strategic interaction. To predict the unique
case, the known actions of a target person or organization serve as the
framework upon which a plot is constructed. The hypothesis that needs to
be tested is: the form of the narrative is recognizable by sensitive com-
munication analysts.
Can acumen be taught and learned? The literature of psychology con-
tains a number of programs that in principle might serve as heuristic de-
vices for the training of analysts of strategic interaction. If there is
merit to the proposal that detection occurs as the result of acumen, and
acumen follows from locating the noticed events in a plot, it would be
helpful to the detective to recognize opitmal strategies for examining
events. When is an "event" an event? The world is in constant flux.
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Like the historian, the observer in the counter deception business must
create boundaries for events.
In recent years, Newtson->l and Allen and Atkinson-^ have provided some
interesting leads to help identify the process that defines "events."
Laboratory experiments have been directed toward discovering the cor-
relates of various strategies of "unitizing" behavior. To a degree, per-
sons can be instructed to adopt a global or a fine-grained strategy for
segmenting the behavioral flow. Suppose the observation of interest is
a suspected spy waving farewell to a woman who has just entered a taxi.
The global unit observer would organize the behavior at a fairly gross
level; many components would be combined into a single unit. The observer
would, e.g., notethat the man waved his hat, at the same time saying "good-
bye," and the woman acknowledged with a smile and a wave of her gloved
hand as the taxi left the curb. Both actors' behavior appears to flow
smoothly and without apparent deliberation. The fine-unit observer would
concentrate on the detailed components. The man removed his hat with his
right hand. He raised the hat about six inches. He leaned forward. His
lips moved as if he were saying "goodbye." He stepped back and straightened
his posture as he placed his hat on his head, tugging the brim. The woman
entered the cab and sat in the middle of the seat. She crossed her legs,
modestly pulled her skirt over her knees, placed her purse on her lap.
Her left hand steadied the purse, then she bent her right arm at the el-
bow. She smiled a quick, nervous smile and waved her right hand in an
arc of about 10 degrees. As the taxi pulled from the curb, she turned her
head to keep her gaze fixed on the man.
Such close examination at first appears strange to an observer. Rather
than seeing a meaningful episode, he sees a multitude of miniature actions,
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to each of which he may assign an implicature. Under such an information
search strategy, the conduct appears deliberate, as if there were inten-
tions concealed by the sequence of overt behaviors. Such a direction
would lead to the creation of a plot structure around deception as a motif.
Newtson" and Allen and Atkinson-*^ have demonstrated, among other
things, that under no instructional set, people tend to have a preference
for a particular strategy of segmenting or "unitizing" the behavior stream.
The evidence points to an additional observation that is potentially
useful to the analysis of deception and the practice of counter deception.
When an unexpected action occurs, the observer will shift from whatever
unitizing strategy he is employing to one that is more fine-grained.
To use a more fine-grained segmenting procedure has an important im-
plication: the observer will read into the behavior the interpretation
that the actor (s) are being deliberate, rather than spontaneous; the in-
stantiation "being deliberate" rather than "spontaneous" is more likely to
be followed by the attribution of deception to the observed sequence.
I cite the work on segmenting as one approach that would lend it-
self to further study. It is consistent with the narratory principle, it
is amenable to experimental manipulation, and so on.
Other contemporary findings could be incorporated into an overall
theory of strategic interaction and communication management, among them
the extensive work of decision making in groups. 55 Since the usual
scenario of deception planners of counter deception analysts shows a half
dozen or more specialists sharing information and designing plots, it would
be important to show how each person's story influences the others; how
military rank influences which story is given preference; how rank in-




It is not likely that strategists and analysts of strategy will sur-
render their decision-making tasks to the "rational" use of prior probabi-
lities. Nor should they. The potential outcomes of their decisions are
often of such magnitude that each case must be regarded as unique. Prior
probabilities and the employment of models based on mechanistic causality
are of little value in predicting for the unique case. This conclusion is
not new for practitioners of strategy nor for the practitioners of counter
deception. However, it needs to be re-affirmed in order to maintain an
appropriate degree of skepticism about the potential contribution of hy-
pothesis-testing methods to the solution of problems arising from the
analysis of strategy.
This conclusion is familiar to scholars and practitioners whose roots
are in the humanities and in the arts of practical affairs. Although they
may not describe their work in the language used in this paper, it is clear
that they work from a set of assumptions other than those of scientists
whose research depends on replication of events and on the long-submerged
premise of the continuity of nature.
The premises most useful in the analysis of strategic interaction have
their home in the contextualist assumptions of the root-metaphor of the
historic event. ^° Rather than construing the world from the premise of the
continuity of nature, the contexualist assumes novelty and change. In pre-
dicting the actions of an adversary, then, the analyst of strategy will em-
ploy coherence as a criterion to assess the credibility of an analysis.
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Given the context, do the observations hang together? Such a question must
be resolved by imaginatively constructing a plot, then testing the implica-
tions of the plot against observations.
I have proposed in the previous pages that the analysis of strategy
is an exemplar of a broader category; the analysis of emplotment. Emplot-
ment is a literary category that has the warrant of history. It is to the
detailed study of emplotment that we must next turn in order to further
penetrate the problems of strategic analysis and counter deception planning,
Unlike the historian who emplots a narrative about events that have oc-
curred in the past, the analyst of strategy must emplot concurrent events,
events that are not frozen but fluid. To predict behavior under such con-
ditions requires acumen, a special skill on the part of the analyst.
The successful penetration of the strategic plans of an adversary,
then, is dependent on identifying analysts who can be characterized as
skillful in emploting the actions of others. A practical recommendation
arising from my conclusions is that efforts should be directed to identi-
fying counter deception personnel who demonstrate acumen in emploting the
strategies used by others. Research methods have already been developed
for the study of acumen as a tool of interpersonal perception. The next
step is to adapt these methods to the study of strategic interaction.
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ASSESSING THE VALUE OF AN
ORGANIZATIONAL APPROACH TO STRATEGIC DECEPTION
Ronald G. Sherwin
INTRODUCTION
The term, "strategic deception," refers to instances during war or
intese international competition where countries attempt to mask their
diplomatic and military strategy either by confusing or by misleading
their opponents. The deceiver's overriding objective is to gain a stra-
tegic advantage by encouraging an opponent to respond inappropriately to
the real state of affairs. Recent books and articles have sparked an
interest in this subject from both an operational and theoretical view-
point. They include a number of intriguing titles: Bodyguard of Lies ;
Ultra Goes to Wa r; The Wizard War ; Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision ;
and the "Rational Timing of Surprise."-*
Focusing on the strategic aspects of deception represents a concep-
tual reorientation to the phenomenon inasmuch as the study of "deception"
historically seems to have been confined to tactical situations. In
this sense, concern for deception seems to have been confined to indivi-
dual engagements or battles and campaigns, while the business of large
scale, strategic deception has received little attention. However,
after being embroiled totally in war and forced to stretch every avail-
able resource to its limits, countries - notably Great Britain during
World War II - have employed deception not just at the tactical level
of conflict, but also at the highest levels of political and military
interaction. This escalation in the use of deception involves nations'
highest decision makers using diplomacy, economics, espionage, intelli-
149
gence, and virtually every conceivable dimension of modern international
conflict in order to mislead or confuse opponents. Thus, the principal
trait distinguishing strategic deception from tactical deception is that
it takes place at a higher level of international interaction and involves
a wider range of variables.
The emergence of strategic deception as an adjunct to the conduct of
international affairs raises many important theoretical and operational
questions. The theoretical questions concern whether strategic deception
is sufficiently tangible to support a collection of empirically verified
propositions about its nature. At the same time, the operational ques-
tions concern whether principles of strategic deception can be employed
reliably to evoke predictable perceptions and behaviors from an opponent,
and to detect as well as counter an opponent's own deception schemes.
In short, these questions concern whether or not strategic deception can
be studied systematically and whether knowledge about its properties can
be applied in the policy arena.
Asking these questions raises an important issue concerning strate-
gic deception. While feints and false information ordinarily accompany
competitive strategies at all levels of behavior from parlor games to
commerce, and while there are theoretical analogues which may be useful
for studying deception at the strategic level, it is important to under-
score several facts. First, strategic deception takes place at the high-
est levels of interaction, i.e., international relations, and it involves
the highest stakes. Further, it is important to note that strategic
deceptions are not known to occur frequently and that the details of
how they are perpetrated are closely guarded secrets. These facts create
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a difficult situation for research and theory-building inasmuch as there
are few empirical cases from which to draw generalizations and data, and
the data which are available may be filtered to protect national security
interests
.
The small number of cases of strategic deception and the secrecy
that surrounds them render the phenomenon relatively inaccessible to re-
searchers. This situation is not unique. In the past, researchers have
been faced with trying to analyze such inaccessible phenomena as interna-
tional crises, arms races and deterrence confrontations. In order to
study these phenomena, researchers draw freely from their own experience
and insight as well as from principles derived from other disciplines
such as psychology, sociology, and economics which study more accessible
phenomena. In most respects, this has been a fruitful research tactic
since reliable, operationally useful indicators and theoretical principles
have evolved by which decision makers may exercise partial control over
certain international relations processes. Realizing that reliable theo-
ries have been developed from studying seemingly inaccessible international
relations phenomena in the past leads to the questions of whether simi-
lar results might stem from studying strategic deception.
Naturally, this question cannot be answered concretely without de-
voting time and energy to the concept of strategic deception and without
employing a simplified, logical approach to the problem. One approach
is to divide the concept of strategic deception into intellectually man-
ageable components, and, where possible, apply principles from other dis-
ciplines in hopes of gaining theoretical leverage on the concept. To-
wards this end, this paper applies an organization approach to the con-
151
cept of strategic deception and employs the notion that large organiza-
tions are involved as targets of deception. These organizations can be
viewed as intelligence organizations whose function is, first, to attend
to, as well as to interpret, matters in the international environment
which pertain to a nation's security, and, second, to pass information
and interpretations along to national decision makers.
Consistent with its focus on intelligence organizations, this paper
draws principles from several research perspectives which are relevant to
the study of organizations. The first perspective focuses on organiza-
tional structures and on simple interaction networks. The second focuses
on the application of communications theory to organizational structures.
A third, information processing perspective, focuses on the factors which
affect the admission of information into a communications network as well
as on the meaning attached to information as it is processed. A fourth
perspective, which might be termed a "situational context" perspective is
also examined. This perspective focuses on exogenous factors which af-
fect how organizations process information.
As a group, the four perspectives simply are different views of
the same phenomenon; i.e., the intelligence organization as it attends
to, processes and transmits information to decision makers who are the
ultimate targets of strategic deception. In a sense, then, this paper
is a hologram in which it is apparent that the same object remains in
view, even though the viewing perspective changes. From each perspec-
tive, this paper attempts to identify what specific variables might con-
tribute to understanding the role that intelligence organizations play
in strategic deception and it attempts to assess each perspective's
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theoretical and operational usefulness.
There is a section in this paper devoted to each of the four perspec-
tives. In addition, there is an initial section which emphasizes the im-
portance of organizations in strategic deception. And finally, there is
a conclusion which assesses the prospects for applying an organizational
approach to the study of strategic deception.
INFORMATION PROCESSING AND INTELLIGENCE
An organizational approach to strategic deception requires a concept
of organizations and their role in deception. In one sense, organizations
may be viewed as perpetrators of deception which implement the policies
of national leaders. This view of organizations focuses attention on the
principles which govern the way organizations are structured in order to
carry out policy. While this is an important field of inquiry, it is not
the central focus here. Instead, the prevailing view taken here is that
organizations serve an information processing role for national decision
makers. This view fits a cybernetics model of decision-making.
A simple cybernetics model of foreign policy decision-making has
been outlined by Karl W. Deutsch in The Nerves of Government . Deutsch's
conceptualization is consistent with other, more elegant statements of
the general cybernetics paradigm, and it emphasizes that the foreign
policy decision-making process requires that sensors be emplaced in order
to interpret and transmit information about vital international circum-
stances to decision makers.
The sensor idea contains the notion that national governments estab-
lish institutions and organizations which are responsible for attending
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to and monitoring environmental conditions, changes in which may affect
the overall well-being of a nation and its ability to achieve its goals.
Such organizations need not always operate covertly, for there is much to
know about the environment which is public. Further, sensor organizations
do not monitor everything that goes on in the enviroment. Instead, they
attend to a few things more carefully than to others, and they literally
ignore most things. They make assessments regarding those things to
which they attend, and pass their assessments along to decision makers.
In the study of international relations the procedure by which nations
publicly and covertly attend to external phenomena and by which decision
makers receive distilled information is called the intelligence function,
and this function is performed, in part, by "intelligence organizations."
According to the cybernetics paradigm, an important factor affecting
decisions is the information which policy makers receive from their in-
telligence organizations. This seems obvious. It also seems obvious
that additional factors converge on the decision arena. These additional
factors include the size of the decision-making group, their particular
mind set, their perceived goals, their responsiveness to demands for
allocating resources, and so forth. Consequently, the role of intelli-
gence organizations is attenuated by other factors, and determining how
important the intelligence organization is in shaping policy is diffi-
cult.
Even so, intelligence is central for rational decision-making, and
the intelligence gathering process alerts decision makers of develop-
ments in the environment which require policy action. It follows that
the factors which affect the information's configuration, flow, and
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meaning are important. Those factors dictate what will be attended to,
what will be interpreted, and what will be transmitted to decision makers.
It is possible that insights and data regarding the factors which
affect the intelligence function may be garnered from examining intelli-
gence organizations in terms of the four perspectives discussed here.
These perspectives may enhance understanding of strategic deception in
two ways. First, much of what decision makers know about the things with
which they are trying to cope comes to them through the intelligence pro-
cess, so that understanding what affects that process helps to explicate
foreign policy decision-making in general. Second - and more to the point
- once the factors which affect the intelligence function's relation to
decision-making are understood, it may be possible to manipulate those
factors in order to prevent, or perpetrate a deception.
INTERACTION STRUCTURES
The most fundamental way to analyze groups and organizations is to
focus on interaction structures, because it is over an interaction struc-
ture that information passes. The structural mode of analysis stems from
the notion that, over time, groups and organizations establish interac-
tion patterns which stabilize and which can be mapped to reflect who in-
o
teracts with whom. In addition to simple mapping, this analytic tech-
nique can be used to describe who engages in what kinds of behavior with
whom and over what issues.
For the most part, people sense the practical importance of knowing
who interacts with whom, just as they sense that information flows and in-
teraction structures parallel each other. They also sense the importance
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of patterning interaction structures in a manner which allows a group or
an organization to fulfil its role as efficiently as possible. In large
organizations this insight manifests itself in the ubiquitous organiza-
tional chart and in endless organizational restructuring. Perhaps be-
cause the notion of interaction structure is relatively concrete, and
perhaps because of the ease with which data can be generated in controlled
experiments for testing hypotheses concerning group structures, a set of
techniques have been developed which can precisely map interaction struc-
tures.
The basic tool used in mapping is the "adjacency matrix." An adja-
cency matrix contains in mathematical form the information which often
9
is depicted in a "sociogram," or "directed graph." Once a group's in-
teraction structure has been depicted on a matrix, it is possible to dis-
cover certain attributes of the structure by manipulating the matrix.
This is accomplished principally by performing a collection of set theory-
based operations. The matrix operations permit tracing series of complex
interaction linkages in order to determine, say, whether and to what ex-
tent a large organization is structured hierarchically, or to identify
communication bottlenecks.
Adjacency matrices are particularly useful in mapping large systems
where interaction patterns and communications linkages are difficult to
trace beyond one or two steps. In order to illustrate this fact, the
following directed graphs, depicting possible interaction structures
that might emerge in a five person group, are analyzed in terms of their
"relative centrality" using matrix — or "graph theoretical"—techniques.













tralized, while the other is non-hierarchical.
Alex Bavelas has found that a task-oriented group displaying a cen-
tralized interaction/communication structure will tend to choose the more
central person as its leader. Bavelas called the critical variable a
person's "centrality ." He found further that the most central person was
the most likely to have an impact on the procedures employed by the group
to perform its task, and that the most central person was most likely to
transmit information about the group's activities to others. This re-
search result is suggestive for an organizational approach to deception,
where determining the centrality of a person or subgroup may affect the
manner in which an intelligence unit performs its work and transmits its
findings.
The differences among the centrality of the points in Figures 1 and
2 are obvious from visual inspection: in Figure 1 each point is equally
central, and in Figure 2 point V. is more central than the others. The





ZD.. is the sum of the lengths of all the distances in the group's
structure, and
A. is the sum of the distances in row i of a "distance matrix."
l
By manipulating the adjacency matrices in A.
.
1
and Af . „ it can be
determined that the centrality value for each of the points in Figure
1 equals 5, while in Figure 2 the centrality value for point V is 8 and
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values becomes clear from studying the two "distance" matrices N(D)...fig.l
2
and N(D),.. „ Each matrix corresponds to the distance structures of
fig. 2.
Figures 1 and 2, and reveals the maximum distance from each point in the
group to every other point. The distance matrices were derived from the
adjacency matrices A,.
. , and A^ . „ which, according to convention, arefig.l fig- 2,
square matrices containing an entry if the entity depicted as row i can
reach (or direct an action towards) the entity depicted as column j.
Graph theory's importance in studying organizational communication
has been shown by those who have demonstrated that group structures and
communication patterns play a large role in determining how a group per-
12forms its task and interacts with other groups. Consequently, the
structural approach promises to shed light on the role of intelligence
organizations in deception. However, a closer examination of the ap-
proach and the way it has evolved among social science researchers sug-
gests that the approach may be too sharp an instrument either for study-
ing the small number of historical cases of strategic deception for which
data exist or, particularly, for implementing deception. In her land-
mark, analysis of the United States' failure to perceive correctly the
facts which would have forewarned of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor,
Wohlstetter documents how the structure of the information channels with-
in the United States intelligence and command community affected the
13transmittal of information. Perhaps, if Wohlstetter had conducted
something other than an historical analysis on a more contemporary case
of deception for which she could have gathered more detailed data, she
may have been inclined to perform the more precise kinds of analyses
which graph theory entails. However, regardless of whether this would
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be Che case, it needs to be asked whether Wohlstetter 's analysis, or any an-
alysis which deals—of only tangentially—with organization structures would
gain sufficient increases in theoretical leverage on strategic deception
from employing graph theory techniques to justify the effort. Especially
if the analysis is limited to one or just a small number of cases for which
only historical data are available. Graph theory techniques may be too re-
fined for the quality of the data which currently exist regarding deception.
It seems that for the time being, insights about organization structures
and their precise role in the small number of known strategic deceptions
will not be generated by graph theory techniques themselves, although in-
tuitive analysis of organizational structures may still prove fruitful.
This conclusion seems especially relevant for developing operation-
ally useful concepts for perpetrating strategic deception. It seems
reasonable to argue that in order to carry out a successful deception,
policy makers must attend to the communications structure of the target
organization in order to insure that deceivers send information to points
in an organization which have connections to decision makers. At the
same time, however, it is unreasonable to expect that a deceiver can
learn as much detail about a target organization as graph theory re-
quires in order to be useful. On balance, it seems reasonable to con-
clude that structural variables have an impact on deceptions and that
both analysts and perpetrators must somehow take structural variables
into account. But it also seems that the analytic precision implied by
graph theory is neither attainable nor required in order to successfully
perpetrate a deception.
In further assessing graph theory's promise for shedding light on
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the role of intelligence organizations in strategic deception, it needs
to be recognized that the approach has several methodological and theore-
tical shortcomings. These shortcomings are related to the fact that
structural maps primarily are static and descriptive.
At the beginning of this section it was noted that groups and organ-
izations establish stable interaction patterns over time. Consequently
a technique designed to reflect stability over the long run is not likely
to reveal variation in the short run. While a structural model will de-
pict who might interact with whom, such a model would not reveal when
someone actually did interact with someone else. Knowing how likely
someone is to communicate with someone else based on past probabilities
may be useful for analyzing deception in a general theoretical context
when data are available from many cases. However, when analyzing dis-
crete historical cases or when perpetrating individual deceptions, it
seems essential to know for certain whether someone actually did communi-
cate with someone else. This type of knowledge cannot be generated from
the structural perspective.
Not only do graph theoretical techniques fail to reveal short term
variations, but the major graph theory techniques are boolean or binary,
so, for the most part, they preclude using measures which reveal the de-
gree to which variation in one phenomenon can be linked to variation in
another phenomenon. That is, the techniques are descriptive and atheo-
retical. They give no insight into how interaction patterns arose, how
they are changing, or if they will change.
Attempting to account for why a particular pattern arises leads
to questions concerning why intelligence organizations attend to certain
162
types of information and not to others, and why they process what they
attend to in one way and not in another. As suggested earlier, answering
these questions is important in analyzing the role of organizations in
strategic deception. So, while the structural perspective may be useful
for identifying key channels in a communications network or for predic-
ting the route that information will take on its way to a decision maker,
the perspective leaves important questions unanswered regarding other im-
portant aspects of the organizational approach to deception.
COMMUNICATIONS THEORY
A second perspective that compensates for some of the shortcomings
of the structural approach is the communications perspective. The com-
munications perspective reflects the principles of communications theory
which are discussed elsewhere in this report. The communications per-
spective, as applied to behavior within an organization rather than to
linkages between organizations, has some characteristics which advance
an organizational approach to strategic deception.
To someone familiar with both communications theory and graph
theory, it is clear that the two approaches complement each other. Graph
theory identifies and maps interaction/communication channels, while
communications theory measures what passes over those channels. From
the latter perspective, an interaction link becomes a communications
channel, and interacting entities alternate between being information
senders and receivers.
The structural and communications perspectives complement each
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other further inasmuch as each is based principally on its own unique
measurement concept. Whereas the adjacency concept is the fundamental
measure for analyzing interaction structures, "variety" is the fundamen-
14
tal concept for analyzing communications networks. Basically, the
variety measure, H-rel, is the ratio between the variety of messages, U,
actually transmitted through a channel and the maximum variety, U of
messages that could be transmitted through that channel. The measure is
defined as follows.
H-rel = — Equation 4
max
where;
U = -Zp log p when p(l), ..., p(n) are empirical or
theoretical probabilities, and Equation 5
U 2p log. p when p(l) = p(2) = ... = p(n) Equation 6
max Z
When transmissions are redundant, i.e., the variety of messages is low
and, therefore, relatively certain based on a record of empirical pro-
babilities, H-rel will be low. In the opposite sense, when transmissions
are uncertain, i.e., when events appear randomly without constraint,
H-rel will be high.
This metric has at least two interesting properties. First, it
transforms the distribution of events in a set of nominal categories in-
to an interval/ratio scale that supports measures of association. In-
deed, one author has attempted to develop measures of statistical asso-
ciation which hinge solely on H-rel. ~* Secondly, H-rel is useful for
gauging the reliability of information channels: when the H-rel values
of information leaving a channel equal the values for information enter-
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ing a channel, the channel can be considered to be a relaible transmitter
of information. That is, additional information, or "noise," does not
enter the message (increased H-rel) or information is not lost in the
channel (decreased H-rel)
.
As a consequence of these properties, the basic communications mea-
sure promises to reveal several things that seem to be important to know
about intelligence organizations and their role in deception. By using the
variety measure, it seems possible to determine whether particular nodes in
the communications structure transmit information exactly as they receive
it, or whether they transform it in some way. Similarly, it is possible
to gauge the speed with which information is transmitted through a net-
work, and it is possible to gauge the ultimate capacity of a network or
its individual channels to transmit large quantities of information.
While the information measure seems useful for studying the inter-
nal transmission of messages by an intelligence organization, the con-
cept seems more directly applicable to studying an intelligence organi-
zation's responsiveness or receptivity to changes in external signals.
Milton Rokeach makes a dichotomy which clarifies this point when he con-
trasts open and closed minds. He characterizes closed minds as being
dogmatic in the sense that they are unresponsive to external changes,
and he maintains that closed minds tend to ignore changes in the environ-
ment or to reinterpret external changes in order to preserve the inter-
nal stability of previous patterns of processing information. In con-
trast, Rokeach characterizes open minds as being responsive to external
changes, and he maintains that open minds tend to allow information con-
cerning changing circumstances into the thinking process. In terms of
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communications theory and intelligence organizations, the closed mind, or
closed organization, would be one that failed to respond internally to
changes in external signals. Such an organization would fail to "per-
ceive" external changes. At the same time, the open organization would
be responsive to changes in the external environment.
By using communications theory, the degree to which an organization
was "open" or "closed" could be gauged by comparing the variation between
internal and external information flows. Such data would help perpetra-
tors of strategic deception determine whether information concerning a
deception had been perceived by an intelligence organization and was
being transmitted towards a decision maker. It would also define the re-
ceptivity of discrete sensors within a larger organization to varying
types of information, since it seems unlikely that the responsiveness of
all the units within an organization to all types of information is uni-
form.
While additional measures exist such as the "quantity of messages,"
which may enhance information theory-based studies of intelligence or-
ganizations, the foregoing discussion highlights what seems to be the
two most important concepts of the information approach. The first con-
cerns the reliability with which intelligence organizations transmit in-
formation to decision makers, and the second concerns the tendency of
organizations to perceive or ignore events.
That decision makers need accurate, undistorted information seems
self-evident and basic. From the perspective of carrying out a strate-
gic deception, it would be important to know which channels are likely
to transmit a message reliably so that deceivers can be relatively cer-
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tain that intended information reached the targets of a deception. Ob-
viously, the best way to insure that a message has been transmitted re-
liably is to control the communications channel. During World War II the
British seemed to be aware of this principle when they provided German
agents who had come over to the Allied side with messages and insured
that the intended messages were transmitted to the German intelligence
organization. While it is true that the British could not control the
messages once they began to be passed along within the German intelli-
gence organization, at least they could control the first step along the
transmission chain.
The second concept stemming from information theory concerns the
receptivity of organizations to information about changes in the environ-
ment. In a practical sense, the receptivity concept concerns the rein-
forcement of existing beliefs or the introduction of new beliefs into an
intelligence organization. For example, if the British wanted the
Germans to alter their existing beliefs, they would have to direct their
deception scheme at points in the German intelligence organization which
were sensitive to information about changes in the external environment
and which would reliably report those changes to the German decision
makers. On the other hand, the British could reinforce existing German
beliefs by directing information to points which were unresponsive to
or tended to overlook dissonant information about environmental changes.
These principles seem to stem naturally from the information theory
principles discussed above. Successfully employing these principles in
a deception requires gauging the internal reliability and responsiveness
of an intelligence organization. However, it is one thing to control
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message inputs at the fringes of an intelligence organization, and quite
another to determine whether the intended quality of the message is main-
tained on its way to the decision makers. Determining whether intended
information reaches decision makers requires a reliable feedback loop
from points within a target organization to a deceiver. The British were
fortunate in that they could rely on ULTRA messages to gauge whether or
not information which they were trying either to introduce into or pre-
vent from entering the German intelligence network was being passed
along to the decision makers.
Given that they had ULTRA, the question arises whether the British
would have been able to make better use of ULTRA if they had systematic-
ally employed information theory concepts and measures. Without the re-
quisite empirical evidence—which would be difficult or impossible to
obtain anyway—the intuitive response to this question is that informa-
tion theory concepts are too precise to be operationally useful, and
that the British made about as effective use of ULTRA as they could.
The British seemd to be intuitively aware of the importance of capital-
izing on the differences between German intelligence channels in terms
of their reliability and receptivity. But taking greater systematic
advantage of information theory for understanding or carrying out a
deception would have required feedback information which was more con-
tinuous and reliable than the British could be confident of obtaining.
So far, then, it seems likely that for students of strategic decep-
tion, knowing the structural and communications attributes of an intel-
ligence organization will reveal many important things. For instance,
it will reveal which channels respond most to changes in input, and
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which channels most reliably and most quickly transmit input messages to
decision makers. At the same time, however, it seems that as a practical
matter the requisite empirical information for employing relatively pre-
cise structural and information measures is unobtainable. Further, no
matter how useful this knowledge might seem, it lacks theoretical rich-
ness because it leaves many important questions concerning an organiza-
tional approach to strategic deception unanswered. The reason for this
may lie in the fact that interaction and communications structures are
the empirical manifestation of other phenomena. That is, while structure
and communication lend themselves to empirical measurement, no satisfac-
tory explanation emanates from either perspective to explain why a par-
ticular structure is as it is, or why information flows through that
structure as it does. Further, neither perspective addresses the criti-
cal aspect of information in terms of its impact on decisions. That cri-
tical aspect is "meaning."
Addressing the issue of meaning requires an examination of the fac-
tors which contribute to the meaning assigned to information being pro-
cessed by an intelligence organization. It is one thing to say that in-
creased variety is being transmitted reliably by an organization, but
it is quite another to say that increased variety indicates to an or-
ganization or group of decision makers that there has been a favorable
or unfavorable turn of events requiring policy action. In other words,
a critical variable affecting whether policy makers act on perceived
changes in the environment is the meaning which decision makers assign
to information.
The matter of meaning is taken up in the next section of this paper.
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Before turning to that section, however, it must be pointed out that in
the short run a deceiver cannot affect meaning. Perhaps in the long run,
through propaganda, bargaining, etc., a deceiver can manipulate the vari-
ables which affect the meaning of perceived information, but in the short
run, a deceiver can only manipulate input information. That is, a de-
ceiver can introduce information into an intelligence organization, but
a deceiver cannot control how that information is interpreted by decision
makers. Because of this, a deceiver must understand the variables which
affect meaning in order to maximize the likelihood that the target of
deception will read the deceiver's signals in the intended way. The sig-
nificance of this conclusion is amplified in the next section.
INFORMATION PROCESSING
A third perspective which may help solve the problem of understand-
ing how meaning is assigned to intelligence information is the informa-
tion processing perspective. This persepctive emphasizes two concepts:
saliency and meaning. Both concepts are relevant in an organizational
approach to strategic deception since they help explain why intelligence
organizations attend to certain types of information and not others, and
why intelligence organizations interpret information one way and not
another.
Saliency and meaning are related to a third concept, perceptual
framework. The perceptual framework concept emphasizes that decisions
are shaped by what people perceive in their environment and how they
evaluate it, and that they interpret information by filtering it through a
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structured belief system. The belief system amounts to an abstract theo-
retical system that explains how things work and it provides the basis
for making logically consistent decisions. The perceptual framework
concept also emphasizes variables which give rise to belief systems.
Such variables include ideologies, personality traits, cultural cir-
cumstances, and so forth.
A perceptual framework identifies important concepts for decision
makers and it contains implicit prescriptions for what information is
relevant to those important concepts. Relevant information is salient
and attended to; irrelevant information is not salient and is ignored.
Johan Galtung explains that nations actively attend to information about
those things which are seen (within the context of a perceptual frame-
work) as having either a positive or negative impact on essential needs;
that is, as being relevant to the enhancement of goals and to the ameli-
1 Q
oration of threats. In more concrete terms, nations, for whom energy
is an essential need, will attend carefully to information about pe-
troleum. Likewise, when the British felt threatened with a German in-
vasion, they attended very carefully to whatever may have been perceived
as relevant to the invasion.
Galtung' s conceptualization is helpful in answering questions about
what intelligence organizations will attend to and what they will ig-
nore. In the context of strategic deception, it seems reasonable to con-
clude that knowing what kinds of information are salient to a target of
a deception will provide guidance regarding what will or will not be
attended to. This conclusion has some basis in empirical fact as the
work of Sophia Peterson, who studies how the world's press processes in-
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19formation, and numerous articles in the Public Opinion Quarterly demon-
strate.
Knowing what is salient to a nation's decision makers and, conse-
quently, what is salient to that nation's intelligence organization re-
quires that the preceptual framework which gives rise to saliency be
known. Perhaps the most systematic study of perceptual frameworks eman-
ating from nations' foreign policy decision-making mechanisms have been
20 21done by Robert Axelrod ' and G. Matthew Bonham and Michael J. Shapiro.
In their respective studies these researchers have attempted to map the
linkages among the variables which decision makers and analysts per-
ceive as determining the outcome of an ongoing international relations
situation. Axelrod, and Bonham and Shapiro attempt to map the nascent
theories, or belief systems, by which policy makers orient themselves
to the world.
Axelrod has content analyzed the verbatim records of meetings in-
volving high-level British officials in order to reconstruct the logic
of the inchoate theory which the officials used to comprehend and cope
with the problems facing Britain in India following World War I. Mean-
while, Bonham and Shapiro have relied on interview techniques in order
to tease out the logical relationships which contemporary officials
have seen as underlying more recent international relations episodes.
Both of these research efforts have employed graph theoretical and ma-
trix algebra techniques to examine belief systems in terms of their in-
ternal logical consistency and the perceived relationships between
policy options and situational outcomes. With these data and analytic
techniques the researchers have attempted to explain discrete foreign
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policy decisions by drawing from notions of cognitive consistency and
other concepts related to cognitive psychology.
Patrick Morgan has examined the notion of belief systems and likened
them to analytical theories, wherein, the cause-effect linkages between
policy variables and situational outcomes are analogous to testable hy-
22
potheses. ' In this context, the information which intelligence organi-
zations and decision makers process is analogous to data which are used
to confirm or disconfirm the propositions which comprise decision maker's
inchoate theories. And, just as scientific theories contain assumptions
or maxims for determining what is salient information and how such in-
formation should be evaluated, belief systems identify salient informa-
tion and provide the criteria for evaluating it, at least insofar as the
information can be said to confirm or disconfirm an analytic belief.
Presumably if deceivers knew the analytic systems of their decep-
tions targets they could structure their deceptions in terms of the
kinds of information the target was seeking. Plus they would have a
pretty good idea of how the information would be interpreted within the
target's network of beliefs. The British seemed to be at least in-
tuitively aware of these principles as they carried out the grand stra-
24
tegic deception described in Cave-Brown's Bodyguard of Lies . In this
deception Hitler was deceived into thinking that the main Allied inva-
sion of Europe would be at Pas de Calais, and the Normany landing would
be a secondary diversion. The British had learned what information the
Germans were seeking as well as how the information was likely to be
interpreted, so that the British were able to reinforce German beliefs
by, in effect, consistently confirming them.
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The argument that theories of strategic deception must take into ac-
count the belief systems of the targets of deception has intuitive appeal.
However, in terms of operational usefulness the same problems arise with
the belief system concept as arose with the structural and communications
concepts. Specifically, in order to be operationally useful, data must
be obtained concerning the belief system by which a target evaluates in-
formation. And, as in the cases of the structural and communications
perspectives, in order to analyze belief systems, analysts must have ac-
cess to the innermost workings of the target organization.
But, suppose sufficient data were available to permit the accurate
mapping of the belief systems by which intelligence organizations pro-
cessed information. This raises an additional theoretical and operational
problem: how to determine which belief system is the one that counts.
It is possible to argue that the key decision makers' belief system is
the one that counts, - because intelligence organizations receive direct
or indirect guidance from key decision makers regarding salience and in-
terpretation. However, this argument does not answer the question of
how large the circle of key decision makers is. Further, this argument
does not answer the question of who, among a group of key decision makers,
25
has the largest impact on the groups' belief system, or whether a pro-
fessionally-staffed intelligence organization does not somehow have its
own effect on a general belief system that contributes to or transcends
the one held by key decision makers.
Compounding the problems associated with identifying the belief
system that matters and then gaining access to pertinent data is the
fact that decision makers as well as organizations learn. Learning is a
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continual process, and one of its attributes is that through information
processing there is an effort to establish a correspondence, or balance,
between sensory information and the framework which is used to comprehend
that information. Insofar as external processes and information about
those processes change over time, decision makers must alter their belief
systems in order to reflect a changing reality. Several important issues
are associated with this aspect of learning. They concern whether infor-
mation is "re-interpreted" to fit existing beliefs, or, conversely,
whether belief systems adapt to changes in incoming information. They
also concern whether belief systems adapt incrementally or in a step-wise
fashion.
Presumably behavioral changes are connected to learning processes in
a systematic fashion so that knowing, say, that step-wise transformations
of a belief system precede major policy shifts may prove useful in the
context of strategic deception. A deceiver may be interested in eliciting
a policy shift from the target of a deception. In order to accomplish
this, it may be necessary to know whether the target's belief system was
about to undergo a major reorientation. As straightforward as this may
sound in principle, it would still be difficult to obtain pertinent data
concerning either pending belief system changes or the connection be-
tween prior changes and subsequent behavior because of the closeness with
which such information may be held.
As an element of the perceptual framework approach, the belief sys-
tem concept is relatively rigorous, insofar as the connection between
belief systems, information processing, and behavior has theoretical pre-
. .
28
cision. In contrast, there are other elements of perceptual frameworks
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which can be identified, but whose connection to information processing
and behavior is difficult to determine. Nevertheless they are important
to consider since the argument that they affect the salience and meaning
of information is intuitively compelling.
Contained within the general literature of international relations
theory is a set of ideas concerned with the factors which affect percep-
tions and information processing. These ideas suggest that perceptual
frameworks are affected, at least indirectly, by such factors as bureau-
cratic political processes, ' ideologies,^ national culture, "*" national
32 33 34
interests, political elites, public opinion, the educational and
35
professional backgrounds of decision makers, processes of political so-
36
cialization, and so forth. Somehow these variables are supposed to
affect the "world views" and decision-making styles of national leaders
and, by extension, the manner in which they treat the information which
•
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they receive from intelligence organizations.
It is plausible to suggest that in the processing of intelligence
information it makes a difference if the information processors are
civilians or military personnel; if they espouse democratic or authori-
tarian values, et cetera. Unfortunately, it has never been determined
whether differences among countries in terms of how they rate on these
39
variables actually account for differences in perception and behavior.
This is a routine criticism of the decision-making approach to
40
foreign policy analysis. But, even though it is routine, it remains
valid, and its implication for the analysis of strategic deception may
by important, especially when efforts are made to weave these variables
into a theory of deception.
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So far, most of the concepts discussed in this paper, at least in
theory, are amenable to rigorous operationalization, but they have been
represented as nonoperational for analyzing strategic deception because
relevant data are unobtainable. In contrast, it is relatively easy to
obtain background information about the targets of deception so that, at
least, detailed historical descriptions of the factors which indirectly
affect perceptual frameworks can be compiled. Intelligence organiza-
tions already routinely compile such information. For instance, they
create biographical sketches of key personnel in foreign countries; they
compile sociological and cultural data concerning potential enemies; or,
they monitor public opinion in foreign countries. Despite the fact that
information concerning these variables is easy to collect, the problem
of relating these variables to decision-making and information processing
with empirical precision remains unsolved. Thus, even though deceivers
may possess such information, how to use it in a deception is not self-
evident—at least not within the framework of an organizational approach
to strategic deception.
This is not to suggest that background information is valueless. In-
deed, it may have considerable value if it gives deceivers and analysts
special insights regarding their target. At the same time, however, it
is difficult to see how a systematic connection can easily be made be-
tween variables such as culture, public opinion, etc. and the perceptual
frameworks which affect the role of organizations in strategic deception.




The preceding sections of this paper have explored the role of in-
telligence organizations in strategic deception from three perspectives.
While initially promising to be useful in general theoretical analyses of
organizations' roles in strategic deception, upon closer inspection, each
perspective displayed some fundamental flaw which undermines its poten-
tial to support systematic theory. This generalization seems to hold
also for the situational context perspective.
The situational context perspective does not focus on the attributes
of intelligence organizations such as their structure, their information
transmitting capability, etc. Instead, it focuses on variables which
are exogenous to intelligence organizations but which, nevertheless,
seem to affect the ways in which information is processed.
Drawing distinct lines between situational and non-situational var-
iables is difficult and for the time being must be done arbitrarily.
One criterion for making the distinction might be to ask on the one hand
if variables are likely to remain stable in the long run or to change
only as a result of routine processes, such as elections, or on the other
hand if variables can change unexpectedly. Variables falling into the
latter category might be considered situational variables. By this
criterion, one clearly situational variable is international crisis, in-
to which is folded the notions that crises occur unexpectedly and repre-
sent dramatic departures from normalcy.
In the field of international relations, crises have been studied
from two analytic levels. One level focuses on the interactions be-
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tween countries during times of crisis, and the other focuses explicity
on foreign policy decision-making. At the interaction level of analysis,
Charles McClelland has demonstrated that the quantity and variety of
events taking place between countries embroiled in a crisis rise drama-
41
tically. In terms of a concept presented earlier in this paper, what
McClelland found was that during acute international crises the informa-
tion input to crisis participants exceeds normal thresholds. From another
perspective, Charles F. Hermann has hypothesized that the internal de-
cision-making environment changes during crisis so that crises catch de-
cision makers by surprise, appear to be highly threatening to national
security, and demand a quick response.
A general assumption underlying international crisis research is that
a crisis situation is one that has gotten out of control and is equally
acute for all participants. From the standpoint of strategic deception,
however, it is easy to see how a deceiver might manipulate inputs to a
target by increasing the quantity and variety of events in order to sur-
prise the target and to make things appear as though the target was
threatened and had a short time in which to react.
While it is possible to suggest that deceivers to some degree can
manipulate the situational context of a strategic deception, the behavior-
al consequences of doing so are difficult to determine—at least insofar
as creating an aura of crisis is concerned. This seems true because the
level of tolerance which countries have for ambiguity and the point at
which they cross from a normal information processing mode to a crisis
mode has never been determined empirically. That is, it has never been
determined how to account for differences in the tolerance levels between
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countries or for differences in individual countries from one time to the
next. These facts coupled with the fact that few historical cases of in-
ternational crises exist to support a general theory present a circum-
stance similar to those encountered with the three analytic perspectives
discussed previously. Even so, it is possible to suggest at least one
empirical consequence for organizational information processing during
crises based on evidence generated in the field of cognitive psychology.
The evidence suggests that periods of stress have an impact on the
way people—and presumably intelligence organizations
—
process informa-
tion. What seems to happen is that, during the early phases of stress
situations, peoples' information processing capabilities actually in-
crease as they tune into the situation. However, after a certain thres-
hold has been crossed, and the quantity and variety of message inputs
continue to increase, the reliability of internal message transmission
falls below what it was before the emergence of the stressful situation.
In short, during times of acute stress, the internal transmission of infor-
mation collapses.
The meaning of this finding in the context of strategic deception
is unclear. As McClelland 's research demonstrates, the international re-
sponse to stress is a breakdown in normal interaction patterns. From
this, it might be argued that deceivers would not want to create a crisis-
like situation characterized by unpredictable responses, since one of a
deceiver's objectives might be to evoke predictable, but wrong, responses
from the target of a deception. However, McClelland 's research notwith-
standing, one objective of a strategic deception simply could be to
"freeze" an opponent's responses. This might be accomplished by increas-
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ing the quantity and variety of input beyond a critical threshold in or-
der to force a collapse of internal information transmission. So long
as the increased possibility of evoking an unpredictable response is re-
cognized and deemed tolerable, a deceiver may find it useful to create
a crisis-like situation in order to gain a short term strategic advantage.
In assessing the fruitfulness of the situational context perspective
for analyzing the role of intelligence organizations in strategic decep-
tion, the conclusion emerges that some of the problems associated with
the perspectives explored earlier also plague the situational context per-
spective. These problems concern the availability of data for studying
single cases as well as for comparing several cases. As with the pre-
vious perspectives, it is possible to argue that it would be difficult
to gauge the internal effects on information processing which may stem
from changes in situational variables because of researchers' inability
to obtain requisite feedback information. Similarly, it would be diffi-
cult to arrive at general conclusions about the role of situational vari-
ables in strategic deception because of the small number of historical
cases from which to glean data. Against these general shortcomings with
the situational perspective it is possible to balance the fact that some
evidence exists which links stress to information processing. Unfor-
tunately, the linkage has not been demonstrated unequivocally in a sit-
uation involving international relations, and its meaning for deception
is unclear.
CONCLUSION
From the preceding, it should be apparent that an organizational
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approach provides some insights into how to think about the role that in-
telligence organizations play in strategic deception. At the same time,
however, it should be apparent that there are severe obstacles which for
the present preclude the systematic application of an organizational
approach to deception. This conclusion seems to apply at the theoretical
level as well as at the operational level. It stems from the facts that
the empirical base for studying strategic deception is small and that
rigorously applying an organizational approach in order to carry out a
deception requires information about a target that is more continuous,
more reliable, more precise, and wider in scope than can reasonably be
obtained. The conclusion stems also from the fact that little is known
about the way in which intelligence organizations process information,
or about the effect that information processing has on foreign policy
decision-making
.
Despite the fact that an organizational approach does not seem to
lend itself to the systematic study of strategic deception, considering
organizational variables seems useful in both a pre-theoretical exercise,
such as this, and in actual attempts to engage in deception. For in-
stance, knowing that organizational information processing can be im-
portant in shaping foreign policy decision alerts analysts and policy
makers to the idea that any attempt to analyze or perpetrate a strategic
deception must always address whether or not organizational factors
play a role in determining what messages finally reach decision makers.
Reading the extant historical analyses and narrative accounts of strate-
gic deception gives the impression that organizational factors are not
usually taken into consideration, or consciously dismissed as being
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insignigicant for well-argued theoretical or empirical reasons.
Systematically drawing attention to the potential importance of in-
telligence organizations in determining deception outcomes does more than
simply alert policy makers to the fact that they ought to take intelli-
44
gence organizations into account when perpetrating a deception. It
illuminates and shows how to consider some things which may ultimately
determine the outcome of a particular deception. And, even if these
things cannot be analyzed systematically within the context of a single
deception, if policy makers are conscious of their potential importance,
they may be taken into account in order to provide greater insight into
how to tailor a particular deception so as to increase the likelihood of
its success.
Insuring a deception's success in the sense that intended messages
reach a target requires a deceiver to have feedback concerning the ac-
tual messages which decision makers receive from their intelligence or-
ganization. Without feedback, it seems the likelihood for the success
of a strategic deception is reduced. From the preceding discussion it
is clear that in order to systematically apply each of the analytic per-
spectives to a strategic deception, the deceiver must somehow tap a
target's internal information flow. At the same time, it is also clear
that the likelihood of tapping internal information flows to obtain data
sufficiently rich to support systematic analyses in terms of the four
perspectives discussed here seems remote. However, so long as a deceiver
does not aspire to analytical rigor, but seeks only sufficient informa-
tion to gauge a target's internal response to information input, the
level of information required by the four analytic perspectives may not
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be required to carry out a deception. All a deceiver may actually re-
quire is reasonable assurance that intended messages reach their destina-
tion and have their intended effect. For example, the British had ULTRA,
and could use it to gauge the effects of their deception schemes and to
determine when it was necessary to alter input information. For their
purposes, the feedback provided to the British by ULTRA was sufficient,
but without ULTRA the British could only guess at the organizational re-
sponse to their schemes.
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TECHNICAL PERSPECTIVES ON DECEPTION
William Reese
The systematic study of deception is not firmly identified with
any existing discipline nor is it established as a recognized specialty
in its own right. Rather it seems a topical subject, perhaps on the
ascendency because a number of accounts of deceptions during WW II
are now appearing. The literature of deception is dominated by ac-
counts of particular deceptions. Such literature constitutes data,
but without a framework for theoretical interpretation, such data con-
stitutes a confusing mass of particulars rather than an organized body
of knowledge deserving even the label protodiscipline.
A logically prior condition for erecting a suitable theoretical
framework is that there be some agreement on the key concepts which
must be incorporated in this framework and the key issues with which
it must deal. As was noted by von Neuman and Morgenstern as they set
forth on the task of providing a theoretical framework for economics
in the theory of games:
There is no point in using exact methods where there is
no clarity in the concepts and issues to which they are
to be applied. Consequently, the initial task is to
clarify the knowledge of the matter by further careful
descriptive work.
It is in this spirit that the following three essays, dealing with an
examination of deception from the perspectives of established techni-
cal disciplines, were written.
Not only do these essays attempt to view deception from perspec-
tives of established technical disciplines and thus clarify some key
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concepts and issues, but their point of view, a product of the
authors' intellectual origins as ''hard scientists," is also technical.
That is, they view the goal of the venture as developing a theory of
the sort used in the physical and engineering sciences. This goal
2
has been well described by Anderson:
The goal of scientific theory is to reduce the complexity
found in nature to a few general laws. If human behavior
is not amenable in terms that are much simpler than the
behavior, it is not really amenable to scientific analysis.
It is better to have a simpler theory that is incorrect
in some details than a theory that is too complex to handle.
Consequently, the aim of the essays is to examine general concepts
which emerge from technical disciplines and attempt to determine what
insights they give about the problem of deception. These essays ex-
amine concepts in communications theory, game theory and systems
theory and relate these concepts to the problem of deception. They
are intended for a non-specialist audience who has no real exposure
to these disciplines.
Examining deception from these three perspectives allows differ-
ent aspects of the problem to be emphasized. However, all three per-
spectives show that feedback allowing the deceiver to monitor the im-
pact of information reaching the intended target should play a criti-
cal role. In the communications and systems theory frameworks feed-
back permits the deceiver to overcome uncertainties in predicting
the response to a given stimulus which arise due to random events and
imperfect organizational behavior in obtaining and interpreting in-
formation. From the game theory perspective feedback encourages
attempts at deception because it can remove many, if not all, of the
penalties of being discovered.
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The communications theory perspective emphasizes the limitations
of the communications paradigm to the deception problem. It further
indicates that the "signals and noise" analogy used in several dis-
cussions of warning and deception use these terms in a manner radical-
ly different from the way they are employed in the original communica-
tions theory framework. The communications approach shows that decep-
tive communications need to be considered as a dual process—first
encoding the deceptive message as a series of concrete indicators
and second transmitting the indicators. The second process is more
amenable to discussion in a communications theory framework if it is
possible to introduce the process by which channel guardians validate
the received indicators into the paradigm. The first process, that
of embedding and extracting deceptive messages as a series of indica-
tors, does not transfer well into a classical communications theory
framework because, without feedback or unusual organizational pre-
dictability, the existence of a host of human and organizational fac-
tors which cannot be anticipated preclude confident encoding of the
message.
The game theoretic framework emphasizes the value of occasional
deception in reducing one's own predictability. In addition, using
a zero sum game structure in which the basic problem is whether to
believe or disbelieve a received message, an analysis is conducted
which shows that the normally preferred strategy is to postpone choice
awaiting further information so long as (it is assumed that) there
exists a significant probability of the situation clarifying in time
to take appropriate action. The alternative, which exists when sig-
nificant probability of timely discovery does not exist, is to choose
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in a highly unfavorable situation where loss rather than gain is
the expected outcome. Since a tendency to wait in ambiguous situa-
tions seems an important factor in many actual cases, this insight
from game theory is probably a key concept in understanding the suc-
cess of deception.
The system theory framework focuses on the sets of stimuli and
responses received and emitted by the interacting players in a po-
tentially deceptive situation. This framework illuminates the pro-
blems of the top level communications process caused by uncertain-
ties and delays. This viewpoint suggests that experience in predic-
tion gained during one type of interaction (e.g. peacetime) may not
transfer to other conditions of interaction (e.g. crisis) since the
system which needs to be predicted may be undergoing rapid internal
change. The approach further suggests that deceptive signaling
ought to be at a rate low compared with the inherent error rates of
the channels employed. Consequently, frequent attempts at deception
require the use of inherently error-prone channels. Finally, the
systems approach suggests that active attempts at :'counterdeception"
ought to be an efficient tool for unmasking suspected deception.
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FOOTNOTES
John von Neuman and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Eco-
nomic Behavior (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 4,
2John R. Anderson, Language, Meaning and Thought (Hillsdale, NY:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1976), p. 17.
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DECEPTION WITHIN A COMMUNICATIONS THEORY FRAMEWORK
William Reese
THE COMMUNICATIONS THEORY PARADIGM
Communications theory focuses on the problems of transmitting in-
formation between a sender and a receiver. The classic paradigm is
that shown in Fiugure 1 of source, encoder, channel, decoder and des-
tination. A typical illustration of this paradigm is that of radio
transmission. The source can be considered either as someone speaking
into a microphone or the electrical signals emerging from the micro-
phone. The encoder is the radio transmitter which impresses the source
signal on a radio wave. The channel is that portion of the electro-
magnetic spectrum employed for the transmission and the physical pro-
SOURCE ENCODER CHANNEL DECODER DESTINATION
Figure I - The classic communications theory paradigm
pagation of the electromagnetic wave emitted by the transmitter to the
receiver. The decoder is the receiving apparatus which converts the
received electromagnetic signal either into an electrical signal suit-
able for driving a loudspeaker or to the radio signal produced by the
loudspeaker. The destination is then either the loudspeaker or the
listener.
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The theoretical structure of communications theory is based
largely on understanding the effects of extraneous, random signals
(noise) which are introduced between the source and destination. The
generic problem is the analysis of the transference of information
generated by the source to the destination under constraints intro-
duced by the nature of the channel, the noise environment and various
exogeneous factors.
Application of this paradigm to deception will be made by
associating these elements with the deception problem, then by ela-
borating this association through consideration of a simple problem
and finally by raising certain conceptual issues which the problem of
deception introduces into the communications theory context.
Deception is a process in which, through inverted signaling, a
deceiver D attempts to cause a target T to act in a manner which will
further the operational plans of D to T's detriment. An inverted
signal is a signal whose "true meaning" is opposite its purported
meaning, in other words, a lie. Within the context of deception, the
source can be identified as the operational planner, i.e., the person
or organization which determines the objectives of the deception in
terms of a statement of what is to be accomplished. Similarly, the
destination is to be identified either as that person or organization
which can direct or cause the desired action to take place or those
persons or organizations who supply the information on which the de-
cision to act will be taken. The remaining elements of the deception
process are then to be embedded in the encoder, the channel and the
decoder.
The role of the encoder in the communications paradigm is to con-
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vert the source message (which is to lead T into taking the desired
action) into a form which is suitable for transmission over an avail-
able link (channel) and which will be interpreted by the target in
the desired way. Viewed in this fashion, the encoder encompasses
the deception practitioners and apparatus (technical and non-techni-
cal) which they employ. The issue for the encoder is, given know-
ledge of the characteristics of the channel and of the processing at
the destination end to devise a set of specific signals or indica-
tions which will be interpreted by the destination in the manner de-
sired by the source.
The channel represents the specific means by which the message
devised by the encoder is delivered to the receiving end. It is
characterized by such factors as its physical form (radio transmis-
sion using specific signal formats and frequencies, arrangement of
images in a photograph, words in a written text, etc.), the time de-
lays associated with the transmission-reception process and by the
nature and normal frequency of random events which might corrupt
the message as it travels from sources to destination.
The role of the encoder in the communications theory paradigm is
to convert the output of the channel (electromagnetic waves striking
an antenna, an exposed photographic negative, a document obtained by
either overt or covert means, etc.) into a form suitable for use by
the destination. This will normally involve some technical processing
such as conversion of the electromagnetic signal into electrical sig-
nals and then perhaps into printed symbols, development of the photo-
graphic negative, possible decoding of text, possible translation,
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etc. Since it is rare for the destination to interact directly with
the information at this stage, there are normally additional decoding
stages in which the information is interpreted, i.e., significance is
attached, and the information is passed to the ultimate destination.
The existence and nature of these additional decoding steps cause prob-
lems when the normal communications theory paradigm is applied to decep-
tion.
The final element of the communications theory paradigm is noise,
random occurrences which corrupt the signal between source and destina-
tion. Following Roberta Wohlstetter 's discussion of Pearl Harbor, the
signal to noise analogy has been prominent in discussions of the warn-
ing problem, a problem intimately related to the deception problem. As
used by Wohlstetter, noise represents the plethora of materials, ob-
tained through a variety of channels (communications intercepts, attache
reports, public document, negotiations, etc.), which obscured the rele-
vant material (those identified by hindsight as seeming to clearly por-
tend the attack) and made its interpretation either ambiguous or even
occasionally inconsistent with an attack.
This concept of noise is poor approximation of the notion of
noise used in communications theory. As Wohlstetter 's treatment makes
clear, the location of this noise was in the concerned decision-making
centers and their supporting intelligence organizations. We have pre-
viously identified these as the destination part of the communications
paradigm. From this viewpoint the messages which Wohlstetter views as
signals and noise become a plethora of competing signals, some of which
conflict to a greater or lesser degree, some of which reinforce to a
greater or lesser degree, and most of which have little or no relationship
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to each other. The problem of Wohlstetter 's noise then becomes trans-
formed into one of decision-making under uncertainty, a problem of
inference whose solution is not fostered by typical noise reduction
strategies
.
A second significant problem is also associated with Wohlstetter 's
2
construct. This objection, raised by Whaley, is that in cases where
deception is possible the main problem is not so much separating impor-
tant signals from obscuring noise as it is one of deciding on the valid-
ity of possible signals, i.e., is it a true signal or an inverted sig-
nal (sprignal).^ This problem is made especially difficult since the
deceiver presumably takes pains that the inverted signal will not be
totally obscured by noise. This validity issue is an important one, in
fact one of the key issues involved in extending communications theory
to a deception context. Thus we will defer discussion to a later point
in the paper.
If we discount the Wohlstetter identification, how shall noise
be introduced into the mapping of deception onto communications
theory in a way which does not obscure the validity issue? The natural
way is to retain the analogy with the communications model as closely
as possible, i.e., to reserve noise for those random events which ob-
scure and garble a transmission from source to destination. Typical
noise events might be not using the correct model typewriter in produc-
ing a forged document (noise in the encoder) , a double agent elaborat-
ing on the story which has been fed to him (noise in the channel) or a
photointerpreter failing to study a film closely enough to discover the
clue which was fabricated for his benefit (noise in the decoder) . If
noise is strictly interpreted in this way, it can be associated as a
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channel characteristic, an association which promises to have utility
in using some of the insights of communications theory as a tool for
dealing with certain problems of deception and counter-deception.
Before leaving this initial exploration of the basic communica-
tions theory paradigm, one additional concept which is much used in
communications theory needs to be introduced—that of channel capacity.
Channel capacity relates to the rate at which different signals can be
transmitted over the chanel . Channel capacity is not an intrinsic
property of a channel, but one which is determined by the physical
characteristics of the channel, its noise characteristics and the en-
coding-decoding scheme employed. While the concept of channel capacity
plays a key role in many communications theory considerations, its role
in understanding the deception problem is unclear at the moment. One
reason for this is that inverted signaling normally is performed at a
low information transfer rate compared to the limits of the channels
employed for their transmission since the rate requirements are normally
set by the ability of the destination to react rather than to receive
information.
In order to set the stage for our next development, let us con-
sider a hypothetical deception problem in the communications theory
context. Consider a ground warfare confrontation between two sides
which we shall call Green and Purple, Green has generally superior
forces and has been advancing on Purple. However, at present Purple
has an advantage in terms of terrain for the only possible avenues for
further Green advance are through two valleys, Eastside and Westside.
The Green commander's estimate of the situation is that he could force
passage through either of these two valleys with a suitable concentration
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of forces, but only at the expense of heavy casualties. Conversely,
the Purple commander's estimate of the situation is that his only pos-
sibility for success in avoiding defeat is to stop the Green advance,
which he can only accomplish by an abnormal concentration of his troops
along the avenue of advance chosen by the Green forces.
The situation which has been set out is one in which the possible
moves are rather obvious. Purple can divide his forces and face almost
certain defeat or he could concentrate his forces and have a chance to
defeat Green. However, he must choose correctly, for if he concentrates
his forces on Eastside and Green attacks on Westside, he will be routed.
Clearly Purple commander will be vigorously urging his intelligence
assets to bring him every indication of Green's likely direction of ad-
vance. Equally clearly, Green commander will be strongly tempted to
try to lead Purple commander to misallocate his forces. If he succeeds,
he will accomplish his goal with far less cost. Thus, Green commander
directs his staff to develop plans for an attack on Westside covered
with a deception effort to lead Purple commander to concentrate his
forces on Eastside.
Within the context we have chosen ,the source (Green commander) has
generated a desired message, i.e., "we will attack on Eastside." The
next step is for the deception planning staff to develop a means for
transmitting this message to the Purple commander. Because of Purple's
aggressive search for information, several possible channels will exist
for sending the message, all related to Purple intelligence capabilities
One channel might be through the photo-reconnaissance flights which
Purple is known to mount, another might be through radio traffic which
Purple is known to monitor, and yet another channel might be planted
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information provided Purple by misleading captives or false captured
documents. Because of the risks involved in the latter channels, and
because there is reasonable likelihood of success using less risky chan-
nels, let us suppose that the Green staff selects the first two channels.
Let us consider in detail the first, that involving Purple's photo-
reconnaissance .
The problem for the deception planners is twofold: to give the
impression of an attack on Eastside and to hide the preparations for an
attack on Westside. Since the use of armor as a spearhead of attacks
has been a feature of Green's doctrine, this suggests that Purple will
be most interested in finding the location of tank concentrations.
Thus, it will be important to provide camouflage for the tanks massing
on Westside and to provide a number of credible dummy tanks on Eastside.
At this point one phase of the encoding stage has been accomplished.
The general message "The attack will come at Eastside" has been trans-
lated to specific messages, "Tanks are massing on Eastside. Tanks are
not massing in Westside." The specific messages are capable of imple-
mentation.
The next step in the encoding process is to actually carry through
the implementation. This will involve a certain amount of planning,
selecting the sites for the dummy tanks and sites where the actual
tanks can best be hidden without impairing their operational effective-
ness, and choosing the personnel responsible for emplacing the dummy
tanks and the camouflage, a certain amount of logistics, insuring that
the required material and personnel for the simulation and dissimulation
tasks are available at the times and places needed. It will finally
involve a certain amount of manipulation of the physical environment
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erecting dummy tanks and either associated entities such as POL dumps
and incoming tracks, etc. At this point the messages, "Tanks are mass-
ing on Eastside but not Westside" are converted into physical symbols,
e.g., dummy tanks, dummy POL dumps, tracks in the dirt, camouflaged tanks,
camouflaged POL dumps, and an absence of tracks where tanks should not
be. In the strictest sense these physical symbols, represent the signals
by which the message is to be transmitted.
An interesting question, which need not be of immediate concern
here although it is of vital concern to the Green deception operatives,
involves the degree of verisimilitude required for the dummy tank con-
centration. Will Purple photo-reconnaissance be of sufficient quality
that tracks can be studied in detail? Will optical or optical plus
infrared imagery be employed? Does Purple possess unintentional ra-
diation detectors capable of identifying the presence of tank engines
or of determining numbers of tank engines present? Can these resources
be expected to be used against the intended dummy and real sites? Fail-
ure to attend to such details can lead to the eventual failure of the
signals to be decoded as intended. To the extent that these failures
to attend to critical details are a result of accidents or careless-
ness, they could be classified as noise, but a type of noise which is
apt to invert rather than corrupt the intended signal. Thus it is
probably better to characterize such failures as encoder errors. To
the extent that these failures are a result of a failure to fully ap-
preciate Purple's reconnaissance approach, failures to attend to criti-
cal details represent something else, the existence of unappreciated
channels
.
The next step in the process is one of transferring the physical
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symbols erected for the benefit of Purple's photo-reconnaissance into
new physical symbols suitable for further processing, in this case im-
ages on film to be studied by Purple photo-reconnaissance flights.
There are numerous possible sources of noise which might enter: the
Purple photo-reconnaissance may fail to cover the desired locations,
the flight may be aborted or lost, the cameras may not work properly
or the film may be misprocessed.
Assuming that none of these unfortunate events transpires, the next
step in the message transmission process involves the decoding process.
The physical symbols which Purple has gathered must be reconstructed
into signals which depict a message. This process chiefly involves a
photo-interpreter examining the results of the photo-reconnaissance
mission, discovering the dummy tanks, which he interprets as real tanks
if the Green deception operatives do their job properly, and issuing a
report to the effect that so many tanks are located in a particular loca-
tion. Perhaps the same photo-interpreter or another one will examine
the photographs from the Westside mission and, if all goes well for
Green, not discover the camouflaged tanks. Again a report will be gen-
erated concerning the presence or absence of tanks on Westside. At
this point part of the decoding process has transpired, that part which
exactly reversed the implementation portion of the encoding process.
Specific messages, "Tanks are massed on Eastside" and "Tanks are not
massed on Westside" have entered into the Purple intelligence systems.
The next step is for these two messages to be merged with each
other and perhaps with messages from other channels, to form the cen-
tral message, "Because tanks are massed on Eastside rather than West-
side, the attack is to be expected on Eastside." The steps by which
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this merger of separate "micro-messages" into a single "macro-message"
takes place, and their relationship to the communications theory para-
digm is somewhat obscure. However, this process, which is normally
called analysis, is clearly a key hurdle between source and destina-
tion. If this hurdle is successfully cleared, then it can be expected
that the desired message will reach the destination.
REFINEMENT OF THE COMMUNICATIONS THEORY PARADIGM
The hypothetical example just considered provides a framework for
refining and extending the concepts of communications theory as a frame-
work for deception. The first observation is that both the encoding and
decoding processes have two parts. In one part specific micro-messages,
which we will now call indicators, are generated, transmitted and re-
ceived. In the second part a macro-message is enfolded into and ex-
tracted from the indicators. Thus we are led to the dual scheme de-
picted in Figure 2. The outer encode-decode process (level 1) corre-
sponds to the design-interpretation functional view of communications
4
advanced by Thomas. The inner process (level 2) corresponds closely
to the conventional view of communications in which the significance of
the communicated signals is not an issue.
According to the schema of Figure 2, one must deal with a two-
level hierarchy of signals as well. On one level the indicators serve
as the signals which convey the main message. This is the context in
which Wohlstetter uses the signal-to-noise analogy. On the second
level the indicators themselves become messages which are transferred
by a variety of physical signals. It is within this context that






















Figure 2. Dual encoder-decoder scheme required to embed deception in a
communications theory framework. The first process (E, & D,)
embeds and extracts the message into a sequence of indicators,
The second process (E~ & D ) transmits the indicators.
A somewhat similar view of the communications process between
opponents was introduced by T.P. Rona in his discussion of information
war. D Rona's schema is illustrated in Figure 3. The level 1 encode-
decode process of the present schema applies to the generate interpret
boxes in Rona's schema. The other of Rona's boxes applies to the level
2 process.
The observation that communications on level 2 involve injecting
indicators into sensor channels of the opponent suggests that on this
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level there exists communications between "channel exploiters" on the
transmitting side and "channel guardians" on the receiving side.
When confined to level 2, the problem of deception becomes a require-
ment that the channel exploiters generate indicators which the channel
guardians will accept as valid. Unless this can be accomplished there
is little chance for the macro-message, whose signals are the level
2 indicators, to be transmitted successfully.
Let us next examine some aspects of the validity problem for level
2 transactions implied by the above discussion. The framework for
this discussion is supplied by Figure 4. A channel, monitored by a
channel guardian, is supplied signals from two types of sources, those
controlled by the channel exploiters and intrinsic sources over which
the channel exploiters exert no control. Signals from these two sources
become merged in the transmission channel and are extracted and made
accessible to the channel guardian by technical processing. Up to this
point all signals which have been designed to survive the processing
have equal intrinsic validity and salience. All signals are equally
susceptible to corruption through random processes-noise. However, in
an effort to insure reception of signals from controlled sources, they
may have been made unusually strong. In addition, signals from controlled
sources may have subtle errors. One important function of the channel
guardian is to detect such signs of tampering. These signs represent
errors in the encode process.
The principal function of the channel guardian is the conversion
of processed signals into a channel report or indicator. In this
process the channel guardian must extract salient features from the
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the criteria for selection and interpretation will be controlled
dominantly by instruction extrinsic to the channel guardian. The chan-
nel guardian will apply additional criteria which are a consequence of
his experience and training. In particular, he should expect to be
alerted by any discordance between signals from intrinsic and controlled
sources and by any departure of detailed features of the signals from
those which his experience has led him to expect. It should be antici-
pated that the channel guardian will be much more sensitive to details
of the indicator than to its implications. According to the approach
taken here problems of validity posed by discrepancies in meaning with
other indicators are a level 1 problem. This approach is suggested as
a method for approaching the validity problem in a fashion which may
be tractable although it is as yet an unsolved problem. In Figure 4
indicator validity is represented by a process which treats signals
passing through as true, false or questionable. The functioning of
this process is -determined by the signals currently passing through the
process, those which have previously passed through the process (in
terms of signal characteristics not signal meaning) and external direc-
tion.
The task for the channel exploiter is relatively clear. First, he
must have sufficient information about the technical processing so that
he can generate signals which will compete with those generated by in-
trinsic sources. Often this will be an easy task since the opponent
will actively be attempting to exploit genuine communications of the
deceiving side, so the only required knowledge is the fact of exploita-
tion. In other cases obtaining sufficient information about the techni-
cal processing (or capabilities) poses a significant challenge. Next
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the exploiter must insure that the details of the indicator to be passed
are similar to those normally passed over the channel and that they are
not discordant with indicators from intrinsic sources. Thus, the ex-
ploiter must attend to the technical processing the signal is to receive,
past signals transmitted over the channel and other signals coming over
the same channel from intrinsic sources. The technical processing as-
pect is mandatory least the proffered indicator be exposed immediately
as counterfeit (e.g., visual camouflage can be penetrated by multi-
spectral techniques, so that knowledge of the existence of multi-
spectral reconnaissance is essential to the camouflager) . Attendance to
past signals is also necessary to insure validity since the guardian can
be expected to be alert to such details (i.e., he can be expected to
recognize the "fist" or accent of past users of the channel) . Finally
attendance to indicators provided by intrinsic sources is necessary if
the controlled indicator is not to be indicated by a preponderance of
contrary evidence.
While embedding level 2 transactions into the communications theory
construct appears relatively straightforward if the validation interpre-
tation process can be handled in a satisfactory fashion, the same cannot
be said for the level 1 process. In this process the message (the de-
ception) is encoded into a number of specific indicators. These indica-
tors are then transmitted via channel exploiters, who use physical sig-
naling, to channel guardians, who form a transformed indicator set.
The received indicator set is then subjected to a process of merger and
analysis to extract the received message. Figure 5 provides a schematic
depiction of the level 1 process. Note that multiple channels may be
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Figure 5. Schematic depiction of Level 1 transactions.
the decoding transformation (Y) is subject to control by the deceiver.
In contrast to the normal communications situation, the encoding scheme
must be based on predictions of, rather than, knowledge of the receipient
decoding transformation (Y)
.
Some deceptions, which R.V. Jones describes as telephone hoaxes,
do involve a single channel. In these deceptions a sequence of indica-
-
tors are passed through a single channel which contains no signals from
intrinsic sources to a single channel guardian who is also the target
of the deception. Jones characterizes such hoaxes as particularly sim-
ple, and the development which we have undertaken allows us to clearly
see the reasons for this. As only a single channel guardian is in-
volved the validity process is unitary rather than multiple. Since all
indicators passed are under the deceiver's control problems of disso-
nance are minimized. The problem is further simplified since the in-
volvement of the channel guardian guarantees the continued salience of
the indicator sequence to the target. Consequently, the only problem
in such proto-deceptions is that of sufficiently predicting the decoding
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transformation and devising an appropriate encoding transformation.
Jones uses the term sympathetic nature to describe the required ability
to predict the target's decoding function. This ability allows the
perpetrator of the hoax to place himself in the victim's place to see
what evidence he has with which to construct and test his world picture.
As one moves from proto-deceptions such as the telephone hoax
toward more complicated situations, a host of additional factors come
into play. One of these is the effect of multiple information channels
into the top level decoder. As information carried over additional
channels is admitted into the decoding process the channel exploiter
must either take steps to control these channels, which as Jones points
out, greatly complicates this task, or else he must find that his free-
dom to exploit the channels which he controls is limited by the informa-
tion deriving from intrinsic sources. However, even more troubling than
the existence of known, uncontrolled channels (white channels) , whose
contribution to the ultimate decoding process of the channel can be an-
ticipated and for which allowance can be made, is the possible existence of
known channels (black channels) . The possible impact of such channels
cannot even be compensated by "worst case assumptions" by the encoder
since the worst case is that the black channel gives the intended victim
access to the innermost secrets of the deception. The target is thus
in a position to turn the deception around.
Other complications which emerge as one moves away from proto-
deceptions have little intrinsic relationship to information. These
are organizational and bureaucratic political factors which occur with-
in the level 1 decoding system. These factors may prevent indicators
which have been successfully injected into the system from influencing
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the ultimate decision in the intended fashion. It is on these types of
factors which analyses such as Wohlstetter 's analysis of Pearl Harbor
Q
and Handel's analysis of the Yom Kippur War focus. As has been stressed
previously, although these analyses use the language of signals and noise
they are using these terms in an entirely different fashion than they
are used in communication theory.
By way of summary of the development of the level 1 problem to
this point , a main task for the encoder is to anticipate the function-
ing of the decoder. The decoder process frequently represents multi-
source fusion and validation, processes which are poorly understood
even in relatively favorable situations. In many cases the decoder
processes are further complicated by embedding them in a complex and
time variable organizational and environmental context. Consequently,
unless the target has stable and well characterized habits in handling
and analyzing information, the encoder can have only a fuzzy predic-
tion of the decoder process on which to base his encoding scheme.
Despite problems of reducing discord with information supplied by
intrinsic sources of the possible existence of black channels and prob-
lems in anticipating the decoding process, reasonably efficient communi-
cation can still take place. The requirement for communication in this
case is the existence of a feedback path from the output of the decoder
to the input of the encoder. Such a feedback path allows monitoring
the current functioning of the decoding system, however it may be
characterized, and provides a method for detecting and correcting errors
in the initial encode-decode scheme. Communications theory shows that
feedback and error correction reduce the signaling rate. However, since
the signaling rate for level 1 transactions is typically quite low,
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considerable delays associated with feedback and error correction
seem quite acceptable.
Allied deception operatives during World War II found the feed-
back provided by ULTRA and the tasking to controlled agents invaluable
in allowing their efforts to achieve their intended goals . While the
type of feedback provided by ULTRA is perhaps unique, valuable feedback
was also obtained through monitoring the search for additional informa-
tion by the decoding system. This observation implies that monitoring
the targets of an opponent's sensor systems is potentially a valuable
source of feedback.
A summary of the major propositions developed in this section is
as follows
:
1. Embedding deception into a communications theory framework
requires a dual scheme. One level involves the generation, transmis-
sion and reception of indicators. The other level involves the encoding
and decoding of the deceptive message in a sequence of indicators.
2. Communications theory, as conventionally understood, seems
capable of extension to cover the indicator transmisson process if the
validate/interpret function of the channel guardian can be incorporated
in a satisfactory manner.
3. Communicatons theory does not map well onto the other level of
communications. However, the communications theory approach suggests
that successful deceptive communications requires either the existence
of stable well characterized patterns for dealing with information on
the part of the deception target, or the existence of a feedback path
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DECEPTION IN A GAME THEORETIC FRAMEWORK
William Reese
INTRODUCTION
The theory of strategic games attempts to deal with situations in
which the outcome of an interaction between two or more actors is mutually
dependent upon the combined choices of the actors.-*- Consequently, it seems
natural to seek insights about deception from game theory. There are two
ways in which the theory of games can be applied to the problem of decep-
tion. In one way game theory is used to identify those cases susceptible
to deception in representing the preferences over choices by one of the
actors in a situation where it is assumed the receiving actor will accept
the representation as truthful. In the second any game theory is used as
a tool to examine the problem and one actor who has received a signal and
is faced with deciding if the signal is direct or inverted. This context
embraces the first should the target wish to consider the possibility of
deception. It could also occur in a direct conflict situation in which
the preference rankings were diametrically opposed. The second application
of game theory in a direct conflict context will be the central focus of
this discussion.
In strategic games a single choice (move) by one of the actors
(players) has no intrinsic meaning since its results are dependent on the
choices of others. It is the strategies which determine the choices which
are important and susceptible to analysis. A strategy can be defined as
a plan for choosing individual moves which is complete in the sense that
no event, whether the action of opposing players or a random occurance
allowed by the game structure, is not anticipated by the plan. It is not
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the individual event, but the complete strategy which can be assessed
rationally. The rational judgment about the strategy of one participant
required either assumptions or information about the strategies of the
other participants. It is not permissible to treat the choices of the
opposing players as chance events controlled by probabilities. This takes
game theory beyond a simple application of probability theory. Normally,
the assumption is made that the opponents will, within the limitations of
the information available to them, attempt to seek the most favorable out-
come which they can obtain. Given the assumption that the opponents will
themselves act rationally, it frequently follows that one should act so
as to deny the opponents useful information about one's own strategy.
A central result of the theory of strategic games is that favorable
strategies frequently involve making choices based on a random event chosen
from a suitable distribution. The role of random choice is to thwart one's
opponents from deducing one's strategy and developing a counter-strategy
which exploits any weakness which might be evident were one's strategy
known. The role of the suitable distribution is to optimize the long term
expected outcome from the game (game's value).. The distribution is devel-
oped from the principle that one should adopt a strategy which will, at
worst, yield a known and acceptable result even if the opponent is able
to deduce the strategy behind one's choices. An example of these ideas is
provided by the game of matching pennies. Game theory shows that no method
of choosing is better than the process of "flipping" the coin which re-
sults in a random selection of the two choices (head or tails) in which
each choice is expected to occur half the time. If this strategy is chosen
the expected outcome is to break even.
Strategies based upon random choice are called mixed strategies, A
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mixed strategy implies that on some plays the player may expose himself
to a greater degree of risk than normal, This risk is compensated by avoid-
ing the greater risk that one's choices will become predictable and hence
exploitable. The role of the risky choice in the game is the same as the
role of bluffing in the game of poker. As was observed in the seminal work
9
of game theory. :
Of the two possible motives for bluffing, the first is the
desire to give a (false) impression of strength in (real)
weakness; the second is the desire to give an impression of
weakness in (real) strength. Both are instances of inverted
signaling. . . i.e., of misleading the opponent. It should
be observed, however, that the first type of bluffing is most
successful when it "succeeds," i.e., when the opponent actual-
ly "passes," since this secures the desired gain; while the
second is most successful when it "fails" i.e., when the op-
ponent "sees" since this will convey to him the desired con-
fusing information.
The lesson of game theory that one should sometimes bluff in order
to confuse the opposition can be transferred to other contexts. For
example, McDonald J notes:
Political strategists often attempt to explain everything
that a powerful nation says in the UN or does on the po-
litical scene in terms solely of a definite strategical
pattern which it is assume can be discovered by fitting all
the pieces together. Such analysis fails to account for the
possibility that some political moves may be made on a ran-
dom basis just in order to throw the opposition off the
scent. A "rational" political leader, according to game
theory, ought to make such random moves.
In some games, only a single choice is rationally indicated so ran-
dom bluffing is not "rational." In such cases, the indicated choice is
called dominant. A dominant choice insures an outcome at least as favor-
able as is obtainable by any other choice and, for some choices by the
opponent will yield results which are more favorable than would be other-
wise possible. An application of game theory to deception involving in-
fluencing the opponent's choices requires implying dominant choices when
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none exist. Brams^ has performed analysis of two actors, two choice (2X2)
games to deduce those most susceptible to deception. Brams ' analysis is
most applicable to negotiation, whether explicit or not, and assumes that
the two parties exchange information about their rankings about the pos-
sible outcomes and act upon the exchanged information. The target does
not consider that the opponent may engage in inverted signaling. Brams
finds that games in which both players have dominant choices are deception
proof since the choice which each player would rationally make is unaffected
by the choice of the other. In other games one or both parties, by mis-
representing his preference ranking to make it appear that a dominant
choice existed when none did, might induce a choice by the opposing party
which could be exploited. In some cases the fact of deception would be
revealed by exploitation. In other cases the deception would be obscured
since the exploiting choice would be the one indicated by the falsely sig-
naled dominant choice. (This situation occurs when the deceiver be faced
by an unattractive choice.)
As stated in the opening paragraph, the type of analysis which Brams
conducted is not directly applicable to the situation in which a player
wished to decide if a signal which has been received is direct or inverted.
A typical example might occur in a direct conflict situation in which the
preference orders of the participants are diametrically opposed and the
problem is to choose, given some signal which seems to indicate the oppo-
nent's probable choice. If the signal may be inverted, deception must be
considered. The framework used to examine this problem will be games of
direct conflict, zero sum games.
A zero game is one in which the winnings of one participant come
directly at the expense of the other participants. As an example of viewing
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deception in the context of a zero sum game, consider the situation of the
Purple commander in the illustration used to focus the discussion of com-
munications theory. The Purple commander receives the message "Green
tanks are massing on Eastside." Given that he has insufficient resources
to guard both sides, game theory cautions him not to fail between two
stools and split his forces for he would then face certain defeat. Should
he choose to act on this information, he has two possible options: assume
the signal is valid and prepare for an attack on Eastside or assume the
signal is inverted and do the opposite. His problem is then this: if he
chooses correctly, he faces a possible gain, if he chooses incorrectly, he
faces disaster (with Green benefiting) . What is appropriate strategy for
the Purple commander to adopt? We will return to this question after in-
troducing a few technical details about two person, zero sum games.
TWO PERSON ZERO SUM GAMES
The simplest model of a direct conflict pame is a zero sum game in-
volving two sides. In such a game structure one side can make one of n
choices and the other side can make one of m choices, with the outcome
being that one side wins" and the other side loses an amount U.. (corre-
sponding to the two sides making the ith and j th choices respectively).
For the purpose of the discussion, we assume that the two sides have com-
mon views of the worth of any particular outcome (the values U..). The
game is thus characterized as one of complete information.
Of all two person zero sum games, the simplest are those in which
each side has two choices. Such games are called 2X2 games. These games
can be represented by four element payoff matrix corresponding to ithe
values U.
.
(taken as viewed by one of the parties - as viewed from the
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other side, the payoff matrix differs by each entry having the opposite
sign.) As an example, consider the game of matching pennies. Calling
the two sides A and B, the possible outcomes of a particular play in which
A and B independently call "heads" or "tails" are:
A and B both choose heads-A wins
A and B both choose tails-A wins
One calls heads, the other tails-B wins.
If winning (or loosing) represents the exchange of the penny, then from
A's point of view the payoff matrix can be represented as
3
A _H T CB's choices are indicated here^)
1 -1
-1 1
The first question which must be answered is "What is the best strategy
for A (or B)?" The theory of games insures that for this game, as is the
case for all two person, zero sum games, there exists a best strategy in
the sense of mini-max. 5 The mini-max criterion insures that even if one
player knows beforehand the strategy which governs the choice of his op-
ponent, he still cannot reduce the average payoff over many repetitions
(the game value) below the value obtained by mini-max. Thus, if a player
uses a mini-max strategy, he can do no worse than a predetermined amount
and he can sometimes do better if his opponent does not play correctly.
The potential for additional profit from an opponent who plays poorly is
dependent on the pay-off matrix which characterizes the game. For the
game considered here this potential does not exist. For other games it
does. To profit from an opponent's poor play in a game such as this, one
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must also play "poorly" (e.g. according to a less rational strategy than
mini-max)
,
The methods for finding the mini-max strategy for 2x2 sum games are
well known. For the case at hand, matching pennies, the proper strategy
is a mixed strategy in which A (for B because of the symmetry of the game)
chooses heads half the time and tails half the time with the choice being
made randomly each play. The reason for the random choice in the prescribed
strategy is to insure that the opponent cannot guess the next choice since
it is not determined beforehand. If correct play is made in this game,
then the wins balance the losses and the value of this (fair) game is zero.
Introduction of deception into this game would be for A (or B) to
announce prior to a move, "Next move I am going to choose heads (or tails)."
The problem would be, how should the other side act? Should he "believe"
and exploit the prior information? Should he "disbelieve" and attempt
the trap the suspected deceiver? We shall perform this analysis for a
more general game in the next section, but for this particular game, the
answer is that the "best" strategy is to ignore the prior call unless it
could be confidently established that the other player departed from good
strategy by adopting an other than random strategy for deciding when to
lie. Analysis of the game with potential deception instructs the player
who makes a prior announcement to lie half the time, with the occasions
chosen at random.
TWO PERSON, ZERO SUM GAMES INVOLVING DECEPTION
Let us return to the problem of the Purple commander as a vehicle for
exploiting two person, zero sum games as a framework for the analysis of
deception. Upon receiving the message, "Green tanks are massing on East-
side," he has the following choices:
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or
Assume the message is direct and prepare for a defense on
Eastside,
Assume the message is inverted and prepare an ambush on
Westside.
In matrix form, his choices his opponet's choices (send a direct or




value of best defense
penalty of unplanned
surprise
penalty of planned surprises
value of ambush
where D and I imply direct and indirect signaling by Green and D' and I'
imply assumptions of direct and indirect signaling made by Purple com-
mander in setting his plans.
To proceed further actual values have to be assigned to the outcomes.
Although we will later simplifly the values and the analysis, let us at
present assign:
A is the value to Purple of best defense.
-B is the value to Purple of Green achieving an unanticipated surprise.
-B-A is the value to Purple of Green achieving an anticipated surprise.
A+A' is the value to Purple of an ambush of Green.
The symbols have been chosen so that all (with the possible exception of
A) are positive numbers. Further, it is expected that B, B+A and A' are
all considerably larger than A. (This expection is based on historical
data on the value of surprise in battles. ) Using these symbols, the







The mini-max solution to the game can be obtained using standard
methods, The recommended strategies for both G and P are mixed. The
Purple commander should make his choices with the following probabilities:
P (D') = A + B + A' , P = A ± B + A
p 2A +2B + A + A' p 2A +2B + A + A'
while the Green commander can be expected to play randomly according to
the following probabilities:
P (D) - A + B + A + A' , P (I) = A + B
G 2A +2B + A + A G 2A +2B + A + A'
These recondite formulae can most easily be interpreted if some simplifi-
cations are introduced. The easiet simplification is to assume a single
value of surprise, i.e.,
B= B + A =A + A' =sA,
The parameter S can be called the value of surprise and represents how
much more effective an operation will be if surprise is achieved than
if it is not achieved. A likely physical value for S would be the ex-
pected "exchange ratio" from the resulting combat. With a single value
for surprise the probabilities for P and G become identical. For P the
probabilities are:
P (D') = 2S
,
P (I') 1 + S
P 1 + 3S p 1 +3S
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Historical data suggests that s might be between about 3 and 5, so that G
(and P) ought to play the direct option about 60% of the time. That is
for this case G should not engage in deception the majority of the time.
The game is indeed unfair to P, having a value to him of -0.6A for s=3
and -1.58A for s=5. This shows the importance of G sometimes using in-
verted signaling. If P could discount this possibility, the value of
the game would be A in favor of P. Thus, the occasional practice of de-
ception, despite the risks, converts G from a loser (on average) to a
winner (on average) . The proabilities associated with direct and in-
verted signaling result from finding a rational balance between the re-
ward of surprise and the risk of being ambushed.
Another special case comes when a higher value is assigned surprise
obtained in an ambush than when achieved in other ways, i.e.,
B=B + A = sA and A + A' =asA.
In this case, the probabilities for P (and G) take the form
P (D') = (l+a)s -A P = 1+sand P
p l+(2+a)s p (i») l+(2+a)s
i
If we examine the case s=3 and a=2, inverted signaling should occur in
just 4/13 of the cases (down from 4/10 when a = 1) and the value to P
becomes -1/7. Thus, as the value of ambush increases G is forced to
lie less (for fear of ambush) and the game becomes more favorable to P,
The same game allows a quantitative .impression to be gained about
the value of feedback to the deceiver. Starting with the base case of





The mini-max solutions has value for P of
-s(s-l) .
3s + 1
If feedback is represented as converting the "ambush" into a "best defense'
(and it will probably be even less favorable than this to P) , then the





which has value for P of
-s-1
That is, the value of the game with feedback to G is (3s+l)/2s times the
value of the same game without feedback. (The advantage is even more if
a >1.) For s=3, the feedback game is 5/3 as valuable to G as is the basic
game without feedback. This increase in value comes because G is free:to
lie more often. For the feedback game, the mini-max strategy instructs
G to gengage in inverted signaling exactly half the time. Thus, the exis-
tence of feedback removes the penalty of ambush and promotes deceptive
signaling.
As we have already observed, the "game" which confronts the commander
faced with the possibility of deception is normally "unfair" against him.
One way of increasing the fairness is to increase the penalty to the de-
ceiving side if it is found out, i.e., by increasing the value of "ambush."
Another way of reducing the "unfairness" is to allow another, realistic
option—delaying the choice until more information is available. The bene-
fit of the wait choice is obvious—if the situation clarifies in time,
surprise can be avoided. The hazard of the wait choice is equally
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obivious— if the situation does not clarify in time to take proper action,
surprise by the opponent is guaranteed. The problem to which we will now
turn is, "under what circumstances and to what extent should the commander
"wait" rather than commit himself?"
As a framework for this analysis, let us extend the now familiar
single surprise game by introducing a third choice for P. The choice,
which is to wait until the situation is clarified, will be modeled as fol-
lows: there is a probability p that the correct situation will be per-
ceived in time to take the correct action (best defense or ambush) and
a corresponding probability 1-p that the situation will become apparent
too late, in which case the penalty of surprise is imposed. With this







Although obtaining the solution for the extended game is more tedious
than for the original game, a mini-max, mixed strategy none the less exists.
The analysis shows that if the probability of timely discovery is less
than 1/2, P should never wait (the probability of surprise is too high).
When p is small, rather than waiting, the Purple commander should immedi-
ately commit himself according to the results of the original game. When
the probability of timely discovery is greater than 1/2, the Purple com-
mander should not take action assuming inverted signaling but adop a mixed
strategy which is a mixture of D f and W strongly biased toward W. This
does not preclude Purple from attempting to set an ambush (i.e., choose
I') at a later time should the situation clarify and indicate this to be
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the proper action or if a reassessement of the probability of timely dis-
covery implies waiting is no longer prudent. What this result implies is
that at the time of choice the Purple commander should either play D or W.
An interesting, and apparently paradoxical, feature of the extended
game is that as the probability of timely discovery grows larger, Purple
should wait less and assume direct signaling more often. This superfi-
cially strange result occurs since a large value of p, which by assumption
is simultaneously the value assumed by P and the value credited to P by
G, forces G to abandon inverted signaling since the risk of being ambushed
is unacceptably high.
In a more quantitative vein, the mini-max strategy for the extended
game is as follows:
p<l/2 P
n
(D') = P (D) = 2s/(l+3s), P (I') = Pr (I) = (l+s)/(l+3s), P (W)=0p o p u p
with value to P = -s(s-l)/ (l+3s)
;
p>l/2 P (D f ) = p(s-l)/(l+s + ps-p), P (I 1 ) = 0, P (W) = (l+s)/(l+s+ps-p),
P
G
(D) = 2ps/(l+s + ps-p), P
G
(I) = (1+s) (l-p)/(l+s+ps-p)
with value to P = (2ps-s(l+s) (1-p) )/ (1+s+ps-p)
.
These formidable formulae can be made more transparent if some indi-
cators are examined graphically. Three useful indicators are the prob-
ability of waiting, the probability of inverted signaling (P (I)) and the
G
value of the game to the target P. These three quantities are shown in
Fig. 6 for the special case s = 3, which is a quite typical case. When the
probability of timely discovery exceeds about 0.7 this game becomes favor-
able to Pin the sense that the waiting option has sufficient probability
























probability of timely discovery
Fig. 6. Key indicators for extended game according to mini-max strategy as
a function of the probability of timely discovery for the case s=3.
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surprise (s) would require larger values of timely discovery before the
game would become favorable to P,
Although the exact behavior which characterizes the solution near p =
1/2 is somewhat an artifact of the particular payoff matrix chosen to repre-
sent the game, the general behavior should persist over quite a range of
similarly structured situations. That is, for low values of timely dis-
covery the choice should be made between D' and I' (an unfair game) while
for higher values of p, a strong preference develops for W with the resi-
dual choice being D'. This suggests that if the signaling party intends
to employ inverted signaling, he should take measures to reduce the pro-
ability of timely discovery by the opponent. One classic means of doing
this is to reduce the time available for discovery. It the deception
must have long life, then either a technique must be developed to pre-
vent the opponent form discovery, i.e., tight security or satisfying the
opponent that he has the correct picture or else reliable feedback must
be established to avoid the consequences of being ambushed.
The model just considered provides one strong clue about the almost
uncanny success of tactical deception. The model implies that the per-
ception of the target of his ability to clarify the situation in time is
an important variable. If the assumed probability is greater than 1/2,
the rational strategy is normally to wait. This suggests a very strong
tendency of the target side to "wait" if it feels that it has substantial
likelihood of timely discovery of the true situation. It would seem that
misestimation of the likelihood of the situation clarifying would be an
attractive error. Having too much faith in either possessing enough time
or resources to clarify a muddled picture seems an almost certain lure to
surprise since the choice which must be made in the absence of
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A SYSTEM MODEL FOR DECEPTION
Paul H. Moose
INTRODUCTION
The systems view holds that a phenomenon such as deception in mili-
tary/political affairs should be analyzed in an appropriate contextual
framework; isolating deception from other systemic functions only creates
an artificial concept, one with no counterpart in reality, Further, it
requires that the phenomenon be bounded, i»e that we have a means to de-
cide what variables must be explicitly included in the system model. We
do this by stating the following general premises.
Deceptions may occur by intention or by accident, We shall consider
only the former, Deceptions are carried out by a Deceiver's overt actions,
or sequence of actions, directed against a Target. In communications
terminology , 2 these actions are viewed as signals; the signals are de-
signed to a) confuse or b) mislead the Target about the Deceiver's true
situation or intentions, or even a third party's situation or intentions.
The probability that a confusion creating signal or set of signals actual-
ly creates confusion depends on the Target's tolerance for ambiguity.
The Target's tolerance will be a function of his goals and objectives and
of his perception of the situation. The probability that a misleading
type signal will be believed depends a) on the target's assessment of the
credibility of the channel thru which it has been received, b) on its
congruence or lack of congruence with his existing perception of the situ-
ation, c) on the action or sequence of actions that may be implied by be-
lieving the signal and d) on the impact these implied actions will have
on his goals and objectives.
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Finally, we postulate that success or failure of a deception must not
be measured by whether or not the Target believes, or is confused by, the
signals, nor even by his actions, but it must be measured by its effects
on subsequent observable events. Though perhaps a harsh test of utility,
the system view holds that anything less is to be neglected as inconse-
quential,, The function of a system model is to provide a program for pre-
dicting future events and, allegedly, assessing the relevance of decep-
tion.,
THE MODEL
The above premises lead us to imbed deception in the overall stream
of events describing the evolution of relationship between two sides,
This event stream is imagined as arising from the actions of Side A in
response to a stimulus set consisting of the previous actions of Side B
plus other environmental stimuli. In turn, Side A's actions along with
other environmental stimuli become the stimulus set that determine Side B's
next actions, etc, The mode is depicted in its most elementary form in
Figure 1<> It is important to note that with three entities, Side A,
Side B and the Environment, there are six couplings to determine. In
considering military/political deception, the Environment includes other
countries or military forces not directly involved in the A-B conflict,
such as Allies, neutral nations, etc, It may encompass public and world
opinion, political factors, and other social components as well as natu-
ral environmental phenomena. In short, the Environment accounts for all
other factors and factions that may be affected by or may affect in anyway
A and B's actions.
We can envision events as being generated by the dynamic interplay
of the three entities A, B, and E. The sequence of events is called an
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A's Responses A's Stimuli to B
Env. Stimuli Env. Stimuli
Figure 1
Elementary System Model
event stream and the instantaneous situation, that is, the state of af-
fairs at any point in time, is the cumulative result, the integrated
effect, of the event stream from t = - °° up until the present. An event
stream (just showing interplay between A & B) is depicted in Figure 2.
Here, it is clear that reactions are caused by actions. Our view is a
teleological one. Events of a military/political nature, do not just
occur. They are the direct results of individuals and/or group behavior,
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ON THE NATURE OF BEHAVIOR
Human behavior lies at the core of deception phenomena . To under-
stand how to deceive, or why deceptions work, we must develop means to
account for human behavior in our analyses The Social Sciences hava no
composite and consistent theory that "explains" behavior or that can pre-
dict behavior unerringly,, Yet psychology has established a great deal
about the nature of human behavior^ A number of the psychological dimen-
sions of behavior relating to deception have been outlined by Sarbin
The systems theorists must have a way to operationalize these ob-
servations „ This is accomplished by adopting the following point of
viewo Behavior consists of two parts: a predictable part and an unpre-
dictable or random parto The predictable part is a function of three fac-
tors: 1) a set of intrinsic properties or features of the organism, 2)
conditioning through integration of the event stream from the time of the
origination of the organism up to the present, and 3) goal-seeking, i<,e
efforts of the organism to achieve a set of goals „ The unpredictable
part of behavior arises from 1) incomplete knowledge of any of the three
factors cited above or 2) purely random and unaccountable events such
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as natural catastrophe.
The questions for us are: 1) to what extent can A predict B's future
behavior and 2) to what extent can he influence B's future behavior through
the stimulus sequence?
SYSTEM VARIABLES
We have already talked about stimulus sets and response or action
setSo The responses, or actions of A become events that establish a new
situation which stimulates B,etc. This is a "feedback" or "cybernetic"
system model. One's actions return, transformed by the oppositions' re-
actions, to stimulate one to new actions, and so on.
In the case of military affairs (as is true for all organisms invol-
ving humans), actions are of the two types: physical or energetic actions
and informational or communicative actions „ Thus, a decision by A to
declare war may first manifest itself as a message from Side A to Side B,
"We declare war on you," or by a physical attack of A's forces upon Be
Decision makers deal primarily with informational variables.
The nature of an organization is such that many informational (as
well as energetic) variables will be transmitted to the other side and
thus will act as stimuli* These transmissions will be intentional, as
in, "We declare war on you" or unintentional, as when material concerning
military plans accidently appears in a newspaper, or is obtained through
covert intelligence channels. In addition to this leakage of information,
the actual force activities that occur can deviate substantially from
those ordered due to reinterpretation of orders as they pass down the
chains of command. Consequently the situation that develops which actual-
ly stimulates the other side may 1) not be what intended and 2) not be
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completely known to the decision maker. Furthermore, it is obvious that
A may only be partly aware of environmental stimuli to B. The combination
of these factors lead to considerable uncertainty about the other side's
stimulus set and accordingly, prediction of behavior becomes much more un-
certain.
A further complication arises because systemic stimuli almost never
pass directly to the decision makers. Various stimuli pass through vari-
ous intermediate levels of analysis, validation, summarizing, etc. This
is unavoidable in large organizations because of the sheer quantity of
stimuli and the number of persons involved in its processing. Neverthe-
less, the effect is that stimuli, in passing through these "internal"
channels, will be modified even further. Some important information may
be discarded, either by accident or for bureaucratic reasons, and other
information may be incorrectly expanded based on uncertain suppositions.
The net effect is that Side A's uncertainty about the inputs to Side B's
decision maker increases even further.
.
In fact, since B is probably only
sensing A's force stimuli indirectly, thru combat reports, A may not be
able to assume that B knows the true battle situation.
j
Thus, although our model is one of cause and effect, it exhibits a
considerable amount of unpredictable or random behavior. The growth of
uncertainty is unavoidable and may be thought of as a characteristic of
the "channels of communications" between A and B and between A and E and
B and E.
FEEDBACK
One of A's objectives is to predict B's behavior and, by suitable
stimuli, to control it. The more certain A is of the channels of com-
munication to B, the better he will do. Since there is great intrinsic
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randomness in these channels, both internal and external, A needs some
way to reduce his uncertainity . There are two ways to do this. Consider
the diagram of Figure 3. One way is for A to wait and see what B's
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Components of the Communications
Channel from A to B (Channel from
B to A, not shown, contains similar components)
response is to a particular action by A. The action may even be "designed"
to elicit a particular type of behavior. Based on this response, and his
knowledge of B's intrinsic behavior, A can deduce what the actual stimuli
must have been. This is a well known and useful technique.
In communications theory this technique is known as "probing the
channel." It has, however, some obvious limitations. We recall that A's
picture of B's response must pass through the return channel (not shown
explicitly in Figure 3, but just the mirror image of the forward channel).
Thus A cannot measure B's actual response, only his response transformed
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by the channel from B to A. This is not as serious a limitation as it might
seem if we argue that B's actual response is of no value to A anyhow be-
cause A's actions must always hinge on his perception of B's response.
So, in attempting to characterize the communication channels for future
deceptive use, A can only expect to act on what he will be able to per-
ceive about B's behavior, not B's actual behavior.
A greater problem with this "learning approach to channel characteri-
zation" lies with the dynamics of the Environment, the dynamics of the
channels themselves and with the high degree of uncertainty introduced by
apparently random behavior in the channels. The theory of measurement
tells us that the greater these uncertainties, the more probes are required
to characterize the channels. But because of natural delays in the system,
the more probes required, the more time required. If the internal or ex-
ternal channels or Environment alter their properties during times charac-
teristically shorter than the time required for measurement, it will not
be possible to characterize the channels in this fashion. Another way of
saying this is that the system properties must be stationary for long
periods, enough to average out random variations, in order to determine
normal trends. It must be remembered that even if this is possible to do,
predicting any particular sequence of events will still be subject to ran-
dom error. However, by knowing the normal or expected system behavior,
this error, i.e the uncertainty in the future event stream, can be greatly
reduced.
We have here one of the primary system theoretical results. In times
of peace, or prolonged conflict, system characteristics will be sufficient-
ly stable that one can learn to predict behavior with a fair degree of
certainty either with intentional probes or by simply extrapolating from
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past sections of the naturally occurring event stream. During such periods.
the system is in equilibrium; it is exhibiting "steady state" behavior.
The period of the Cold War is an example of such an epoch. However, during
periods of transition, such as crisis, or when one military force is gain-
ing a significant advantage vis-a-vis another, the system is unstable.
Attempting to probe the channels to measure their properties will not be
successful because they are changing too rapidly. Furthermore, knowledge
of the organism's intrinsic properties may become faulty at such times.
An old organism may be dying and a new one being given birth. Such is
the case during revolutions.
The ordinary feedback that is a part of the natural interplay between
two sides is one way to estimate the normal trends of the channels of com-
munications and of the opposing side's decision maker in order to be able
to better predict his future behavior. Another type of feedback, purely
informational in nature, is a direct feedback channel from Side B's de-
cision maker to Side A's decision maker. By "direct" we mean a channel
that is relatively free of delay, error and environmental influences (see
Figure 3). ULTRA is a good example of such a channel. Foreign agents
operating at high levels represent another example. These "intelligence
channels" are normally established by A's initiative and without B's
cooperation or knowledge. The purpose of direct feedback is to short
circuit one or the other or both of the normal channels in order to re-
duce uncertainty, eliminate delay, and permit more accurate prediction of
the other side's behavior. It becomes particularly useful when systems
are in transition, or as we shall see, when one wishes to deceive the
other side at relatively frequent intervals.
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GOAL SEEKING
In addition to the integrated effects of past stimuli and certain
intrinsic properties, an organism's behavior is a function of its goals.
One component, or element, of the "goal set" is always organism survival.
For some organisms, viability is their only real goal. In military/politi-
cal organisms, however, there are other goals imposed from without. In
general, the goal set of such a system will be very complex and it too will
be dynamic, i.e., it will change with time and situation. Nevertheless,
one can better predict the behavior of one's opponent in direct relation-
ship to certainty of the opponent's goal set.
For example, it A knows B is greatly concerned about maintaining
status quo, he can predict with some certainty that B will select among
his possible courses of action the one that will appear to assure status
quo for the greatest possible period of time. Thus, if a deceptive stimu-
lus is designed to cause B to postpone force action in order to "gather
more data about the situation," then A cart be quite certain B will accept
this deception and A can mount a surprise attack on B with great impunity.
j
Almost any deception will work, either one that confuses B, so he has a
rationale for searching for information to alleviate his confusion, or a
deception that misleads B into thinking that A also intends to try to
maintain status quo. Thus it was simple matter for Hitler to deceive
Chamberlain because the Prime Minister wanted it to be true, even though
it was more or less obvious to the whole world that Hitler was lying.
We have as a primary principle that a Deceiver intent on misleading
a Target should stimulate actions on the part of the Target that are con-
gruent with the Target's goals to the greatest possible degree. By con-
gruent we mean they support at least one of the elements of the set with
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little or no risk of setback to any others.
If the Deceiver's objective is only to confuse the Target, that is,
increase his uncertainty about the true situation, the Deceiver must
consider the Target's tolerance for ambiguity. The general issue is to
understand for how long and to what degree an organism can remain ambig-
uous about his perception of reality. We postulate that it resolves am-
biguity at the point it perceives that the risks of waiting outweigh the
risks associated with immediate action. These "risks" must be assessed in
terms of the decision making element's goals, not those of subordinate or
supporting elements. For example, in spite of a variety of intelligence
analyses indicating that the Japanese could attack the Pacific Fleet and
achieve surprise in 1941, there certainly was more than enough ambiguity
about whether they actually would to make it problematic at best. Roose-
velt is reported to have said after having moved the Fleet from the West
Coast to Pearl Harbor in 1940 in order to threaten the Japanese expansion-
ism, that "... when I don't know where to move I stay put." 6 On the
other hand, Khrushchev withdrew the missiles from Cuba, although still
somewhat ambiguous about Kennedy's resolve to attack Cuba, when he came
to feel the risk of waiting substantially outweighed the risk (loss of
face) of withdrawal.
We conclude that a deception that confuses or creates ambiguity in
the Target may or may not buy the Deceiver time. The Target will resolve
(in his own mind) the ambiguity and act immediately if he believes waiting
risks greater loss than action. Resolution will be based on "good judg-
ment," that is conditioning from the cumulative stimuli of the event
stream, and on the current set of actions available to deal with the
given situation. However, if the Target's main goal is to preserve
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status quo, he will almost always see more risks in acting "prematurely"
than in waiting to get a "clearer picture" of his opponent's intentions.
DECEPTIVE METHODS
Now with this dynamic system model in mind, consider what methods
may be employed to deceive a Target. It is clear that the Deceiver must
consider carefully the sequence of future events he envisions unfolding.
That is, he must look beyond the "first move" to the actions the Target
is most likely to take and what, in turn, his own reactions must be in
order to gain the advantage he seeks.
Furthermore, the deception itself may take a number of cycles to un-
fold. It may require establishing special channels, including a direct
feedback channel, and a means to measure the reliability of those channels.
It most certainly requires a determination of the Targets' goals, and prob-
ably requires their prediction for the time period the Deceiver will utilize
in capitalizing on the lie or confusion he has perpetrated. Finally, the
Deceiver wants to understand to the greatest possible extent the intrinsic
properties of the Target system, how it transforms stimulus sets into actions
and how it resolves ambiguity.
Given this understanding and capability, the Deceiver should design
the lie or lies, whether they aim to reinforce the Target's perception of
the situation or aim at changing it, to require actions congruent with the
Target's goals. He should use channels of communication that a) the Target
believes to be credible and b) are reasonably connected to the decision
making element (s) of the Target system.
In order to assure the reliability of these channels, the Deceiver
will have to transmit many "True" messages for every "False" message.
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We can formalize this requirement somewhat as follows: Assume that the
probability a message is transmitted correctly over the channel from A
to B is p. Then q = 1-p is the normal error rate in the channel. If r
is the fraction of deceptive messages transmitted, then for r < q, the
probability that the Target will unmask the deception is very small. It
is "buried in the normal noise" of the channel. However, note that the
fraction of messages that can be successfully transmitted as deception is
r' = pr 4 pq
which has its maximum value at p = q = 1/2. A channel that has the pro-
perty p = q 1/2 is a "maximum entropy" channel; it is maximally uncertain.
If p > q, the channel is very reliable but one is not permitted many op-
portunities to deceive if he does not wish to give himself away. A chan-
nel where q > p has so much noise that it is consistently unreliable, and
though many deceptive signals can be transmitted, they will probably fall
on deaf ears.
Also note that only 50% of deceptions attempted will be correctly re-
ceived over the maximum entropy channel, and the Deceiver is maximally un-
certain about whether his Target has been deceived or not. This state of
affairs will probably be unsatisfactory to the Deceiver so he must arrange
to reduce his uncertainty with a high quality, i.e. low error rate, low
delay, direct feedback channel. In this way a Deceiver can attempt to per-
petrate a fairly large number of lies, assuming a large fraction will be
rejected, and still know with considerable certainty which have been ac-
cepted and are acting to stimulate the opposing decision maker, thereby
affecting his behavior in the desired way, We conclude that establishing
a direct feedback channel is a prerequisite if one wants to practice de-
ception on a regular basis. If one only wishes to deceive on rare occasion,
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he can transmit the lie over a highly reliable channel, if one exists, and
be quite certain it will stimulate the desired behavior in the Target.
UNMASKING DECEPTIONS
The most effective way to prevent deception is to be continuously
aware of one's vulnerabilities as a Target. One should maintain great
skepticism about signals from the opposition that encourage procrastina-
tion or inactivity. One should attempt to exploit the "leaky" nature of
the opposition's internal communiations . But most importantly, one should
attempt to unmask deception by the use of counterdeception. One can do
this either by initiating preliminary activities indicating the lie has
been believed or that it has been rejected. What is necessary is estab-
lishment of a direct feedback channel from the original or suspected De-
ceiver's decision making elements to the suspected Target, in order to
determine if the counteractivities have been successfully transmitted
through the return channel. Once again, the Counter-Deceiver must antici-
pate expected behavior from the Deceiver, his Target, be it further at-
tempts to reinforce the original lie or be it initiation of the actions
planned to capitalize on a lie believed. In either case, he must have a
counterdeception plan that hypothesizes two measurably different near
term event streams, depending on whether a deception is present or not.
The evidence to support one hypothesis or the other will come through both
reliable and unreliable channels and it must be combined in a proper mathe-
matical fashion if the two hypotheses are to be differentiated in an un-
biased fashion. Throughout the counterdeception period, the Target must
continually assess his risks of waiting vis-a-vis those of action from
accepting one or the other hypotheses as true. The risks will vary with
246
the certainty with which one or the other is held true, and at some point
a threshold will be crossed where the Target's risk of waiting outweighs
that of acting on the most probable hypothesis. At this point, the de-
ception, if present, has either been unmasked or not, but the ambiguity
has been removed: a "true state" upon which the Target will act has been
established.
CONCLUSION
We have proposed that deceptions must be analyzed in their contextual
framework and that that framework includes interactions not only between
the two sides but between both parties and their Environment (s) . This is
the general system theoretical viewpoint. But it appears to render histori-
cal analyses of deception exceedingly difficult. This is not to say that
considerable insight will not be derived from case studies of past mili-
tary affairs suspected or known to contain attempts at deception, but only
to point out that it may be exceedingly difficult to measure the effect
of the deception on subsequent events.
The advantage to be derived from adopting a systems point of view of
deception is that it focuses players on the problem of predicting the
future event stream. This is more likely to assure that a Deceiver has
devised a set of actions to capitalize on the advantage he has gained.
It is more likely to force a Target to consider deception as a possibility
in the interpretation of evidence and to evaluate the potential consequences
on his cause.
We have also seen that ambiguity causing signals may or may not defer
decision making by the Target. If the Target perceives sustantial risk
in waiting for more data, he may act immediately, perhaps even before he
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would in the absence of the confusion producing signals. However, if
the Target's main goal is to maintain the status quo, confusion producing
signals will almost always stimulate procrastination.
Finally, we have seen that if one wishes to transmit misleading type
deceptions, he should keep their frequency below that of the normal error
rate in the channel. In this way he can be fairly certain to not be dis-
covered lying. Thus, one can use very reliable channels of communication
to deceive only on very rare occasions.
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FOOTNOTES
See, e.g., F.E. Emery, Systems Thinking (N.Y.: Penguin Books, 1969),
p. 281.
2William Reese, "Deceptions within a Communication Theory Framework,"
unpublished paper, (1980).
Sarbin refers in his notes to the "behavior stream," Sarbin, "Some
Psychological Dimensions of Deception," unpublished paper, (1980).
Sarbin, "Some Psychological Dimensions."
"Organism" is the general systems theory term for any living system
including groups, organizations and societies. See, e.g., James G. Miller,
Theory of Living Systems (N.Y.: John Wiley, 1979), p. 34.
Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1962), p. 82.
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